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MAIN CURRENTS OF EUROPEAN
HISTORY

1815-1915



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TORONTO

MAIN CURRENTS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY

1815-1915

BY

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TO THE MEMORY OF
MY DEAR AND ONLY SISTER
MARY AMELIA COBB DOWER
WHO ON 27TH MAY 1916 PASSED
“TO WHERE BEYOND THESE VOICES THERE IS PEACE”

PREFACE

THE substance of these ten lectures was delivered under the auspices of the London County Council to a large audience of teachers during the autumn of 1916.

The purpose of the lectures was not—what is normally a proper function of lectures—to excite interest ; for the audience was already professionally interested in the theme. Still less was it—what is rarely legitimate in lectures—to impart detailed information ; for the audience was already in possession of excellent text-books. The purpose was the lowly one of reducing a complex and confused century to comprehensible categories, of emphasising its dominant characteristics, of rendering it more readily teachable.

In order to achieve this purpose the lecturer divided the century chronologically into half a dozen consecutive periods, and tried to find in each period some single prevailing feature. No doubt this involved an artificial simplification of the subject, just

as the tabulation of the seven primary colours involves an unnatural disintegration of the indivisible unity of the rainbow, and an inadequate presentation of its splendour. But neither the tabulation of colours in the one case, nor the classification of historic phenomena in the other, need entail any departure from the truth ; and it is hoped that the lectures, if necessarily incomplete, were not misleading.

The lecturer further sought to give symmetry and coherence to the record of the century by grouping all its incidents round what seemed to him to have been the grand progressive tendency of the period, viz. the tendency towards the constitution of a lawful Commonwealth of Europe composed of democratic national states. The three controlling factors, or "main currents," in this movement, as it appeared to him, were, first, the underlying and inextinguishable consciousness of unity inherited by the peoples of the West from the Roman Empire and Mediæval Christendom ; secondly, the democratic impulse engendered by the French Revolution ; and, thirdly, the passion of nationality roused during the struggle against Napoleon I. To each of these controlling factors a preliminary lecture was devoted. The remaining seven lectures traced the operation of the three factors—their action and interaction—down to the outbreak of the present great war. The tragedy

of the century, as it displayed itself from the point of view here assumed, consisted in the frustration of the beneficent movement towards a federated Continent peacefully administered under recognised international law by, first, the blind antagonism of reactionaries, and, secondly, the mad perversity, much more fatal in its results, of revolutionists idealogues and fanatics. Democracy and nationality more than most good causes have suffered from the follies of their friends.

The lectures were delivered extemporaneously, with the aid of outlines exhibited on a blackboard. At the close of the course, when the lecturer thought that his work was done, a general wish was expressed that he should put the lectures into writing for purposes of reference. Accordingly he devoted his scanty leisure during the opening months of the present year to the dull task of slowly retracing in melancholy solitude, pen in hand, the paths over which he had lightly passed during the preceding autumn in the inspiring company of his auditors. He can only trust that the result is not too disappointing and depressing.

In conclusion, he wishes to express his special thanks to Sir Robert Blair, Education Officer to the London County Council, without whose kind encouragement and support the lectures would have been neither delivered nor published; and to

Professor A. J. Grant, of the University of Leeds, who, without necessarily endorsing the lecturer's opinions, has carefully revised his proofs with a view to the elimination of errors respecting matters of fact.

F. J. C. HEARNSHAW.

KING'S COLLEGE,
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON,
27th May 1917.

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INTRODUCTION

§ 1. HISTORY TEACHING IN ENGLAND

UNTIL recently the teaching of history in England has run on narrowly restricted lines. In secondary schools it has commonly been limited to classical antiquity on the one hand, and to the mother-country on the other. In each case it has been treated rather as an appendage to linguistic studies than as an independent subject, and in each case it has stopped short just when it was becoming historically most interesting and politically most important. The reading of Greek history has been carried precisely to the point when the conquests of Alexander extended Greek influence over the world, and then, because the Greek language lost its Attic purity, it has been suspended. The story of Rome has on the same principle been diligently studied in countless seminaries of sound learning and religious education down to the battle of Actium; but then, at the very crisis when Rome became imperial and world-dominant, merely because the golden age of

meticulous Latinity was over, the veil of ignorance has been allowed to remain unrent. Similarly English history—which also has been too much regarded as a literary subject, the handmaid of parsing and analysis, the vehicle for the inculcation of a good narrative style—has not only persistently ignored Wales Scotland and Ireland, but has remained almost silent concerning the building of the British Empire (incomparably the most important phenomenon of the eighteenth century) and has generally stopped short at 1815, the very date from which most of the problems of modern international politics have had their origin.

In elementary schools the case has been still worse. Until 1900 history was an optional subject, and an unpopular one, and as such was scarcely taught at all.¹ Experience revealed to astute teachers and managers the fact that it was a poor medium for the earning of grants. In the rare schools where attention was paid to it nothing beyond English history in the narrowest sense of the term was ever attempted—unless the inculcation of legends concerning such things as burning cakes, persevering spiders, poisoned daggers, and undigested lampreys be regarded as belonging rather to the realm of cosmopolitan imagination. Since 1900 history has

¹ Professor H. L. Withers, presenting a *Memorandum on the Teaching of History* in London School in 1900, stated that only "about four children out of every hundred took history as a class subject."

been compulsory : but its scope has remained almost as restricted as before. The net result has been that boys and girls have left school, whether secondary or elementary, in lamentable ignorance of just those departments of history which, from the point of view of citizenship, it is most necessary they should know. Nor have the universities, until the last few years, done much to remedy this defect in general education, even in the case of the small percentage of students who carry on their historical reading beyond their school years. They, too, have concentrated too much on English history, and have conspicuously avoided contact with anything that happened in the nineteenth century.¹

The consequences have been serious. Just as neglect of Welsh Scottish and Irish history has allowed unnecessary barriers of ignorance and prejudice to retard the complete unification of the three kingdoms and the principality ; just as the curious failure of our educationists to make use of that most fascinating of all authentic historical romances, the story of the expansion of England, has helped to prevent that most urgent of all administrative problems, the federation of the Empire, from coming within the range of practical politics ; so has neglect of Continental history in general, and

¹ Cf. Dr. G. W. Prothero, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 1904, pp. 12-31. The younger universities, particularly those in the north of England, have been the pioneers in the departure from this evil insular tradition.

failure to follow the course of events in the nineteenth century in particular, led to disastrous results. The British democracy has remained ignorant of its international responsibilities, unaware of its treaty-obligations, blind to foreign sources of peril, unacquainted with the essential conditions of national security and peace. There are some at the present moment who are raising a cry for democratic control of foreign policy. It is not power of control that the British democracy lacks in respect of foreign policy : its sovereignty is equally supreme in all departments of state. What it lacks is interest and knowledge. When on rare occasions it has been moved by affairs abroad, and has given attention to them, it has speedily and effectively manifested its capacity for action. For instance, the general elections of both 1880 and 1885 turned primarily on questions of international and imperial politics : in the first the democracy punished with overwhelming defeat Disraeli's truckling to the Turk ; in the second it showed its equally severe condemnation of Gladstone's incompetent handling of the problems which had arisen in the Transvaal the Soudan Egypt and Persia. In normal circumstances, however, the British electorate remains indifferent to affairs that lie beyond the borders of domestic policy ; nor do the leaders of the various parties encourage their followers to impair their fighting powers or mitigate their mutual animosities by

dwelling on concerns of general national interest about which it might be possible and indeed necessary that they should co-operate with their rivals. The genius of party politics requires that every proposition laid before the electorate, no matter how axiomatic, should be couched in the form of a challenge to mortal combat. Hence the permanent postulates of British diplomacy, the clear and unchanging essentials of imperial foreign policy, even the public and long-contracted treaty-obligations of the government are sealed mysteries to the mass of uninstructed voters. Take the crucial question of the neutrality of Belgium, which was the immediate cause of Britain's entry into the present war. In this matter there was no unsuspected entanglement of secret diplomacy. From the time of the Norman Conquest to the present day it has been the fixed preoccupation of every English government to prevent the Low Countries from passing into the hands of a potentially hostile great power. It was for this end that Edward III. fought Philip VI. of France, that Elizabeth fought Philip II. of Spain, that William III. fought the Grand Monarch, and George III. Napoleon. The Congress of Vienna, 1815, laboured to secure the independence of the Netherlands; public treaties of 1831, 1839, and 1870—to all of which Britain was a party—guaranteed Belgian neutrality. Yet the British public remained ignorant of the whole business, and when Germany precipitated the crisis

of August 1914 by invading Belgium, popular education in respect of our international obligations and interests had to begin from the very rudiments. It is not the machinations of secret diplomatists but general ignorance and apathy that, except on rare occasions, have prevented the democracy from exercising control over foreign affairs. When one considers how little the electorate knows of European politics, and how little it cares about Continental concerns ; when one observes, moreover, how unreasonable and bellicose uninformed public opinion tends to become at times of excitement, one can only feel thankful that hitherto democracy has been content not to interfere. But it is urgently necessary, both for the welfare of the Empire and the peace of the world, that for the future the British people should seriously and intelligently face their imperial duties and their international responsibilities. In order that they may do this, it is imperative that their education should include much more history than it has hitherto done, and history of a far wider scope than has heretofore been common. They must learn not only how the English constitution and the existing social and economic conditions of Britain came into being ; they must also be made familiar with the inspiring but solemnising story of the growth of the Empire, and with the leading lines of the development of modern Europe. For history serves three pre-eminent functions in the

education of the citizen : it provides a school of political method ; it supplies an inexhaustible store of examples and precedents ; and it furnishes indispensable knowledge of the antecedents of present-day problems.¹

§ 2. THE PLACE OF RECENT HISTORY IN EDUCATION

From the point of view of citizenship history grows in importance in proportion as it approaches the confines of the present day. Ancient history, it is true, is peculiarly valuable as a school of political method, because its problems have been worked out, its heated controversies have cooled, its essential factors have emerged, and can be studied at leisure and without passion.² Mediæval and early modern histories are specially rich in examples and precedents ; for the ages with which they deal were simpler and more intelligible than our own ; their extant records have been surveyed with some degree of completeness ; their story can be told with some approximation to finality, and as to some of the lessons which they teach there is a possibility of general agreement. But if ancient history supplies a good training in political method, and if mediæval and early modern

¹ For a fuller development of this thesis see *The Place of History in Education* by F. J. C. Hearnshaw, published in *History*, Original Series, vol. i. no. 1, London, Francis Hodgson, 1912.

² Cf. A. P. Stanley, *The Eastern Church*, Introductory Lecture.

histories are full of useful political precedents, it is precisely because they are divided by a wide gulf from present-day controversies. The questions which ages ago in the Athens of Pericles, the Rome of Cæsar, the Constantinople of Justinian, or the Florence of Lorenzo de' Medici excited furious conflict can now be examined with scientific detachment and calmness : they do not directly affect the lives of those now living. Valuable, however, as are the lessons to be derived from these more remote periods of human experience, it is on present-day controversies that the citizen requires light, and it is for light on present-day controversies that to history he primarily turns. The only history that serves his purpose is recent, even very recent, history. A knowledge of the main currents of nineteenth-century history is what he specially needs.

It is true that many problems, both of domestic and foreign politics, are much older than the nineteenth century, and that the specialist who wishes to trace them to their sources will have to search the secrets of far earlier periods. The poor-law problem, for example, has a continuous history from the time of the Reformation onwards ; the Irish problem from the days of the Wars of the Roses ; the Franco-German frontier question from the ninth-century Treaty of Verdun ; while the Eastern question of to-day is but a phase of that perennial conflict between Asia and Europe which has endured without

intermission from the age of Priam and Agamemnon to our own. The man in the street, however, does not want, and cannot be expected to acquire, information concerning the distant causes and the more remote phases of the practical problems with which he is called upon to deal. For him, in most cases, the essential facts lie within the limits of the century immediately preceding his own time. This is particularly true at the present moment respecting the century 1815-1915; for, on the one hand, the French Revolution with its attendant wars which culminated in the Treaties of Vienna, marked the founding of a New Europe conspicuously different from that which had preceded it; while, on the other hand, the outbreak of the present war equally clearly indicated the end of the era inaugurated at Vienna a hundred years before.

But, though from the civic standpoint the study of this recent history is of vital importance, it must be admitted that it is attended by peculiar difficulties. The two chief of these are, first, the objective difficulty of the complexity of the subject; secondly, the subjective difficulty of the prejudices of the student. As to the first, the masses of materials of all sorts that demand examination are so vast that one tends to be overwhelmed by mere quantity; moreover, on most matters differences of opinion, conflicts of evidence, incompleteness of information, and even deliberate falsifications are so serious as to

make the search for truth infinitely laborious ; finally, the variety of subjects — political, social, economic, religious, literary, scientific, artistic, philosophical—that come within the scope of recent history, all of them important, is so great that it is a matter of extraordinary perplexity to discover unifying principles, leading lines, main currents, without which the accumulation of masses of detailed information has no educational value whatsoever. As to the second, or subjective, difficulty ; the fact that the problems dealt with by the student in recent history are the same as those which confront him as a citizen in practical politics, makes it impossible for him to approach them with that detachment of mind which is necessary for the highest type of scientific investigation. Political opinion inevitably warps historical judgment. It is hard for the historical student to be impartial towards nations who have lately been, or who are now, at war with his own ; it is not easy for him to be just to statesmen whose policy, he believes, has resulted in the widespread calamities of the present ; it is beyond human capacity for him to be sympathetic or wholly equitable in examining movements whose current operations he regards as mischievous. Similarly, he cannot fail to be biassed in favour of peoples, parties, politicians, and propensities whose present-day manifestations he approves. The utmost he can do is to bear constantly in mind the fact that he is necessarily

subject to these limiting prejudices, and that they are most perverting where they are least suspected ; to be ceaselessly on his guard against them, even though he knows that he cannot entirely overcome them ; and to realise that, owing to their inevitable influence, his results must necessarily lack finality, and can in the nature of things be regarded as no more than an interim report pending the appearance, generations hence, of the fully-informed and dispassionate revelation of how things actually occurred —*wie es eigentlich gewesen war*. Consideration of these two inherent and unavoidable difficulties in the study of recent history makes it evident that it is a subject suitable only for mature intelligences. It is particularly appropriate for students in universities, training colleges, adult schools, and tutorial classes ; but in secondary and elementary schools it is useless to attempt to teach it except in the highest standards, and even there only by means of simplified outlines. The idea, popular some years ago, of teaching history backwards, of starting from the present day and working towards prehistoric times, showed an extraordinary ignorance of educational psychology. The underlying assumption that a child is familiar with the world he lives in, and that the age of the tree-dwellers and the cave-men is unknown to him, is an amazing perversion of fact. It is precisely this strange, highly-articulated, heterogeneous, and ephemeral civilisation into which he is

born that needs explaining and interpreting to him ; he brings into it, as an inheritance from an immemorial ancestry, an uncanny familiarity with fairies and genii, with wild men of the woods and companionable beasts, with primitive ways of life and the passions of rudimentary society. The policeman, whom some would take as the centre from which his civic education is to start, is a horrible and insoluble mystery to him ; it is the giants who dwelt upon the earth in the days before the flood who alone are fully comprehensible. As he grows up, as his mind expands, as his experience widens, he will find that the culture-epochs of the world's history nicely correspond to the stages of the development of his intelligence. But, as I have already said, it is only when he begins to attain the mental stature of the full-grown man that the significance of recent history can be grasped and the difficulties of its study overcome.

§ 3. TWO METHODS OF STUDY

There are two ways of dealing with recent European history ; both are exemplified in well-known modern text-books. The first way is to take the countries of the Continent one by one, and trace the development of each in turn ; the second and more usual is to assume an international point of view and treat the Continent as a whole. Mr. E. Lipson in his valuable *Europe in the Nineteenth*

Century adopts the first. In his preface he says : "The traditional method of writing European history from the standpoint of international politics has been discarded in this volume in favour of a method of treatment which gives a concise and connected account—analytical rather than narrative—of the internal development of the chief European states after the fall of Napoleon." This method, he thinks, "is more helpful for students and general readers." Professor C. M. Andrews of Yale University and M. Charles Seignobos of the University of Paris apparently hold the same opinion, for they have made the national principle the basis of their respective works.¹ So, too, in the main have the editors of the *Cambridge Modern History*. The majority of writers, however, take the other point of view. "The method of dealing with the history of each nation separately and continuously has many advantages," admits Mr. Sydney Herbert in the preface to his excellent little handbook on *Modern Europe* ; "but," he adds, "these were outweighed in my mind by the desire to describe the forces moulding Europe as a whole." I have no hesitation in expressing my complete agreement with Mr. Herbert and—if he will allow me to do so—in taking my stand by his side. Like him, I freely recognise that there are advantages to be gained by

¹ C. M. Andrews, *The Historical Development of Modern Europe, 1815-1897* ; C. Seignobos, *A Political History of Europe since 1814*.

the disintegration of the history of Europe into the histories of its constituent states. For one thing it greatly simplifies the task of the writer ; for another it emphasises the cardinal fact that each state has a unity of its own, and, when it is a national state, a quasi-organic unity, an individuality a spirit and a soul ; it enables the distinctive characteristics of each state to be indicated, the lines of its peculiar development to be traced, the workings of its special institutions to be explained, the nature of its particular problems to be emphasised. But over against these advantages has to be set the heavily countervailing disadvantage that it obscures the real and growing unity of Europe which was one of the dominating features of nineteenth-century history. No fact is in need of stronger or more constant iteration than this. Particularly is that the case in books written by English writers for English readers ; for insularity is the besetting sin of the Briton, and the history of his country has almost always been presented to him without any indication of the countless links that connect it with the history of the larger world beyond his narrow seas. It comes as a revelation to him—an immeasurably salutary and indeed indispensably necessary revelation—that the currents that have moved in his domestic affairs have been but local manifestations of the mighty tides that have ebbed and flowed in the wider waters of the Continent, and in the ocean of Humanity.

§ 4. THE UNITY OF EUROPE

The impress of unity was first stamped upon Europe by the Roman power. Britain France Spain Portugal Italy the Netherlands Switzerland South Germany Austria Hungary the Balkan States and Rumania all comprise territories that enjoyed the inestimable blessings of the Roman discipline, the security of the Roman peace, the educative protection of the Roman authority, the unifying influence of the superb Roman administration, the centralising attraction of the great cosmopolitan city where dwelt the emperor, lord of the civilised world, whence radiated the roads that linked to the common metropolis the uttermost parts of the vast domain, whither gravitated all that was most potent in all lands. The consolidating effects of the Roman law, the Latin language, the imperial religion, the common administrative system were such that they triumphantly survived the incursions of the barbarians and the disruption of the empire. They were, moreover, powerfully reinforced by the equitable principles of the Stoic philosophy which taught that in the light of Nature human distinctions vanish away, and later by the universal philanthropy of the Christian faith which proclaimed a brotherhood that recognised no essential difference between Jew and Gentile, or even between Roman and Barbarian. Thus when the Roman empire passed away as a governing force in the

West, its name and its influence endured, and indeed still endure. For no country that has ever been Roman has wholly lost its cosmopolitan consciousness, its sense that it is but a part of a larger whole. It is the lands that never passed beneath the beneficent tutelage of Rome—in particular Teutonic North-Germany and Celtic Ireland—wherein has grown and flourished that self-bounded exclusive and intolerant nationalism which has now plunged both the Continent and the British Isles into war.

The Roman tradition of unity was carried through the thousand years of the Middle Ages by the Catholic Church. The peoples of Western Christendom formed for religious purposes—which were a good deal more inclusive than they are now—a single society. It was the *Respublica Christiana*; whose spiritual head was the Pope, whose Councils were œcumenical, whose monastic and military orders were international, whose language and law were the same throughout all lands, whose creed ritual and mode of government were uniform and universal.

The Reformation, which was accompanied—though whether as cause or effect is matter of dispute—by the formation of the modern national states, broke up the ecclesiastical unity of the Middle Ages. But it did not destroy the idea of the oneness of Christendom; and efforts continued to be made both by political theorists and by practical statesmen to establish some sort of a Concert of Europe, to

maintain some sort of a balance of power, to secure general recognition for some sort of international law. This is not the place in which to treat of the schemes of Sully, St. Pierre, Leibnitz, and Kant for the founding of a Continental commonwealth; nor is it possible here to trace the laborious development of an authoritative law of nations at the hands of a succession of eminent jurists.¹ Suffice it to say that, in spite of countless wars, the conception of the community of Christendom—the Christendom of the Middle Ages together with its modern offshoots—continued more and more firmly to establish itself, and increasingly to extend the sphere of its influence. A western civilisation was developed in which the factors common to all the constituent nations constantly became larger more numerous and more important. Law literature art science philosophy education commerce and finance all grew to be international and even cosmopolitan.² The peoples of Europe and their kinsmen across the Atlantic were brought into ever closer contact with one another by means of steadily improving means of communication, by the spreading habit of travel, and by the formation of numerous international societies. In politics, too, it became more and more the custom for the Powers to act in

¹ Readers who wish to pursue these themes may be referred to W. O. Manning, *Law of Nations*, 1875, and Ramsay Muir, *Nationalism and Internationalism*, 1916.

² Cf. *The Unity of Western Civilisation*, a series of instructive essays, edited by F. S. Marvin, 1915.

concert, to meet in congresses, to deliberate in common concerning matters of general interest, and to take joint action. The nineteenth century—which began with the military federation of Europe against Napoleon and ended with the pacific conference at the Hague—more than all its predecessors saw the development of the international idea. The primacy of the Great Powers became an accomplished fact; an earthly authority higher than that of the sovereign independent state actually came into existence; the law of nations acquired a new and effective guarantee; joint protectorates were established over small powers such as Belgium and Switzerland; countless questions (especially those relating to Eastern Europe Asia Africa and Oceania), which in earlier centuries undoubtedly would have led to war, were settled by the means of joint diplomatic discussion. There seemed good hope that a veritable Commonwealth of Europe would be established, and that the justice which it would administer would render war between the civilised nations of the Continent impossible. This is the fact that needs emphasising if the significance of the century is to be understood; and it is precisely this fact which is occulted if the history of the century is told in a series of monographs on individual states. This also is the fact that needs emphasising if the full meaning of the tragedy of 1914, and the full guilt of Germany in precipitating the war, are to be appreciated. For

the tragedy of 1914 lay in the destruction of the Commonwealth of Europe ; and the unpardonable crime of Germany was that, in her selfish lust for world-dominion, she withdrew from the society of her equals, plotted against them, rejected conference and arbitration, violated international guarantees, repudiated the *jus gentium*, and so undid at a blow the work of a dozen generations of devoted seekers after the ideal of a "Parliament of Man, a Federation of the World."

Such being the case, in the lectures which follow I deal with Europe as a whole, laying stress upon its unity, concentrating attention on movements that were common to all the great states of the Continent, showing the action and reaction of each country on the others, tracing the operation of a few dominant ideas in all alike, revealing as far as possible the main currents of the complex history of the century.

§ 5. WHAT ARE THE MAIN CURRENTS?

An answer to the question, Of what nature are the main currents of nineteenth-century history ? involves a confession of faith on the part of the respondent. He is compelled to state, explicitly or implicitly, what is his conception of history—to what school he belongs. Now modern conceptions of history are very various, and rival schools are numerous. There are, perhaps, still a

few survivors of an older day to whom history is a collection of biographies; to them the prime significance of the century would be found in the careers of Napoleon Metternich Cavour Bismarck and other outstanding men. Another class, represented by the authors of a recent *Graphic History of Modern Europe*,¹ concentrate their attention on picturesque incidents (largely sanguinary), and regard nothing as important which lacks the elements of adventure and romance: to them the hundred years are dominated by conquests fights for freedom explorations and discoveries. Neither of these groups of writers, whose works appeal primarily to the man in the street or the boy in the holidays, need be taken into serious account. But, besides these, there are four schools of scientific historians whose views command careful consideration. First may be placed the intellectualists, led by Döllinger in Germany and Acton in England, to whom the motive forces in human affairs are ideas—religious beliefs, political principles, philosophical conceptions, scientific theories: to them the events of history are merely external phenomena, manifestations of spiritual energies; and for them the main currents of any period would have to be sought in the realms of thought. A second school, specially associated with the name of Professor Lamprecht of Leipsig, emphasises what it calls the socio-psychological

¹ Morris and Dawson, *Graphic History of Modern Europe*, London, 1916.

factors in historic causation ; points out the impotence of mind in conflict with appetite, and the insignificance of the sentient individual as compared with the insensate masses ; finds in national character and its determinants the key to history's secrets. Says an English disciple of this school : "The great movements which history records have in every case been irrational. They have come to life not as the result of intellectual statement or appeal, but always in obedience to forces at first so obscure, and in the day of their power so complicated and diverse that it is impossible to isolate them, or name them, or relate them to man's average behaviour."¹ A third important group of historians, of whom Thorold Rogers was the pioneer in this country and Roscher (followed by Marx, Wagner and Schmoller in Germany), declare for an avowedly economic interpretation of history : to them developments in industry and commerce, movements in wages and prices, changes in the condition of the people, social evolution, are the significant things, and along these lines they would look for the distinctive characteristics of the nineteenth century. The fourth and last school of historians, which includes the overwhelming majority of the writers of all countries, holds that the main currents of modern European history are to be found within the realm of politics ; that the life of the state is the central fact of the existing

¹ J. A. Hutton in *Hibbert Journal*, July 1905.

western civilisation, and that history is primarily a record of the being and the doing of organised civic communities. It is this last view which, with certain qualifications, is adopted in the lectures that follow. I say "with certain qualifications" because I have no sympathy with that extreme form of this doctrine which was held and illustrated by Freeman and Seeley, the leaders of the English historical school of a generation ago. To them history was merely past politics, and past politics in the narrowest sense of the term. They limited their purview to state papers, and they had rigid and restricted conceptions of the sphere and functions of the state. Thus their writings necessarily ignored and excluded many highly efficient factors—religious moral intellectual social economic—in historic development. It was against the restriction of their outlook upon human affairs that John Richard Green's *Short History of the English People* was an embodied protest. Nevertheless, although Green protested against the restriction of outlook, he did not change the point of view. This to him remained political. It was, as he tells us in his preface, because he perceived that "constitutional progress has been the result of social development," and because he recognised that "political history is the outcome of social changes," that he devoted "attention to the religious intellectual and industrial progress of the nation." He had, in fact, an ampler conception of the nature

and meaning of the state than his predecessors had achieved. He anticipated in effect Professor Bernard Bosanquet's declaration that "the state is not merely the political fabric, but includes the entire hierarchy of institutions by which life is determined, from the family to the trade, and from the trade to the church and the university," and that "it includes all of them, not as the mere collection of the growths of the country, but as the structures which give life and meaning to the political whole, while receiving from it mutual adjustment."¹ In this view political movements — constitutional changes, administrative developments, legislative reforms, international agreements, imperial expansions, peace and war — are the final outcome and the concentrated expression of all the influences of all sorts that operate in society. They are the supreme manifestation of the spirit of the age. The writer, therefore, who has to confine himself to depicting the leading characteristics of a modern era, such as the nineteenth century, and has to limit himself to indicating the main currents of its history, will fix his attention upon its political phenomena; and he will do so because he knows not only that they are the most significant things, but also that he cannot understand or explain them without taking into account all the dominant ideas, all the chief social changes, all the principal economic developments, all the

¹ Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 150.

effective religious revivals which have marked the period.

Regarded from this political point of view, the most striking feature of the century has already been noted. It was the growth of the unity of Europe, the building up, on the basis of a common civilisation and by means of an expanding body of international law morality and custom, of a commonwealth of nations—until at the end of the period Germany wrecked the structure. The second feature was the powerful operation of the spirit of nationality, which emphasised the existence of divergences within the European unity and insisted that the members of the Continental commonwealth should be national states—a principle fatal to the existence of the Austrian and Ottoman Empires. The third feature was the growth of democracy, the varyingly successful demand on the part of the Many who constituted the national units, that they should assume the control of their own destinies by means of some form of representative government—a form of government most obnoxious to the militarist despots of Central Europe. It is with these three features—the growth of the European community, the development of nationality, the spread of democracy—that the ensuing lectures mainly deal.¹

¹ The first three treat of their rise and development during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era ; the remaining seven trace their evolution during the succeeding century.

Those who follow the line of study indicated in the lectures will find that each of these three movements was extremely complex, that each changed its direction from time to time, and that each acted and reacted upon the others, sometimes advancing harmoniously with them, sometimes crossing them in conflict. They will further discover that what at first sight appear to have been separate movements—as, for example, cosmopolitanism and humanitarianism, imperialism and militarism, socialism and syndicalism—were really tributary to the three main movements. Thus cosmopolitanism was a visionary and undesirable extension of internationalism ; imperialism was an outcome of the potent national principle ; socialism was affiliable to democracy. Finally, they will observe that all these movements were allied in the most intimate manner with the popular changes, the economic revolutions, the scientific discoveries, the mechanical inventions, the philosophical speculations, the educational advances, the religious activities, for which the century was so notable.

§ 6. TEXT-BOOKS

These lectures are not intended to give detailed information concerning the history of the nineteenth century. They are intended, first, to furnish some guidance as to general principles ; secondly, to indicate sources of further knowledge.

A table of the chief text-books in the English language is appended, those specially recommended being marked by an asterisk. Fuller bibliographies, including text-books in foreign tongues, will be found in the *Cambridge Modern History* and in Dr. Hazen's *Europe since 1815*, (pp. 737-772). At the end of each lecture lists of supplementary references for further reading will be found. These supplementary lists do not include references to any books named in the general table here given.

It will be noted that the books in the subjoined table are arranged in order of date of publication, and, further, that a line of demarcation is drawn between works published before and works published after the outbreak of the war. These are matters of considerable importance. On the one hand, new information from state papers, memoirs, monographs, and other sources is so constantly coming to light that text-books on recent history tend rapidly to become obsolete; on the other hand, the outbreak of the war has thrown such a flood of illumination upon the international politics of the past half century that every previous judgment needs reconsideration. The student is recommended to study the period in at least two text-books, one written before 1914 and one after.

[TABLE

TEXT-BOOKS

Date of Publication.	Author.	Title.	Period covered.	Publisher.	Price.
1880-89	Fyffe, C. A.	Modern Europe	1792-1878	Cassell	10/6
1880-96	Mackenzie, R.	Nineteenth Century	1800-1880	Nelson	7/6
1896-1909	Andrews, C. M.	Modern Europe	1815-1897	Putnam	10/6
1901	*Phillips, W. A.	Modern Europe	1815-1899	Livingtons	6/- net
1901	*Seignobos, C.	Contemporary Europe	1814-1900	Heinemann	12/6 net
1905-15	*Rose, J. H.	European Nations	1870-1914	Constable	7/6 net
1907-10	Ward, etc.	Cam. Mod. History, x.-xii.	1815-1910	C. U. Press	16/- net each
1908	Dyer & Hassall	Modern Europe, vol. vi.	1815-1900	Bell	3/6
1909	Marriott, J. A. R.	Modern Europe	1789-1878	Methuen	2/6
1910	Hazen, C. D.	Europe since 1815	1815-1910	Bell	10/6 net
1910	Jane, L. C.	Metternich to Bismarck	1815-1878	Clarendon Press	4/6
1911	Jeffery, R. W.	New Europe	1789-1889	Constable	8/6 net
1912	Hawkesworth, C.	Last Century	1814-1910	Arnold	5/- net
...
1915	*Terry, C. S.	Short History	1806-1914	Routledge	6/- net
1916	Hasluck, E. L.	Short History	1789-1914	L. U. Press	3/-
1916	*Hayes, C. J. H.	Modern Europe	1815-1915	Macmillan	10/- net
1916	*Herbert, S.	Modern Europe	1789-1914	Macmillan	2/6 net
1916	Lipson, E.	Europe in 19th Century	1815-1914	Black	4/6 net
1916	Morris, J. E.	Europe in 19th Century	1815-1878	C. U. Press	2/6 net
1916	Smith, G. B.	Outlines of European History	1814-1914	Arnold	2/6

PART I
CONTROLLING FACTORS

LECTURE I

DEMOCRACY AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

§ 7. ARRIVAL OF THE THIRD ESTATE

UNTIL the outbreak of the present war the French Revolution was generally recognised as the most important event in modern European history. It marked the definite entry of a new and dominant force into Continental politics—the force of the third estate, the vanguard of the democracy. Ever since the close of the Middle Ages this third estate had been making its way towards the front: now it broke down the last of the mediæval barriers which hitherto had prevented it from occupying the place to which its members and its capacities gave it a valid claim.

Mediæval society had consisted of three grades, viz. the prayers, the fighters, and the workers. They had formed ideally a trinity in unity, for each grade was supposed to perform its function not only on its own behalf but also on behalf of the whole *Respublica Christiana*. The circumstances

however, of the long and distressful period of the Middle Ages militated against the real equality of the three orders, and gave uncontested pre-eminence to the first and second over the third. The clergy, by reason of the magnitude of their uncontested supernatural claims, exercised indisputable sway over the mind and conscience of a believing Christendom, and by reason of their monopoly of clerkship necessarily possessed an almost equal ascendancy in the world of politics. The feudal nobility, because of the lawlessness and insecurity of the time, and because the art of war as then known gave military supremacy to horse-riders armour-wearers and castle-dwellers, had a monopoly of material power. In other words, the first estate controlled the moral and intellectual forces, the second estate the physical and economic forces of those dark centuries. That they did so was not due to usurpation or tyranny or lust for dominion on their part, but was inevitable in the circumstances. For the commonalty, though numerous, was incapable of either self-government or self-defence. Still, barbaric superstitious undisciplined illiterate disorganised, still haunted by demons and oppressed by brigands, a prey to superstitions and invading hordes, it was wholly dependent on the tutelage of the clergy and the protection of the warrior-lords.

With the Renaissance—that is, with the advent of that great period of transition from the mediæval

to the modern which began in the thirteenth century and extended to the sixteenth—conditions changed. The period of tutelage came to an end. The third estate began to proclaim its independence. The Church lost the monopoly of knowledge; the lay mind became educated emancipated and sceptical; the individual conscience grew active inquisitive and rebellious. Similarly the advent of the pike the cross-bow the long-bow and firearms revolutionised the art of war and destroyed the military value of both armour and castle. The protective suzerainty of the feudal magnates, no longer either necessary or effective, assumed the appearance of a tyranny to be repudiated and thrown off. Courtrai Bannockburn and Crecy were portentous triumphs of the third estate, armed with the new weapons, over the second. The third estate showed itself capable of self-defence, and began to organise vigorous measures for the security of life and property. At the same time as these revolutionary changes in the political world, and in the closest connection with them, industry and commerce developed, wealth increased, towns sprang up, definite artisan and merchant classes came into existence—classes so powerful and important that even kings found it prudent to make alliance with them and call them to parliament and council. The third estate began to take its place as a governing factor by the side of the first and second. The third estate, however, in late

mediæval and early modern times, was but a small and restricted order : it consisted, indeed, of little more than a new urban aristocracy of merchant princes, master-craftsmen, and lawyers. The mass of the commonalty, the smaller artisans and the peasants, were outside its effective limits : they were passive members who remained impotent and incapable.

The process of the emancipation and enfranchisement of this passive proletariat was late and slow, and it varied much from country to country. It is not, in fact, even yet complete. But, once again, it must be clearly understood that its long exclusion from power has not been primarily due to the jealousy and oppression of the ruling orders, nor yet to the pride and tyranny of kings ; it has been fundamentally due to the fact that the peoples as a whole, by reason of ignorance and inexperience, have been unfitted to perform political functions.

The appearance of a politically-capable third estate—a small but wealthy potent and alert middle class—was first manifest in the mediæval city-states of Italy the Netherlands and Germany ; but the communities in which it displayed its activities were too small and unstable to maintain themselves in the modern world of national states. Next England, secure in its insularity, developed a powerful order of merchants and lawyers, reinforced by yeomen and country gentry—an order which in the seventeenth

century was strong enough to overthrow the monarchy, eject the clergy, dismiss the nobility, and assume control of the state. The Great Rebellion and its sequel, the Revolution of 1689, form together the cardinal event in English history, and one that has had the most far-reaching effect upon subsequent Continental affairs. This effect, however, was not immediately evident: indeed, for the space of a hundred years it was limited to the region of political ideas. The condition of Europe down to the close of the eighteenth century was not such as to favour the development of democracy. Constant wars and rumours of wars necessitated the maintenance of military monarchies with large standing armies. The feudalised nobility was generally so numerous and so firmly established that it was able to retain its mediæval ascendancy. The clergy, though they lost their spiritual authority and ceased to command either the intellectual or the moral respect of the educated laity, succeeded through the support of kings and aristocracies, and through their hold over the illiterate, in clinging to the properties and privileges which their predecessors had secured in the ages of faith. The effective third estate, the *bourgeoisie*, though growing in numbers in wealth in knowledge in experience of practical affairs and in administrative capacity, found itself excluded from social recognition intellectual freedom and political influence. It was an anomalous situation, a gross anachronism. Most

revolutions are caused by anachronisms ; and it was not new burdens but a new unwillingness to bear old burdens that caused the outbreak in 1789. Continued exclusion from power would in the eighteenth century scarcely have been tolerable if monarchy had been efficient, aristocracy public-spirited, the hierarchy saintly : it was wholly insufferable where the king was incompetent, nobles pleasure-seeking and unserviceable, bishops unbelieving and immoral. Nowhere was the anomaly so flagrant as it was in France. In this country the monarchy, which had gathered all political power into its own hands, was hopelessly decadent and bankrupt ; the nobility, which had ceased to perform any useful public functions, was merely parasitic : the upper ranks of the clergy were filled by men notoriously unspiritual. On the other hand the third estate was more than ready to enter upon its heritage of influence in state affairs, of social equality and intellectual independence. Since it is necessary that the condition of the third estate should be clearly realised if the significance of the French Revolution and its influence throughout the nineteenth century are to be accurately understood, a brief indication of the essential facts must be attempted.

§ 8. THE THIRD ESTATE IN FRANCE

Some historians of the French Revolution preface their narrative of its lurid events by a description of

the deplorable situation of the peasantry of Europe in general and France in particular at the close of the eighteenth century. They imply, first, that the peasantry was more oppressed and wretched then than it had ever been before, and, secondly, that it was the peasantry which, goaded beyond endurance by its sufferings, made the Revolution. Neither of these implications is correct.

First, as to the condition of the peasantry. True, it was, according to modern standards, bad. But, on the one hand, it was not worse than it had been in previous periods : rather, under the influences of scientific agriculture and of humanitarian sentiment, it was steadily and even rapidly improving. On the other hand, so far from being specially bad in France, it was distinctly better there than it was in Germany Italy Spain and Russia. The main grievances of the peasantry were that it bore a disproportionately heavy share of the national taxation, that it was painfully burdened with dues for the Church, and that it was harassed by a number of vexatious feudal incidents. It did not resent its exclusion from political power ; for it had never regarded political power as part of its heritage, and it had no knowledge of, or interest in, affairs of state. Left to itself, though no doubt it would have continued to murmur and complain against the hardness of its lot, it certainly would not have risen in rebellion. It had neither the capacity nor the inclination for heroic action. Only when the Revolu-

tion was in full progress did it tumultuously join in, seizing the occasion to get rid of its burdens and give vent to its passions.

Secondly, as to the makers of the Revolution. It was not, as we have just remarked, the oppressed peasantry with whom it originated. Nor yet was it the much more active and energetic proletariat of Paris and the other great towns; though this mighty anarchic mob early entered the arena and secured control of events. No; it was the enlightened *bourgeoisie* to whom the revolutionary movement was due. Save for a few stray nobles, such as Lafayette and Mirabeau, and a few rare clerics, such as Siéyès and Talleyrand, all the early leaders, and most of the later ones, came from the middle class—the class of lawyers, doctors, philosophers, men of science and letters, merchants, financiers. This class, as a whole, held most of the wealth of France; it bore the main burden of taxation; it supplied the bulk of the frequent loans required by the Government. Moreover, it suffered more directly than any other through the inefficiency, obscurantism and corruption of the administration, and it stood to lose more heavily than any other in the event of that national bankruptcy which threatened in 1789. It was this class that was specially moved by the legends of the antique Romans, by the example of the English commons of the seventeenth century, and by the still more recent and more

striking object lesson of the revolt of the American colonies against the British monarchy. This class also had provided the fertile soil in which had sprung in the eighteenth century a rich harvest of disintegrating new ideas. It had read Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois*, and from its pages had imbibed a conception of the relativity of political institutions fatal to the doctrine of the divine right of the Bourbons; it had laughed over the scathing satires and droll stories of Voltaire, and had learned to share the great sceptic's profound contempt both for the clergy and the religion they professed; it had pondered the new gospel of equality proclaimed in Rousseau's *Contrat Social*, and had become profoundly convinced that there was no justification in the nature of things for either the superiority assumed, or the privileges enjoyed, by the first and second estates. The Revolution in its early stages was specially the work of this illuminated *bourgeoisie*. The ideal at which it aimed at first was the modest and prosaic one of a constitutional monarchy similar to that established in England. It had no intention of sharing any political power it might acquire with either the urban or the rural masses. Said one of its leading spokesmen, Siéyès: "Tous les habitants d'un pays doivent y jouir des droits de citoyen *passif*; tous ont droit à la protection de leur personne, de leur propriété, de leur liberté, etc.; mais tous n'ont pas droit à prendre une part active dans

la formation des pouvoirs publics ; tous ne sont pas citoyens *actifs*. . . . Tous peuvent jouir des avantages de la société ; mais ceux-là seuls qui contribuent à l'établissement public sont comme les vrais actionnaires de la grande entreprise sociale. Eux seuls sont les véritables citoyens actifs, les véritables membres de l'association."¹

This is an eminently respectable, even conservative, sentiment, which Burke himself would not have hesitated to accept. It pictures an active governing third estate of well-to-do, well-educated taxpayers. It shows the *bourgeoisie* anxious to carry through a moderate reform of the constitution on the lines of the pacific English Revolution of 1689. It lays down the common-sense, middle-class principle that they who pay the piper shall call the tune. Such was the attitude of the men who began the Revolution. But those who begin a revolution are rarely those who end it. It is much easier to start the forces of change than it is to keep control over them. The assault that the *bourgeoisie* made upon the ramparts of the old régime opened a breach through which poured unexpected floods that in the end swept away the *bourgeoisie* itself, together with king nobles and clergy. Let us briefly note the causes and trace the course of the cataclysm.

¹ Siéyès to the Committee of the Constitution, July 20, 1789 : quoted Aulard, *Révolution Française*, p. 61.

§ 9. THE FRENCH STATES-GENERAL

The strength of the *bourgeoisie* in all countries has always been the power of the purse. It is a power by no means discreditable to those who possess it; for its possession by a specific class marks out that class as pre-eminently alert intelligent active resourceful efficient. Moreover, the control of money implies command of those means of education and those sources of experience which fit the men who enjoy them for public life. In England the power of the purse sufficed at an early stage in the national history to establish representatives of the third estate in political authority. In the thirteenth century, under John and his successors, first knights of the shire, then representatives of city and borough communities, secured recognition as permanent factors in the great council of the realm. From that period onward, though with many fluctuations, the power of the third estate increased until during the century following the Great Rebellion it became dominant. The secret of its success lay in the chronic poverty of the Crown. The maxim that 'the king should live of his own' was never in time of war a practical policy; from the fifteenth century it ceased to be a reasonable ideal even in time of peace. The monarch became dependent upon parliamentary supplies, and in order to secure them he was compelled to transfer to the

commons more and more of his royal prerogative. That the English commons were able without disaster to the state to undertake the work of government was due to the facts, first, that they had had a long tradition and experience of administration in local affairs ; secondly, that they had learned much of the art of rule in the conduct of voluntary associations such as industrial guilds and merchant companies ; and, thirdly, that sovereign power in politics was transferred to them slowly by means of a process extending over several centuries. The French *tiers état* had enjoyed none of these advantages. It formed but one of the three houses that constituted the French States-General (the counterpart of the English Parliament), and it effected no sort of alliance with either the estate of the nobles or the estate of the clergy. This was all the more serious because the country gentry—who in England, through their representatives the knights of the shire, amalgamated with the burgesses and formed the main strength of the mediæval House of Commons—ranked in France as the lower grade of the nobility. Hence the *tiers état* remained almost purely urban and bourgeois. Then, again, the growing and ultimately complete concentration of the French administration, combined with the strict control which the royal authority retained over all industrial and commercial associations, prevented the French commons from obtaining that apprenticeship in affairs which is the indispensable preliminary of

successful political activity. Finally, and most fatal of all to the development of an influential third estate, the French king was so great a feudal lord, and so richly endowed with permanent taxes, that to the end of the seventeenth century he was easily able, except on rare occasions, to live on his own resources. Hence the mediæval States-General never secured the power of the purse ; and consequently never obtained a share in legislation, never gained control over the administration, never attained even to a fixed constitution or an established position. In 1614 it quietly dropped out of existence ; and with its disappearance the third estate ceased to play any part in the political life of France. ✧

The eighteenth century, however, saw two movements, quite distinct and separate, whose converging courses brought them in 1789 to one and the same point, thus precipitating the Revolution. On the one hand, as we have already seen, the third estate made an immense advance in wealth and enlightenment ; it became prosperous cultivated sceptical critical, resentful of the anachronistic privileges of the other two estates and of its own continued exclusion from society and office. On the other hand, the autocratic state ceased to be self-supporting, ceased to pay its way, ceased even to be able to raise loans, ultimately ceased to be solvent. This is a fact of vital importance. Fiscal causes lay at the root of the Revolution.

Let us note the main stages of the Bourbons' road to ruin. The beginning of the downward financial course must be ascribed to Louis XIV.: the heavy expenses of his many wars, combined with the reckless extravagance of himself and his court exhausted the resources of both Crown and people. The evil and incapable Louis XV. pursued all the pernicious policies and practices of his predecessor, and added to them a negligence in public affairs and a corruption that at his death in 1774 left the monarchy both impoverished and disgraced. Then came the amiable but feeble and ill-fated Louis XVI. to the throne. He found the state on the verge of bankruptcy. The finances were in utter confusion. No accurate accounts were kept; none of any sort were issued. All that was known was that year after year income was inadequate to meet expenditure, and that it had to be supplemented by borrowing at increasingly monstrous rates of usury. The only hope of a return to solvency lay in a rigid economy, in a drastic purification of the services, and in a courageous taxation of the privileged orders of nobles and clergy, whose exemptions had long ceased to have any justification on the ground of public duties fulfilled. Louis XVI. was fortunate in having among his ministers two financiers of exceptional capacity, viz. Turgot the economist and Necker the banker. Both of them realised the gravity of the situation, and saw that the sole way

of salvation lay in retrenchment reform and reduction of privilege. The king, however, had neither clearness of intellect to grasp the problem presented to him, nor strength of will to support, against the opposition of court and council, his able and devoted advisers. Turgot and Necker in turn were dismissed when they made proposals unpalatable to the higher orders, and their places were given to ministers who were prepared to leave chaos undisturbed, abuses unreformed, privilege unrestricted. The old and fatal system of paying current expenses by means of loans was resumed until it ceased to be possible to raise any more. The final blow to French national solvency was struck when Louis, against his better judgment and against the warnings of all his prudent advisers, was dragged into war with Britain on behalf of the revolted American colonies. The French Revolution was the immediate nemesis of this adventure. Not only were the principles of rebellion and the ideas of republicanism disseminated broadcast through France, but at least a thousand million livres (some £40,000,000 sterling) were added to the already overwhelming public debt. Necker, called back to office in order to deal with the almost insoluble financial problem, could do no more than advise the calling of the States-General, in the hope that this obsolete assembly might find some way out of the *impasse*, either by gratifying and reassuring the perturbed third estate so that it would once more

open its money-bags, or by frightening and forcing the unhelpful first and second estates so that they would surrender their iniquitous claims to exemption and provide new sources of supply. Hence the summons to the States-General to meet in May 1789, and hence the occasion which the *bourgeoisie* had long and eagerly desired.

§ 10. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The French Revolution, which was inaugurated by the meeting of the States-General on May 5, 1789, has often been compared to the English Revolution of the seventeenth century. For English students, at any rate, the comparison is a suggestive one. There are certain superficial resemblances between the two events, especially in the financial causes, the rapid descent towards violence and regicide, and the culmination in military despotism. Charles I. is the counterpart of Louis XVI., and Cromwell of Napoleon. Many similarities in detail, moreover, are manifest, owing to the fact that the French leaders carefully studied English precedents and consciously imitated English models. But, in spite of superficial resemblances, the differences between the two movements are essential and profound.

First, whereas the English Revolution was primarily political, the French Revolution was primarily

social. What the Long Parliament attacked was the Stuart autocracy : the enemies whom Pym and his colleagues essayed to overthrow were Charles I. himself and his ministers. On the other hand, the majority of the States-General, and of the National Assembly into which the States-General transmuted itself, directed their assaults, not upon the monarchy or its officials, but upon the anomalous privileges of the upper classes. It was aristocratic monopoly of place, exemption from taxation, right of feudal exaction ; it was clerical immunity, sacerdotal jurisdiction, ecclesiastical extortion that were the objects of their declared antagonism. To the king they expressed and felt entire loyalty ; and if Louis XVI. had but possessed the capacity to lead a movement of reform, all the later and more tragic phases of the Revolution might have been avoided. He was welcomed at first with enthusiastic acclamation by the newly elected deputies of the third estate ; and it was only when he showed by repeated lapses and ineptitudes his inability to resist the reactionary pressure of the court, or to keep his promises to the people, that he became involved in the fate of the privileged social orders. The republicanism of the French Revolution was a late and secondary development ; it owed its triumph to the failure of Louis XVI. to rise to the height of his responsibilities and opportunities.

Secondly, whereas the watchword of the English

Revolution was "liberty," that of the French Revolution was "equality." True, the words *la liberté* were often on French lips; but their connotation was different from that of their English counterpart. They meant a deliverance from fetters which had long ceased to bind Englishmen; they expressed a demand for the removal of rigid social barriers and class restrictions, for the suppression of obsolete feudalities, for the emancipation of serfs, for the throwing of careers open to talents. They also meant the breaking down of provincial exclusiveness, the abolition of hindrances to internal freedom of trade and communication, the recognition of the policy of *laissez faire* and *laissez aller*. "Liberty," in fact, was to the deputies of the third estate merely a specialised form of that "equality" which it was their main purpose to secure. When they had attained to equality, they showed how little they understood or cared for liberty, in the English sense of the term, by establishing a more strict and all-embracing subordination of the individual to the state than had ever been known before, even in France.

Thirdly, whereas the English Revolution was organised and carried through by practical men of affairs—men who, like Cromwell, had had wide experience in local government, and men who, like Pym, had had a long apprenticeship in mercantile management,—the French Revolution was engineered by doctrinaires, idealogues, men of theories. The

English parliamentary leaders appealed to historic precedent, and their series of petitions and enactments constituted a Declaration of the Rights of Englishmen—rights traditional customary insular limited and precise, demonstrable by legal evidence. Quite otherwise, the orators of the French States-General appealed to philosophic principle, and made in universal terms a Declaration of the Rights of Man—rights abstract visionary intangible vague, subject to endless controversy. The difference between the English appeal to law and the French appeal to reason manifested itself in a thousand practical ways. The wilder spirits of the English Revolution could always be silenced or ruled out of court by the argument : It is not so in Magna Carta, or it was not so in the days of Edward Confessor and Alfred. The extremists of the French Revolution could not be silenced at all : they were able to meet abstract argument with abstract argument, and could claim to be as high authorities as their more conservative opponents in the interpretation of “the natural, the inalienable, the sacred rights of mankind.” Moreover, in France, neither moderates nor extremists had any practice in the conduct of public business : they met as strangers to one another in 1789 ; they were not organised in parties ; they had no recognised leaders ; their meetings were subject to no known rules of procedure ; no precise agenda concentrated their erratic energies. Neither king

nor ministers were quick enough or wise enough to seize the occasion and guide them into the paths of business-like and useful activity. Hence inevitably chaos supervened ; the moderates were overwhelmed by the fanatics ; all restraints were cast aside ; the forces of disorder were let loose, and France drifted into an anarchy which ultimately could be suppressed only by the military despotism of Napoleon. The Revolution got entirely out of hand. It proved itself potent for destruction, but incapable of distinguishing between good and bad in either the institutions or the persons among whom it ran amok, and powerless to build up a new social and political order on the ruins of that which it swept away. It will suffice for the purposes of this course of lectures to indicate in the briefest manner the chief stages in its tumultuous career.

§ II. COURSE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The French Revolution proper covered the five years from the meeting of the States-General on May 5, 1789, to the death of Robespierre, the incarnation of the evil genius of the movement, on July 28, 1794. Those who study the great upheaval in detail will find it convenient to divide the period into four nearly equal sections of some fifteen months each.¹ For our purpose, however, it is enough to indicate

¹ (1) Constitutional Development, May 1789–July 1790. (2) Conspiracy against the Constitution, July 1790–Autumn 1791. (3) Beginnings of Violence, Autumn 1791–January 1793. (4) Reign of Terror, January 1793–July 1794.

broadly the process by which power gradually passed from the hands of the prime movers of the Revolution into the hands of persons of whose very existence they were at first ignorant, of whose principles they would have vehemently disapproved, and from whose deeds they would have shrunk in horror.

The representatives of the third estate who appeared at Versailles on May 5, 1789, were almost without exception drawn from the *bourgeoisie*. The careful researches of recent investigators have revealed the fact that of the 621 members, no less than 360 were lawyers. Next in importance to this dominant company of the robe came a group of 130 monied men—merchants bankers financiers. Of the remainder, not more than ten can be assigned to any class lower than the middle. The estate of the clergy, whose representatives numbered 308 in all, included some 200 *curés* whose sympathies were rather with the third estate than with their own privileged superiors. The 285 nobles of the first estate formed an almost solid phalanx in defence of their own order.

No sooner had the States-General assembled than a confused but embittered constitutional struggle began respecting the elementary but fundamental question whether the three estates should meet separately and decide disputed issues by a vote in which any two estates would outweigh the third, or should meet all together in one great gathering of 1214 equals and determine contested matters by a

mere majority. It is clear that the question was vital to the third estate; and it is eloquent of the ineptitude of Louis XVI. and his ministers, that they should have allowed it to remain unanswered until the States-General had actually assembled, and until the problem had forced itself upon them as one that could no longer be evaded. Even then—at what, if they had but known it, was the crisis of their fate—they hesitated and procrastinated so long that the third estate took the decision out of their hands, and on June 17, 1789 proclaimed itself, together with such members of the other estates as should consent to join it, the National Assembly.¹ It was a veritable Declaration of Independence on the part of the third estate, and it was made still more emphatic three days later by the famous Oath of the Tennis Court, in which the newly constituted Assembly vowed not to allow itself to be dissolved until it had drawn up a constitution for France. The framing of a new constitution thus became the prime occupation of the revolutionary third estate and its supporters, and in recognition of this fact, on July 9, they changed their designation from “National” to “Constituent” Assembly. For over two years they continued their labours, much obstructed by the floods of their own oratory, and much bewildered by the discussion of unfathomable problems of

¹ The invitation to join the third estate was accepted by 149 clergy and 2 nobles.

abstract philosophy, until finally in the autumn of 1791 they produced the new scheme of government according to which France should be ruled by a Legislative Assembly of a single house, chosen by a strictly limited electorate of "active citizens," *i.e.* taxpayers. The king was to remain as nominal head of the executive ; but in the matter of legislation he was to have neither initiative nor more than suspensory veto. The way for this drastic change in the French constitution was prepared by a series of the most far-reaching reforms. The privileges of nobles and clergy were swept away ; feudalism and serfdom were suppressed ; game laws and manorial jurisdiction were abolished ; tithes were repudiated ; careers were opened to all ; the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* was drawn up and issued ; the mediæval provinces of France were displaced for purposes of local government by a geographical system of 83 departments ; Church property was secularised and a civil constitution of the clergy promulgated ; an attempt was made to deal with the financial problems which had been the original cause of the summons of the States-General by the issue of a paper currency.

The king and his ministers looked on helpless and inert while their authority was defied, their traditional claims ignored, and their immemorial prerogatives taken away. Far other, however, was the attitude of the proud nobility, the haughty hierarchy, and the indignant queen, the Austrian

Marie Antoinette. They were not prepared to surrender the heritage of ages without a blow. First they gathered soldiers to overawe and suppress the Assembly ; but—portentous omen of the collapse of the old régime—the soldiers recognised their kinship with the revolutionaries and made common cause with them. Then they appealed to the militarist monarchs of the Continent—the rulers of Austria Prussia Sardinia Spain—and the sympathetic aristocracies of other lands. Their appeals had a tragical success : they brought upon France the horrors of war, and precipitated the Reign of Terror. Thus the selfish and unpatriotic machinations of the privileged orders supplied what little was lacking, through the inexperience and unpracticality of the bourgeois idealogues, to plunge the country into anarchy and strife. In the midst of the chaos the doctrinaire third estate was supplanted by the violent proletariat ; the limited middle-class monarchy of the Constitution of 1791 was converted into the republic of 1792 ; the peaceful development of a new popular administration was stopped by the outbreak of conflict and massacre.

The first serious symptom of the upheaval of the masses was manifested in July 1789 when—on news that troops were being collected at Versailles, that popular ministers were being dismissed, and that the States-General were to be dissolved—the Paris mob rose, stormed the Bastille, and took possession

of the city. This event, which sent a thrill throughout Europe, transporting lovers of liberty with joy and causing despots to tremble, was speedily followed by a general rising of the peasants against their feudal lords—a rising marked by awful scenes of destruction and carnage. The self-emancipated serfs, filled with fury and zeal, but wholly devoid both of means of subsistence and of inclination to seek them, flocked towards Paris and added their turbulent and starving multitudes to the already over-vast and ungovernable mob. On October 5-6 the hungry and leaderless crowds surged out from Paris to Versailles and compelled king queen court and assembly to return with them to the city. Henceforth Paris increasingly dominated the Revolution, until finally the civic Commune and the Jacobin Club secured complete control. The Constituent Assembly somehow contrived, though with growing difficulty, to conduct its business with a show of independence and order ; but its successor, the Legislative Assembly, throughout its brief existence (October 1791 to August 1792) lived in obvious and chronic terror of the lawless hordes that swarmed the gallery of its hall of assembly, interrupted its debates, and applauded only the extremest and most sanguinary utterances. In August 1792—when the Prussians were advancing on Paris with the avowed intention of restoring the old régime and exterminating the revolutionaries—

The French monarchy was abolished and a republican Convention established in its place. Next month, under the influence of a panic fear of treachery and betrayal to the foreign foe, the frightful September massacres of nobles and clergy began. In January 1793 Louis XVI. was sent to the guillotine, to be followed before the end of the year by the queen and other members of the royal family. Then the revolutionary republicans in mutual suspicion and mortal hatred turned upon one another, and each surviving group, as soon as it became the most moderate of the diminishing survivors of the holocaust, found itself marked down for annihilation by its more bloodthirsty rivals. Thus in succession Girondists, Hébertists, and Dantonists passed in not unmerited ruin and perdition from the ghastly scene. Finally, when Robespierre remained alone and supreme, and as he was planning fresh proscriptions to confirm his power, the threatened victims of his fury banded themselves together with the courage of despair and effected his overthrow (July 28, 1794). The Revolution was over.¹

§ 12. EFFECTS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

By the middle of 1794 every person, whether royal noble clerical or bourgeois, who had been

¹ From 1794 a reactionary movement began, the main stages of which were marked by the establishment successively of (1) the Directory, 1795; (2) the Consulate, 1799, reorganised 1802; (3) the Empire, 1804.

prominent in France five years before, when the States-General met, had been swept away either by death or exile.¹ Similarly all three estates alike had disappeared from the political scene—the feudal seigneurs, the landed bishops, the well-to-do and enlightened middle class. All had gone, and in their place a new nation had arisen, an emancipated proletariat, as yet anarchic leaderless and undisciplined, but full of the enthusiasm of inexperience, the vigour of long-pent-up energies, and the large visions of indomitable youth. The institutions of the old régime had been abolished, and the ground cleared for a great reconstruction. The treaties made by the Bourbons had been repudiated and a challenge thrown down to all the governments of Europe. Decrees had been issued proclaiming the universality of the new French gospel of the Rights of Man, urging other oppressed peoples to follow the French example, and promising them aid.

The disappearance of the venerable French monarchy, with its record of eight centuries of unbroken succession and its tradition of unsurpassable magnificence, filled all the potentates of Europe with alarm. The sanguinary extermination of a great and once all-powerful nobility ; the disestablishment and spoliation, in total disregard of excommunications and interdicts, of the dominant and authoritative Church, threw into vehement antagonism all the

¹ Unless Siéyès and Gregoire be regarded as exceptions.

aristocracies and hierarchies of the Continent. But the opposition of despots feudal magnates and prince-bishops was rapidly ceasing to be formidable. They represented an expiring mediæval order whose day was obviously gone. Immeasurably more serious and deplorable was the alienation of all the moderate men of Europe from the Revolution. They had welcomed the emancipation of the French nation with generous enthusiasm. To liberal-minded Englishmen the calling of the States-General had appeared as the inauguration of a new era of constitutional government and international good-will. To the advanced thinkers of the Continent the destruction of feudalism in its Bourbon citadel had presented itself as an omen of the deliverance of the whole of Europe from the effete institutions of the Middle Ages. But everywhere eager sympathy had given place to horror and loathing as control of the revolutionary movement had passed from the hands of reasonable men and had been secured by gang after gang of murderous fanatics, each more extreme unbalanced and sanguinary than its predecessor. Burke had given voice to the general revulsion of feeling in his *Reflections on the French Revolution* ; he had shown that the movement which had begun so hopefully had developed into a cataclysm which threatened to destroy the very foundations of civilisation. In short, the excesses of the French revolutionists had done more to ruin the cause of the Revolution than

all the hostilities of kings nobles and clergy combined. They had antagonised and terrified that all-powerful mass of moderate men, that balancing body of sober opinion, whose support at one time they possessed, and whose support was necessary for their success. The result ensued that the emancipation which the Revolution promised was postponed for a whole generation, and that the thirty years of that generation were filled by wars massacres devastations and miseries unparalleled in all the preceding history of Europe. Nevertheless, in spite of the unnecessary agonies which the errors and crimes of the demagogues brought upon Europe, the main work of the Revolution was accomplished. The democracy had arrived ; it had proclaimed its principles in tones which would never cease to be heard ; it had laid securely the foundations of a new political and social order. The first of the controlling principles of the nineteenth century had come into potent operation.

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LECTURE II

NATIONALITY AND THE GREAT WARS

§ 13. DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALITY

THE democratic idea as exhibited in the French Revolution was summarised in the formula "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." We have seen that equality was the fundamental conception of this formula, and that liberty meant little more than one specialised aspect thereof. The essential demands of the revolutionists were equality of burdens, equality of privileges, equality of powers, equality of opportunities — *la carrière ouverte à tous*. The conception of fraternity also was based upon that of equality. But it was subordinate and weak; it had little restraining influence upon the operations of either guillotine or sword. In so far, however, as it had any meaning at all, it connoted a cosmopolitan sentiment antagonistic to the idea of nationality, viz. the idea of universal brotherhood.

Such a sentiment was entirely in accordance with the *Zeitgeist*. The eighteenth century was a cosmo-

politan era. It was the age of reason in which a cold and critical intellect demonstrated the absurdity of the prejudices of patriotism; it was the epoch of the ascendancy of natural theology and natural law, in the light of which the unity of mankind was clearly revealed; it was the period of the growth of a humanitarianism and a philanthropy world-wide in scope and regardless of conventional classifications; it was the century which saw the beginning of the grand general attack upon slavery, and the inauguration of the mighty missionary enterprises of Protestant Christendom whose avowed object was the evangelisation of the globe and the union of the whole race in one vast religious organisation. The principle of nationality was treated with the same contempt by politicians as were the sundering dogmas of the divergent Christian sects by philosophers. It was ignored in a long series of secret family compacts made by dynastic monarchs; it was openly flouted in the partition and succession treaties by which the century was rendered notable. Scholars and men of affairs congratulated one another upon being citizens of the world. In deed and in discourse they displayed their emancipation from the superstition of state-worship, their salvation from "the vulgar vice of patriotism." Thus Frederick the Great of Prussia surrounded himself with foreigners and gave preference to French books in his library; thus Voltaire regarded him-

self as equally at home in Paris Potsdam London and Geneva ; thus Gibbon prided himself upon being a European rather than an Englishman, and contemplated writing his *Decline and Fall* in French, the universal language of polite Continental society. Lessing gave expression to this prevailing cosmopolitan sentiment when he said, "I have no conception of the love of country, and it seems to me at best a heroic fallacy which I am well content to be without." In similar strain wrote Fichte—whose words are the more remarkable because he later became so strong a champion of German nationality : "The Christian Europeans are essentially but one people ; they recognise this common Europe as their one true Fatherland, and from one end of it to the other pursue nearly the same purposes and are actuated by similar motives." Even more cosmopolitan was the social gospel of Rousseau, whence came both the inspiration of the Revolution and the principles of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*.

Thus the "fraternity" with which the Revolution started was distinctly anti-national. It recognised as brothers the down-trodden of all peoples, and called upon them to rise against their governments, to overthrow their oppressors with the aid of their French comrades, and then to join the new republic in a federation of the free. The response to this appeal was by no means insignificant. In every

country in Europe—particularly in the feudal states of Germany and in the subjugated provinces of the Austrian monarchy—answering voices were heard. “Corresponding Societies” and similar organisations were formed for the purpose of maintaining sympathetic communication with the French republicans, and thus an international agitation was generated which ignored political distinctions and seemed to threaten the very existence of the national states of the Continent.

All this is true ; and yet in spite of it, when in 1815 the revolutionary upheaval subsided, one of the most prominent and most permanent of its effects was found to be the establishment of this very anti-fraternal principle of nationality as one of the great controlling factors in European politics. What is the explanation of the paradox ? How is it that a movement which began with the most emphatic assertion of cosmopolitan principles should have ended by stamping indelibly on the Continent the antagonistic principle of nationality—a principle which lays stress, not on elements and interests which the peoples of the world have in common, but on those which distinguish them the one from the others ; not on the factors that unite but on those that divide ; not on the general characteristics of humanity that make for equality and fraternity, but on differences of race language religion and tradition that tend to inequality and alienation ? It is the

purpose of this lecture to answer that question ; but here and now the conclusion may with advantage be indicated. (The transformation was effected by the great wars. They operated in two ways to the same end. On the one hand they roused and inflamed the national spirit in the French. Like the Saracens in the seventh century, the French in the eighteenth became united and inspired by the sense that they were a peculiar people, the champions of a new religion against an unbelieving world. Moreover, as the struggle between the missionary armies of the republic and the conscript forces of the old monarchies progressed and as the French went on from triumph to triumph, further bonds of union among themselves, fresh sources of schism from their neighbours developed. Incommunicable memories of victories on a hundred battlefields, a tradition of glory all their own, a consciousness of the possession of powers and possibilities not shared by others, a sense of superiority came to divide them from their fellow-Europeans and to make them a people apart. Finally, their easy and numerous successes in the early days of the war roused in them the old and evil lust of conquest and world-dominion—the heritage of the Bourbon régime—and their cosmopolitan ideals of liberty equality and brotherhood were forgotten as they built up a vast empire of subjugated nations, and established themselves as lords of the Continent. On the other

hand the great wars quickened the dormant spirit of nationality in the apathetic and divided peoples who were drawn into them. At first they entered the fight unwillingly, impelled by unpopular governments. For their own part they were to no small degree fascinated by the noble sentiments of the revolutionists, and were more disposed to welcome the republican hosts as deliverers than to resist them as invaders. But experience, as we shall see, brought speedy and bitter disillusionment ; until finally, in one country after another, a passion of patriotism was aroused which left no room for rest till the alien tyrants were expelled, and national independence was secured. The spirit of nationality which was so conspicuous a feature of European history in the nineteenth century was in France the bequest of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic tradition ; in the rest of the Continent it was the heritage of the struggle for liberation from the French yoke. ✓

§ 14. CAUSES OF THE GREAT WARS

The French Revolution during its early stages seemed to be purely a domestic concern of the French nation. It was, of course, regarded with the most absorbed interest by all the potentates and peoples of the West ; and such was its nature that there was none who was not stirred by it to intense emotion, whether of enthusiastic approbation or of

horrified disgust. But neither devoted sympathisers nor antipathetic reactionaries felt called upon to interfere, or expected to be dragged into its vortex. The French, moreover, on their part, at the beginning were wholly engrossed with the problem of putting their own house into disorder—preparatory to the rearrangement and reopening under entirely new management. They had no idea that the eyes of the world were upon them, or that what they were doing concerned others besides themselves. This attitude of aloofness, however, soon became impossible for both sides alike. The French were the first to contemplate action beyond their own frontiers. The theories by which they were inspired, and the dogmas which they proclaimed in the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, were general in their application; and the zealots of the Revolution, when once they had secured the realisation of their ideas in their own country, became eager to disseminate the truth in other lands. Hence the opening up of correspondence with kindred spirits in every country; hence the November Decrees of 1792; hence the formation of a widespread conspiracy which challenged every monarchical government in Europe. Then, again, the social and economic condition of France almost necessitated war as the sole means of escape from anarchy and utter exhaustion. The Revolution had meant the cessation of industry and agriculture, the suspension of law and administration, the break-

up of the social system, vast migrations of starving populations, the congestion of the cities with desperate rioters. The salvation of France depended on getting for these undisciplined hordes something to eat and something to do ; and these requisites could be found only in regions beyond the French frontiers. Said Marat in 1793, when the breach with Britain threatened : "The war must come in order to rid France of 300,000 armed brigands." Thus the French precipitated the struggle, partly as a war of political ideas, partly as a war of social and economic necessity. But, as we have already seen, when once started, it speedily assumed other aspects. It became a war for the attainment of the Bourbon ideals of the extension of French territory to the "natural boundaries" of the Rhine the Alps and the Pyrenees ; later it developed into a war of undisguised conquest and aggrandisement whose limits ever receded as the French advanced, until finally, under Napoleon, it grew to be a war for world-dominion.

Long before this point was reached all the states of Europe, one by one, had been compelled to abandon their neutrality, and had been drawn into the struggle. In general the monarchs and ministers of the old order had recognised that their very existence depended upon their taking action against the common foe ; the aristocracies of every land had assumed the cause of the French nobility, had welcomed the *émigrés*, and had joined them in urging the suppression of the

Revolution by armed force ; the Catholic Church, indignant at the annexation of the papal enclave of Avignon, horrified at the irreligion of the movement, outraged by the spoliation of ecclesiastical property and the murder of priests, had pronounced against the Revolution and preached a crusade. In particular, and first of all, the Emperor prepared for war in order, if possible, to save his sister Marie Antoinette, to restore Louis XVI. to his authority, and to prevent the French occupation of Belgium. The French anticipated his declaration by beginning hostilities in April 1792. The king of Sardinia joined the Emperor in the hope—vain as it proved to be—of securing his Transalpine province of Savoy from capture. The king of Prussia next came in, partly because he was bound by treaty to Austria,¹ partly because he wished to defend the principle of monarchy by divine right. Soon afterwards, early in 1793, George III. of Britain and William of Holland entered the coalition against the French in alarm at the conquest of Belgium by the revolutionists, and indignant at the opening of the Scheldt to navigation in spite of its closure by international conventions. Finally, the king of Spain completed the encirclement of the formidable republic because he was a Bourbon, akin to Louis XVI. (who

¹ He was a dull person, was Frederick William II. ; he had not learned the "scrap of paper" theory of treaties. Nevertheless he had attained such standard of efficiency in treachery as to hold that it was enough to fulfil treaties in the letter, regardless of the spirit.

was executed January 21, 1793), and because he feared the spread of the Revolution to his own misgoverned and oppressed dominions.

Thus in the spring of 1793, four years after the meeting of the States-General to discuss the financial situation in France, Europe was ablaze with a war in which six powers of the old type were struggling to maintain the *status quo*, striving to keep the French people within their treaty-boundaries, bending all their energies to stamp out, or at least prevent the spread of, a revolutionary doctrine and practice which they felt was subversive of civilisation and social order. In this war, however, although at first sight the forces seemed unevenly weighted on one side, they were as a matter of fact unevenly weighted on the other. Appearances seriously belied realities. It looked like an unequal conflict of one against six. It was in reality the struggle of an emancipated, inspired and indomitable *nation* against a feeble, disunited ring of effete and unpopular *governments*. The issue did not remain long in doubt.

§ 15. THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR, 1792-1802

The war of the French Revolution lasted nine years, and during that period passed through four phases of approximately equal length.¹

¹ The four phases of the Revolutionary War may be summarised as follows :

During the first of these phases (1792-95), in spite of some early successes of a remarkable kind gained before the hostile coalition was fully formed, the French were on the defensive. Nevertheless, these early successes—which included the defeat of the Prussians at Valmy, the rout of the Austrians at Jemmappes, the occupations of Belgium and Savoy, and a brilliant raid into Central Germany—so filled them with assurance of their power and confidence in their ultimate victory, that they fought against their numerous foes with unconquerable resolution. They had, indeed, need of all their resolution and courage, for the task which faced them in 1793 seemed to be one of overwhelming magnitude. Against their frontiers pressed a ring of foes cutting them off from the outside world. Within their own borders three great regions—La Vendée, and the districts centring respectively in Lyons and Toulon—were in armed revolt on behalf of Monarchy and Church, while everywhere nobles and clergy were (or were suspected to be) in friendly communication with the enemy. In the circumstances the revolutionists, feeling that nothing could make their situation and prospects more desperate than they were, cast moderation to the winds and struck everywhere with the energy of recklessness. Throughout France itself the Reign

1. France on Defensive against the First Coalition, 1792-95.

2. France Aggressive against the two survivors of First Coalition, 1795-97.

3. Anglo-French Duel, 1797-99.

4. Second Coalition against France: deadlock and truce, 1799-1801.

of Terror exterminated alike the avowed foes and the doubtful friends of the extremest republicanism. On the frontiers armies of bankrupt fanatics, with nothing but starvation behind them, under youthful generals raised from the ranks for merit alone and liable to be instantly superseded and remorselessly punished for any failure, in furious onslaughts drove back the invaders and carried the war into the enemies' countries. Before the end of 1795 every anti-republican force within the borders of France itself had been destroyed by guillotine and sword ; large districts of the Netherlands Germany and Savoy had been annexed ; the unwieldy coalition of six powers had been broken up. These were remarkable achievements, and to contemporaries, because they were entirely unexpected and inexplicable, they seemed even more remarkable than they actually were. Moreover, during the winter of 1794-95 Holland was overrun, its stadholder driven as a refugee to England, and its administration converted into a republic—named the Batavian Republic—under French protection ; in April 1795 Prussia was constrained to withdraw from the coalition in order to be free to attend to the pressing business of the partition of Poland ; in July 1795 Spain was fain to follow suit, exhausted by military expenditure and alienated from Britain by her use of her dominant sea-power ; finally, early in 1796 Sardinia was forced to make peace by a rapid and decisive

campaign conducted by Napoleon Bonaparte. Of the Allies of 1793 only Austria and Britain remained.

In these conditions the second phase of the struggle began. The French, now relieved of their most formidable dangers, were in a position to take the offensive on a grand scale. On the one hand they organised a great threefold attack upon Austria. Jourdan with the army of the Meuse, Moreau with the army of the Moselle, and Bonaparte with the army of Italy were to converge upon Vienna. The elaborately co-ordinated scheme broke down, it is true, owing to Jourdan's defeat at the hands of the Archduke Charles; but Bonaparte alone, as the result of his marvellous and flawless Italian campaign of 1796, did more than all that was necessary. He drove the Austrians out of Lombardy and forced them to make a peace of his dictation at Campo Formio (October 1797); he compelled the Pope to surrender the northern portions of the Papal States (Bologna, Ferrara, Romagna, etc.) and, adding them to Lombardy, established a new Cisalpine Republic in strict dependence on that of France. On the other hand, while these dazzling successes were being achieved on the Continent, a strong effort was made to reduce Great Britain. The maritime aid of Spain was secured; the fleet of subjugated Holland was fitted out, and a serious attempt was made to gain the command of the sea in order to invade England by way of Ireland (which at that time was seething

with rebellion). It was a critical year for Britain, was 1797, for to add to her other perils the fleet on which her salvation depended was mutinous. But the mutiny was quelled in time, and the two naval victories of St. Vincent and Camperdown removed the immediate fear of invasion. Nevertheless for two years after the withdrawal of Austria Britain all alone had to face the menacing might of France and her subject-allies. This period of the Anglo-French duel constituted the third phase of the Revolutionary War.

It was during this phase that Bonaparte, now (though nominally a servant of the Directory) the controlling force in French policy, began to dream his dreams of world-dominion. The power of Britain, based on the wealth of commerce and on the command of the sea, alone imposed itself between the leader of the French armies and the lordship of the Earth. Since the British naval victories of 1797 had rendered a direct attack on the United Kingdom impracticable, Bonaparte formulated a vast and marvellous plan—whose strangeness and magnitude certainly succeeded in baffling all British forecasts—according to which he hoped to gain control of Egypt, cut Britain's connection with the East, destroy her overseas trade, stamp out her Indian Empire, and so indirectly reduce her to submission. Incidentally he hoped to be able to secure Syria and Asia Minor, to evict the decadent Turk from Constantinople, and to plant in the Levant a French dominion that would,

in conjunction with the Western Republic, hold Central Europe as in a vice. Three things frustrated the realisation of the great design. The first was Nelson's victory at Aboukir Bay; the second was Sidney Smith's defence of Acre; the third was the formation of a new coalition, which included Austria Russia and Turkey, all of whom were thoroughly alarmed by Bonaparte's oriental enterprises. Hence in 1799 the European war broke out again. Bonaparte hastened back from Egypt to become First Consul, and to assume the continental command. The fourth and last phase of the Revolutionary struggle was inaugurated.

The second coalition proved to be even more ephemeral and inefficient than the first. Russia, disgusted by the conduct of her allies, withdrew in a year, and actually organised against Great Britain an armed neutrality which Nelson had to break up in the battle of the Baltic (1801). Austria, defeated at Marengo and Hohenlinden, was forced once more to make peace. By 1801 the struggle again had concentrated itself into an Anglo-French duel—an incongruous conflict between a land-monster and a sea-monster, neither of whom could inflict any serious injury upon the other, but both of whom were exhausting themselves by their efforts. In the circumstances the Peace of Amiens was made (1802). It was an inconclusive peace which settled no principles and solved no problems. It was a compromise

effected on the basis of an exchange of conquests, and a recognition of the *status quo*. It stands in the records of history as the classical example of a premature pacification big with the seeds of future conflict.

§ 16. THE INTERVAL OF TRUCE, 1802-3

The cessation of hostilities effected by the Peace of Amiens lasted but fifteen months. The British Government, it is true, under the mild and ostrich-minded Addington, seriously believed that the bloody and expensive business of fighting was over, that a tolerable settlement of Europe had been arrived at, and that Bonaparte would henceforth remain quietly at home, a satisfied and good young man. The British nation, too, profoundly ignorant of European politics, regardless of the principles of the balance of power, and utterly weary of the long war, shared the optimistic illusions of their rulers; in thousands they swarmed over to the Continent to survey the scenes of the concluded tragedy. It was indeed a childlike faith which could suppose either that the peoples of the Netherlands the Rhinelands and Italy would be content to remain permanently under French domination, or on the other hand that Bonaparte would rest satisfied with a mere consulship at home and with mere alliances abroad. Bonaparte, on his side, was under no illusions. He deliberately entered into the treaty of Amiens in order that with colonies

recovered, troops released, seas reopened, stores replenished, fleets refitted, armies reorganised, hostile alliances dissolved, he might renew the war in conditions that would offer a virtual certainty of success. Scarcely was the ink of the treaty dry when Bonaparte inaugurated a twofold movement, internally to consolidate and increase his personal power, externally to enlarge the French dominion—a twofold movement which resulted on the one side in his own proclamation as emperor in 1804, and on the other side in the establishment of a French hegemony over the Continent. Into the details of Bonaparte's internal administration it is not necessary, and it would not be proper, here to enter. Enough to indicate the main steps by which, though at peace, he extended French authority over far larger regions of Europe than he had been able to reduce in many years of war. First, the Batavian Republic of the Netherlands was compelled to admit into its fortresses French garrisons whose presence constituted a practical annexation of the Low Countries—a most formidable menace to British security and British commerce. Secondly, the Cisalpine Republic of North Italy was persuaded to elect Bonaparte as its president, so that its conformity to French policy was assured. Thirdly, the Ligurian Republic, which had been constituted out of Genoa and its environs, was induced to follow the example of its neighbour and to appoint Bonaparte as its "doge." Fourthly, in order to link together

these vassal republics and to secure the control of all the western passes of the Alps, Piedmont was without a shadow of right annexed, and the king of Sardinia compelled to content himself with the insular part of his territories. Fifthly, the Duke of Parma was pressed into a cession of his duchy to France. Sixthly, the Swiss Confederation, now hemmed in by lands subject to the control of Bonaparte, was overawed into electing him "mediator," so that it virtually became a member of his empire, and gave him command of all the mid-Alpine approaches to Italy. Finally—and this to Britain was the last aggravation—the French designs on Egypt were renewed. News came that a so-called "commercial mission" had made its appearance in the delta, and that under the guise of trade an active anti-British political propaganda was in progress. This was more than even the peace-obsessed Addington could stand. The British ambassador in Paris was instructed to ask for explanations and assurances, and while doing so to draw the attention of the French Government to that disquieting increase of French power on the Continent which had rapidly been effected under the forms of republican elections. The negotiations, which speedily became acrimonious, owing to Bonaparte's studied insolence and persistent prevarication, ultimately concluded with the definite demand on the part of the British Government for the withdrawal of French troops from the Netherlands, the evacuation of

Switzerland, the grant of compensation to the king of Sardinia, and the abandonment of political propaganda in Egypt. On the refusal of Bonaparte to satisfy these requirements, Addington definitely declined to remove the British troops from Malta, as he should have done under the terms of the treaty of Amiens : he felt that if Bonaparte were about to renew his oriental adventures Britain could not afford to weaken her control over the Mediterranean. Bonaparte chose to regard this breach of the treaty as an intolerable example and an irrefragable proof of Britain's perfidy. Hence he made it the pretext for the war which he had long anticipated, and for which he now seemed to be adequately prepared. Everything appeared to be in his favour. He was incomparably stronger than he had been when he made peace in 1802. In addition to the reorganised resources of France herself, he had at his disposal the men and the money of the Netherlands Switzerland and most of Italy. Spain, moreover, was too weak to resist him, and was thus compelled to conform to his will. Britain, on the other hand, found herself on the eve of war with conquests surrendered, armies diminished, defences neglected, alliances dissolved—alone, and with nothing except her fleets between herself and destruction.

Thus the Napoleonic war began. On Britain's side it was a desperate struggle for existence ; on Bonaparte's side a resolute bid for world-dominion.

Gone from the French armies were all visionary ideas of equality and brotherhood. Not liberation, but conquest was their purpose. Fired with a sense of their own superiority, inspired by hatred of Albion, they prepared to destroy the only obstacle which blocked their way to universal suzerainty.

§ 17. THE NAPOLEONIC WAR, 1803-14¹

Bonaparte's simple and undisguised plan was an invasion of England.² He assembled a large force—the "Army of England"—at Boulogne, accumulated vast stores of ammunition and supplies, prepared an immense flotilla of transports, and then waited for an opportunity to cross the few miles of water that divided him from the white cliffs of Kent. His requirements at the hands of Providence and the French seamen were modest; twenty-four hours command of the Channel was all he asked. To secure it he elaborated a subtle and complex scheme. The main British fleets were to be decoyed to Egypt and the East by a feigned renewal of the abandoned oriental adventure; then the French squadrons, issuing from their bases at Brest, Rochefort

¹ The main phases of the Napoleonic War may be summarised

1. Bonaparte's bid for world-dominion, 1803-7.
2. Zenith of Napoleon's Power, 1807-8.
3. Rise of National Resistances, 1808-13.
4. Overthrow of Napoleon, 1813-14.

² Bonaparte denied this, it is true, after the plan had collapsed; but no credence need be placed on the denial. See Rose, *Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era*, p. 156.

and Toulon, were to effect a union at the West Indian island of Martinique, and, returning thence to European waters, were to surprise and overwhelm the unsupported Channel fleet of Britain. The British, realising the magnitude of the peril that confronted them, made feverish preparations to meet it. They recalled William Pitt to power, enrolled the militia, raised volunteers, built martello towers, held patriotic meetings, sung "Rule, Britannia!" and so on. But their real defence lay in Nelson's ships and Pitt's diplomacy. It was the latter which came first into effective operation. In April 1805 the foundation of the third coalition against French aggression was laid by an Anglo-Russian convention, according to which the Tzar Alexander I. and the King of England agreed to join forces in order to compel the French to evacuate Italy Germany Holland and Switzerland, to restore the King of Sardinia to his Continental possessions, and to call an international congress to settle the affairs of Europe. Bonaparte (who had become the Emperor Napoleon in 1804) replied by crowning himself King of Italy at Milan (May 1805), and by formally annexing the Ligurian Republic. These provocative measures helped to drive Austria in the direction which Pitt desired, and in July 1805 she joined the Anglo-Russian alliance. Pitt strove hard to secure the adherence of Prussia also; but for half a year Napoleon kept the feeble and greedy Frederick William III. from

decision by holding out to him the bait of Hanover. From the moment when Austria entered the coalition the immediate invasion of England became an impossibility. The camp at Boulogne was broken up and the army transferred from the Channel coast to the Rhine and the Danube. Not till October 21 (the day after Napoleon had secured his first great military success over the Allies at Ulm) did Nelson's opportunity come. By his decisive naval triumph at Trafalgar he removed the fear of invasion from the region of practicable operations, and made it feasible for Britain to contemplate military enterprises on the Continent. But if Britain thus secured uncontested command of the sea, so did Napoleon in brief time establish indisputable control of the Continent. On December 2, 1805, he crushed Austria at Austerlitz and compelled her by the Treaty of Pressburg to withdraw from the coalition, ceding Venetia Istria and Dalmatia to Napoleon's kingdom of Italy. Next year (1806), all too late, Prussia, realising the insincerity of Napoleon's offers and the menace of his power, declared war. On October 14 she was overwhelmed at Jena and Auerstädt; on October 27 Berlin was occupied by the French, and the King and Queen of Prussia forced to seek the protection of the Tzar. The year 1807 saw a furious struggle on the Russian frontiers. A battle at Eylau (February 8) was indecisive; a second battle, at Friedland (June 14), ended in a victory for

Napoleon. By that time, however, the sentiments of Alexander had changed. He was wroth with Britain for her failure to support him in the Baltic, and he was eager to divert his armies to conquests in Turkey. Hence he met Napoleon in a personal interview on the Niemen, and arranged with him the Treaty of Tilsit (July 7, 1807), by which it was agreed that Alexander should support Napoleon's designs in the West, while Napoleon should leave to Alexander a free hand in the East.

Napoleon, now triumphant over all his Continental enemies, was at the zenith of his power. In many ways he used his power beneficently : especially did he give to divided and distracted Germany and Italy a unity and efficiency of administration such as they had never known before. Nevertheless, in the arrogance of conquest and in the confidence of illimitable might, he did things which roused against him throughout Europe a passion of patriotic antagonisms that eventually proved fatal to his empire. First, regardless of national sentiments, and careless even of French approval, he remodelled the map of Europe to suit the interests of himself and his family. Thus (beginning soon after Austerlitz) he drove out the Neapolitan Bourbons and conferred Naples as a kingdom on his brother Joseph ; the Papal States he occupied and parcelled out among his marshals ; the Batavian Republic he converted into the kingdom of Holland for his

brother Louis ; all the German States outside Prussia and Austria he gathered together into a Confederation of the Rhine under his own control (thus bringing to an end that relic of the Middle Ages, the Holy Roman Empire) ; the Polish provinces of Prussia he cut away from the Hohenzollern kingdom and made the nucleus of a subject Grand Duchy of Warsaw ; finally, he overran and partitioned Portugal, and placed his brother Joseph (transferred from Naples) upon the throne of Spain. This transformation of the map of Europe was the first cause of the national revolts which were to be his undoing. The second cause of these national revolts was the introduction, by means of the Berlin Decrees of 1806 and the Milan Decrees of 1807, the so-called "Continental System," which was intended to sap the strength of Britain by declaring a blockade of her coasts and by excluding her commerce from the whole of Europe. No doubt the system—imperfectly though Napoleon was able to realise it—severely injured Britain ; but it pressed with even greater hardship upon the nations subject to Napoleon's despotic sway. It roused a widespread disposition to revolt, even in France itself. Thirdly, these same subject nations—Italians Germans Dutch Belgians Swiss Spaniards—found themselves called upon, in return for the benefits of Napoleon's enlightened tyranny, to supply large and regular drafts to the imperial armies, and to contribute

increasingly heavy payments to the central treasury. They began to doubt whether the advantages of unity and good government were not purchased at too high a rate when they involved loss of national individuality, subordination to foreign control, commercial ruin, financial exhaustion, and implication in an alien military organisation whose activities eventually extended from Madrid to Moscow.

In 1808 the era of national revolts began. The wars that resulted were no longer the struggles of unpopular governments allied against an emancipated and united French nation, but the spontaneous rising of oppressed peoples, made conscious by suffering of their nationality, against an autocracy which had lost the support of all the better sections of the French nation itself. First Portuguese, then Spaniards, and later Italians and Germans, all joined in the "Wars of Liberation." Russia repudiated the Treaty of Tilsit and came in (1812); Austria ventured once more to risk her fortunes in a fight for freedom (1813). In the "Battle of Nations" fought at Leipsig (October 1813)—a battle in which every European people except the Turks was represented—the power of Napoleon was broken. In 1814 he was forced to abdicate.

§ 18. EFFECTS OF THE GREAT WARS

It will have been evident, even from the cursory survey of a crowded epoch which alone has been

possible in this lecture, how profoundly both France and Europe had been transformed during the course of the great wars. France had developed from a liberal republic into a despotic empire ; she had abandoned her cosmopolitan ideals of equality and brotherhood for aggressively national ideals of conquest and universal ascendancy ; she had exchanged the tricolour of freedom for the eagles of imperial glory ; having emancipated herself, she had sold herself to a master, and had by him been led into adventures by means of which she had gained the world but had lost her soul.

It was much easier for the Allies in their wars of liberation to recover the world than it was for France to regain her sacrificed ideals. The Napoleonic tradition lingered—developing, indeed, into a legend and a myth. Not until France had passed through the purging fires of 1870 was she delivered from its fatal possession. It was a tradition that had in it, we may freely admit, some noble elements ; it was a tradition of unparalleled efficiency in government, of the highest intellect applied to affairs of State, of scrupulous impartiality and indiscriminate justice, of sweeping and beneficent reform, of brilliant achievement and dazzling success. But it carried with it also memories of triumphant militarism ; of victorious campaigns waged in many lands ; of conquered countries, plundered cities, subjected peoples. It fed in the French nation a spirit of over-

weening pride, of insatiable ambition, of conscious superiority—a spirit which for two generations kept them apart from their fellows in resentment suspicion and dislike.

On the continent of Europe, and on its peoples, the great wars also left indelible marks. First, they swept away much useless mediæval lumber, particularly in Germany and Italy, and so rendered the reconstruction of Europe on new lines possible. The bogie of the Holy Roman Empire was for ever laid ; the temporal power of the Papacy shaken to its very foundations; crowds of obsolete feudal lords and prince-bishops hopefully extinguished. Secondly, the peoples of Europe were roused as never before. In the early stages of the war, as we have seen, when dynasties and aristocracies contended unpopularly against the Revolution for their own purposes, the doctrine and example of the French stirred far and wide the sympathetic fire of democratic zeal. A new age of freedom self-government and cosmopolitan goodwill seemed to be dawning upon the world. But as the struggle progressed, and “liberation” at the hands of the French was found to connote absorption into the Napoleonic empire, loss of independence, government by alien marshals, suppression of traditional institutions, exploitation to the interests of a group of upstart Bonapartist dynasties—the zeal for a European fraternity under so masterful an elder brother gave

place to a passion of nationality. In each subjugated country the dispossessed rulers and the oppressed people were drawn together in defence of their common heritage ; classes once privileged and classes once enslaved were welded together incredibly by an ardent longing for deliverance from a foreign yoke, and determination to achieve it. The consequent successful wars of liberation confirmed in each participant nation the sense of unity, and excited still further the flame of patriotism. The perils and the triumphs of 1813-15 gave to Britons Russians Swedes Germans Italians Spaniards Portuguese new and glorious traditions which deepened the consciousness of their individuality, and exalted the value of their independence. In other words, the second of the great controlling factors in nineteenth-century history, *nationality*, had come into active operation.

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LECTURE III

THE COMMONWEALTH OF EUROPE AND THE SETTLEMENT OF 1815

§ 19. THE FALL OF NAPOLEON

THE beginning of 1814, in consequence of the victory of the Allies at Leipsig and the triumph of Wellington at Vittoria, saw the French reduced to the defensive on their three "natural" frontiers of the Rhine the Alps and the Pyrenees. The Napoleonic empire was gone, but the Greater France remained ; and the proud armies of the mighty war-lord were determined to maintain it against a hostile world. Never had the genius of Napoleon himself shown itself so pre-eminent over the pedestrian intellects of the opposing generals as it did in the campaign of this year. The great commander divided his enemies, defeated them in turn, reduced their plan of operations to chaos. But even he could not work miracles, and in the end he was overwhelmed by sheer numbers. The victory of the Allies at Pantin (March 30, 1814) opened the way to Paris ; the city capitulated ;

Napoleon was forced to lay down his arms and abdicate his throne (April 11, 1814).

The first problem which the Allies had to face related to the government of France. Now that Napoleon was overthrown, what form of constitution would give the surest guarantee against a repetition of his imperialist adventures? Napoleon himself had hoped that by abdication he might win favour for his son, the young "King of Rome," whose mother, the Hapsburg Marie Louise, might be expected to obtain Austrian influence on his behalf: but the Allies (and many powerful groups in France as well) were resolute to exclude the Corsican brood. Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden, considered that his services to the cause of the Allies were such as to warrant his aspiration to the French throne: his opinion, however, was not shared by the potentates with whom the decision rested. There were many in France who looked for a restoration of the Republic as it had flourished before Napoleon had prostituted it to his military ambitions; but the prevalent sentiment was against so perilous an experiment. The one feasible expedient that remained was the recall of the Bourbons, and, galling though this recall would necessarily be both to those who had felt the thrill of 1789 and to those who had shared the triumphs of the emperor, it was felt that it offered the surest path to a stable and enduring settlement. Accordingly, the brother of the decapitated Louis XVI.—an elderly and worn-

out prince who had spent some twenty years in harassed and impoverished exile in Germany Italy Russia Poland and England successively—was invited to return to Paris as king by the grace of the allied conquerors of his country. In order to mitigate as much as possible the inevitable unpopularity of a monarch thus imposed upon a humiliated nation, the terms of peace granted to the French were of remarkable leniency. A politic fiction was adopted, according to which they were an innocent and peaceful people who had been enslaved and misled by an unscrupulous adventurer, and to whom the Allies had come as beneficent deliverers, bringing back their rightful king. Hence no indemnity was demanded; not even was the return of the plundered art-treasures of Europe required; the colonies were, with the exception of a few islands vital to British sea-power, restored; nay, more, the territories annexed by the French during the three years of the Revolution, when Louis XVI. was nominally king (1789-92), they were allowed to keep, and the frontiers of France were generously fixed as they had existed on November 1, 1792. Such, in outline, were the terms of the Treaty of Paris signed May 30, 1814. Liberal as they were, however, in view of the completeness of the victory of the Allies, what impressed the French most was the painful fact that they involved the abandonment of the natural frontiers of their country, the surrender to the Netherlands

Germany Switzerland and Italy of territories which had been regarded as for ever incorporated in France, the evacuation by unbeaten troops of over fifty border fortresses. The acceptance of these conditions by the new king, little as he had had to do with formulating them, and helpless as he was to secure their modification, at once invested him with the odium of a diminisher of the kingdom. Not only did his restoration mean a repudiation of the principles of the Revolution, it also denoted the sacrifice of the fruits of a long series of glorious campaigns which had been won during a period when the Bourbon influence was wholly on the side of the defeated enemies of France.

The early acts of the new king did nothing to remove the disfavour with which his restoration was received. On the contrary, they confirmed the view of those who held that the Bourbons were incapable of either learning or forgetting anything. They showed that, although he had been compelled by the allied powers to accept a constitution modelled on that of England, the instincts of absolutism were inherent to the Bourbon nature, and were ineradicable. He assumed the title "Louis XVIII.," thus recognising the reign and the sovereignty by divine right of his nephew "Louis XVII.," the uncrowned son of Louis XVI., whose lamentable death at the age of ten had been announced by the republican government in 1795. He issued a charter in which he spoke

of the new constitution as "granted" by his royal grace, using words which suggested that he might revoke it if it were found to work unpleasantly. He dated this charter as in "the nineteenth year" of his reign, thus treating the Revolution as mere riot, its principles as exploded heresies, and the Napoleonic régime as a vulgar usurpation. He hauled down the tricolour under which French citizen armies had marched for twenty years to victories of unprecedented splendour, and hoisted once more the white flag of the old régime associated with aristocratic privilege and a long tradition of defeat. He established a franchise for the newly constituted Chamber of Deputies, which limited the right to vote to some 100,000 well-to-do men. These and other retrogressive acts—all the more ominous because perpetrated apparently in amiable unconsciousness of their significance—roused widespread antipathy and antagonism to Louis, and competent observers viewed with anxious apprehension the unrest and disgust of France in general and Paris in particular. The attention of Europe was, however, for a time diverted from the internal affairs of the Bourbon monarchy when in November 1814 the plenipotentiaries of the Powers assembled at Vienna for the resettlement of Europe.

§ 20. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

Never since the break-up of mediæval Christendom had the Concert of Europe been so living a reality as it was at the close of the great wars. Neither the ambitions of Philip II. in the sixteenth century, nor even the far more formidable designs of Louis XIV. in the seventeenth century, had drawn the other powers, threatened with subjugation, into so intimate a union as had the menace of the Revolution and the military oppression of Napoleon. The long duration of the struggle, as well as the exceptional severity of its nature, had welded the more permanent members of the successive coalitions into something approaching a confederation. The first coalition (1793-95), it is true, had been little more than a panic-stricken concourse of fortuitous atoms, soon dissipated by the blasts of adversity. Even the second (1799-1801) had been loose and incoherent; its dissolution had been due less to external pressure than to internal dissensions. But as soon as the vague peril of the Revolution had transformed itself into the imminent spectre of Napoleonic conquest; as soon as the war against a novel system of doctrine had assumed the more familiar and recognisable form of resistance to the schemes of a would-be world-ruler, then the alliance had become close and solid. Definite policy and clearly formulated purposes had taken the place of confused and aimless wrestlings with ghostly foes.

Britain and Austria had been the basal and more enduring elements in both the first and the second coalition ; into the second coalition Russia also had for a brief period entered. These three powers, reinforced by Prussia, had constituted the permanent nucleus of all the subsequent anti-Napoleonic combinations.¹ They had formed a Quadruple Alliance between whose governments the most intimate confidences had been exchanged, whose princes and ministers had become united in close ties of personal friendship, whose policies had been assimilated to one another, whose armies had been amalgamated, whose finances had been pooled at least to the extent that all were replenished from the common reservoir of the British taxpayer. It was to these four powers that the overthrow of Napoleon had been due, and it was they who had made arrangements for the assembling of the Congress of Vienna.

On no previous occasion had so important a diplomatic conference been held ; never before had so many monarchs and ministers of the first rank been collected together. Six reigning sovereigns were present, including Francis I. of Austria, Alexander I. of Russia, and Frederick William III. of Prussia. Among the leading representative members were Metternich, who, in virtue both of

¹ The third coalition, 1805-7 ; the fourth coalition, 1812-14 ; so also the later fifth coalition, 1815.

his position in Vienna and of the part which he had played in the destruction of the Napoleonic empire, presided over the congress and exercised a dominant influence upon its deliberations ; Nesselrode, minister of the Tzar ; Hardenberg, eminent for the work which he, in conjunction with his colleague Stein, had accomplished for the revival and liberation of Prussia after the disaster of Jena ; Castlereagh and Wellington who attended successively on behalf of the British Regent. Most remarkable of all, Talleyrand was present as representative of Louis XVIII. His admission to the congress was due to the acceptance of the same fiction as had secured for the French such easy terms in the first Treaty of Paris, viz. that not the French nation, still less their exiled Bourbon kings, but only the Revolutionary leaders and Napoleon, had been guilty of the great attack upon the liberties of Europe.

The main tasks which lay before the plenipotentiaries when they met on November 3, 1814, were five in number, viz., first, to erect a barrier round France, so that if at any time the revolutionary flame should break out again in that country it might the more easily be prevented from spreading, and so that if another Napoleon should arise to excite once more French lust of conquest he might find himself hemmed in by a ring of watchful powers too strong to be lightly attacked ; secondly, to provide a new constitution for Germany in place

of the mediæval figment of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation which had been swept away in the period of chaos and reconstruction that had followed the battle of Austerlitz ; thirdly, to decide the fates of (1) the Grand Duchy of Warsaw which Napoleon had formed out of such parts of Poland as had fallen into his power ; (2) Saxony whose ruler, a traitor to the German cause, had fought steadily on the side of Napoleon against the Allies up to the battle of Leipsig ; and (3) Finland, which Russia had absorbed from Sweden in 1809 ; fourthly, to repartition Italy which, when it was nominally divided between Napoleon and his brother Joseph, or Napoleon and his general Murat, had more nearly attained to unity than at any time since the days of the Gothic dominion of Theodoric in the sixth century ; finally, to penalise Denmark for her antagonism to the Allies, and to reward Sweden for the valuable aid she had rendered to Russia and Prussia since 1812.

Several of these questions, and many minor ones, had been dealt with in negotiations between individual states before the congress assembled ; some of them had actually been settled by treaty, subject to the confirmation of the Powers as a whole. Thus when Sweden in 1812 had offered her aid to Russia she had stipulated for the acquisition of Norway, and this stipulation the Treaty of Abo had confirmed. The Treaty of Kalisch (1813), which had

brought Prussia into the fourth coalition, had contained definite promises of compensation to her for her losses of 1807. Similarly Austria in entering the coalition a few months later had in the open Treaty of Teplitz, supplemented by secret engagements, received the assurance that her lost Tyrolese and Dalmatian provinces should be restored to her with important additions in Italy. The stadholder of Holland had been led to hope not only for restoration to his Dutch dominions, but also for the subjection of Belgium to his authority; the King of Sardinia had been encouraged to expect, besides the recovery of Savoy and Piedmont, the cession of Nice and Genoa.

Thus the plenipotentiaries commenced their negotiations not only with a long series of extremely difficult problems to solve, but also with their hands tied by a formidable tangle of public treaties and private promises. These pre-existing treaties and promises, together with certain prevailing principles and prepossessions, largely determined the course of the discussions and the ultimate decisions.

§ 21. THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

We have already seen that the two great principles which emerged from the changes and chances of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era were the principles of democracy and nationality. But these principles,

though potent among the peoples, and destined immensely to increase in power during the century, emerged thoroughly discredited in the eyes of all ruling classes and most moderate men because of their association with the excesses and the aggressions of the French. The idea of the sovereignty of the people had become indissolubly joined to memories of September massacres and November decrees, murders of monarchs and a long-drawn reign of terror, anarchy and atheism, spoliation and blood. Similarly, the national idea had acquired an evil favour because its realisation in France under Napoleon had been found to imply immeasurable egoism, merciless selfishness, insatiable ambition, incessant war, interminable conquest, ruthless subjugation, and intolerable tyranny. The two principles together—democracy and nationality—were summed up at Vienna in one word of horror, the “Revolution,” and it was the prime purpose of responsible statesmen to adopt means and erect safeguards which should prevent the “Revolution” from breaking out again. Thus at this crisis in the affairs of men, as has so frequently happened both before and since, the cause of progress in which lay the best hopes of humanity was found to have received its most deadly blows from the hands of its friends. In vain would reactionaries have resisted the mighty movements towards emancipation and self-government, towards the disintegration of dynastic empires

and the formation of national states, if only the leaders of these movements had in the days of their power been wise and strong, if only they could have kept themselves and their followers under control, if only they could have refrained from doing evil in the vain hope that good would come of it. As it was, they were fallen and discredited, and the principles for which they had agonised and sinned were involved in their humiliation punishment and disgrace. As opposed to the "Revolution," the principles of authority and legitimacy were dominant in the minds of the diplomats of the congress. These principles involved the undoing of the work of the preceding quarter-century, in so far as it was possible to undo it; the restoration of exiled rulers and old régimes; the reconstruction of the *status quo ante*, and the re-establishment of the balance of power; the revival of ultramontane Catholicism and the suppression of religious particularism; the inauguration of a romantic reaction in every sphere of thought and action.

The general acceptance of these anti-revolutionary fundamentals by the plenipotentiaries at Vienna reduced much of their work to mere matter of routine. The restorations in such countries as Spain and Portugal, Naples and Piedmont, were settled *a priori*, and only questions of detail remained to be arranged. There were a few problems, however, which could not be solved by the simple

application of a general formula, and these gave rise to a controversy so long and acrimonious that at one time the congress seemed likely to break up and to give place to a new arbitrament of arms. The most formidable of these controversial questions related to the fates of Poland and Saxony. The destinies of these countries were closely bound together; for under the Napoleonic régime both lands had been governed by Napoleon's submissive henchman Frederick Augustus I., and there was a common sentiment among the representatives of the Quadruple Alliance that he merited and should receive exemplary punishment for his perfidy to Europe in general and Germany in particular. As to Poland, the armies of the Tzar had overrun it in the course of the wars of liberation, had extinguished the "Grand Duchy of Warsaw," had expelled the Saxon administrators and the French garrisons, and had established a Russian occupation. Alexander was firmly resolved not to surrender his hold over the conquered territory, although he was quite prepared to grant it a separate constitution and to govern it as a subject kingdom, linked by merely personal ties to his Muscovite empire. The Western Powers, on the other hand, particularly Austria and Britain, dreaded the immense increase of Russian influence in Central Europe which would necessarily accrue from the Tzar's establishment in the Warsaw salient—between east Prussia in the north and Galicia in

the south. Britain, if she could have had her way, would have preferred to restore the autonomous Polish kingdom of the period prior to the iniquitous partitions of 1772-95 ; but she found so firm a determination on the part of all the partitioners not to surrender their acquisitions that she did not press her views. Thus the only alternative to the Tzar's scheme was a return in substance to the threefold division between Russia Austria and Prussia as completed in 1795 ; and this solution of the Polish problem was insistently urged by the Western Powers. Here was one serious bone of contention. As to the second, viz. Saxony, the whole of this kingdom was demanded by Frederick William III. of Prussia as a reward for his services and a compensation for his losses and surrenders. Austria, however, had no wish to see Prussia without any rival in northern Germany ; France was eager to save her old ally from entire destruction ; the minor princes of Germany were much concerned to prevent the extinction of one of their number, and Britain in the interests of Hanover supported them. Hence Prussia discovered a strenuous antagonism to her preposterous claim. Thus towards the close of 1814 a serious schism split the congress into two hostile factions. Russia and Prussia drew together in mutual support. Opposed to them, Austria, Britain, and France formed a defensive alliance which was actually embodied in a treaty on January 3,

1815. Armies once more began to move towards the debatable lands, and a new European conflict seemed to be in sight. But at the last moment moderate councils prevailed. The Tzar abandoned his larger claims, agreed to restore to Austria and Prussia most of the Polish territory which they had held in 1795, and so was allowed to convert the remainder into a constitutional kingdom under his own sceptre. Prussia, in consideration of this recovery of the major part of her lost Polish territories was brought to consent to the retrocession of rather more than three-fifths of Saxony to Frederick Augustus. Thus in February 1815 outward harmony was restored in the congress, and from that time rapid progress was made in the general settlement. But the work was still incomplete when, on March 4, news reached Vienna that Napoleon had escaped from Elba.

§ 22. THE HUNDRED DAYS

The dissensions which had riven the congress during the autumn of 1814 had revealed the painful fact that the unity of Europe was a very fragile thing, that the international concert easily degenerated into wrangling discord, and that the close cohesion which had marked the Quadruple Alliance during its last phases had been due rather to the external pressure of fear than to any internal attraction.

Only the peril of imminent war had restored superficial harmony in the early weeks of 1815; the supreme menace of the return of the common enemy was necessary to re-establish cordial co-operation.

For several days after the escape of Napoleon had been announced it remained uncertain where he intended to put his fortune to the test. Talleyrand expected to hear news of his landing in Italy which was seething with discontent due to the restoration of the mediæval chaos that Napoleon had reduced to order. But Metternich with accurate prevision declared his belief that the emperor would stake everything upon the recovery of France. It was a bolder move to sail for Cannes than it would have been to slip across the narrow strip of water that divided Elba from the coast of Tuscany; but it was the only move that gave any prospect of ultimate success. Napoleon had been kept informed by secret agents of the growing unpopularity of Louis XVIII. and his court; he was aware of the schism in the Congress of Vienna, and believed it to be so serious as to preclude the possibility of the reconstitution of the Quadruple Alliance; he counted, moreover, upon the fact that the Peace of Paris had released from internment in the prisons of the Allies some quarter-million of French troops who were still under the spell of his name and genius. The events seemed to justify his prescience and his courage. Though he landed with but one thousand men, France was soon at his feet.

The forces sent to arrest him went over to his side, and on March 20 he made a triumphant entry into Paris. Louis XVIII. and his satellites fled precipitately and disgracefully across the Belgian frontier, and sought safety with the remnants of the armies of the Allies still established there. The stage being thus cleared, Napoleon, with that marvellous energy and promptitude of decision which had always been his distinguishing characteristic, set up a new empire. It was markedly different from the old. The empire overthrown in the wars of liberation had been a military autocracy unmitigated and undisguised. The new empire, it was announced, would stand for peace, for democracy, for nationality, for social reform. Napoleon hoped by these professions of pacific purposes and liberal principles not only to win the support of the large constitutional party in France but also to conciliate British opinion, which had been so conspicuously friendly to France and antagonistic to Prussia and Russia in the recent Vienna negotiations. Unfortunately, however, neither Napoleon's pacifism nor his liberalism excited any confidence. His mere presence, moreover, as ruler of France threatened the whole structure of that reconstituted Europe which was being so laboriously framed by the congress. It was felt that the indispensable condition of any permanent settlement at Vienna must be the suppression of this new Revolution, and the punishment of this flagrant defiance of

the Powers. Hence Napoleon was denounced by the assembled diplomats as "the enemy and disturber of the peace of the world"; the Quadruple Alliance was renewed, and each of the four signatories engaged to provide and maintain 150,000 men "till Bonaparte should have been rendered absolutely incapable of stirring up further troubles." In these circumstances—with the prospect of the invasion of France by 600,000 enemy forces fed by inexhaustible reserves—Napoleon realised that his only chance of success lay in instant action. He had fewer than 300,000 regular troops available at the time, and to use these effectively against the overwhelming masses of his foes necessitated his attacking each of their constituent armies in turn before they could effect a junction with one another. At the beginning of June 1815 the Russians and the Austrians were still far away. The Prussians and the British, with their Dutch and Belgian auxiliaries, were, however, drawing together in the Low Countries. Before they were able to concentrate—and they were amazingly lethargic in their movements—Napoleon, skilfully veiling his designs and striking with masterly suddenness and severity, got in between them at Charleroi and compelled them to prepare separately for battle. By June 16 his genius had triumphed over all preliminary difficulties, and had placed him in a position of distinct military advantage. But from that point, from some unexplained cause, his wonted mastery

failed him. He made a simultaneous attack upon the Prussians at Ligny and the British at Quatre-Bras, instead of crushing the one before dealing with the other. Although he drove the Prussians from the field at the end of a long and desperate battle, he neglected to follow up his partial victory by a prompt pursuit, and he actually lost touch with the retreating enemy so completely that he remained unaware in which direction it had withdrawn. He believed that it had retired eastward along the Meuse towards its base at Liège, whereas its main forces had moved northward to Wavre, keeping in close communication with the British. The British for their part had held their own at Quatre-Bras; but the retreat of the Prussians from Ligny had necessitated their falling back to Waterloo, where they took their stand to cover Brussels. Here Napoleon (ignorant of the nearness of the Prussians) resolved to overwhelm them with superior forces in a gigantic frontal attack. Here Wellington (relying on a positive assurance of Prussian aid from Wavre, only thirteen miles away) determined to face the terrific shock and to put the fate of Europe to the test. On June 18 was fought the battle of Waterloo—one of the greatest and most decisive conflicts of modern times. For several critical hours the issue of the titanic struggle was in doubt; but in the end, as the long summer day drew to its close, the curious errors of Napoleon, the stubborn

fighting qualities of the British, and the arrival (though extremely belated) of the Prussians turned the decision into an irretrievable disaster for the French. Napoleon fled from the stricken field to Paris, where, for a second time, he abdicated. The victorious Anglo-Prussian armies rapidly advanced upon the capital; to reinforce them, Austrian troops crossed the Rhine, and Sardinian forces the Alps. Realising the hopelessness of resistance, Paris capitulated, and on July 8 readmitted Louis XVIII. as king.

§ 23. THE TREATIES OF 1815

It was no longer possible to maintain the fiction of guilty government and innocent people which had secured for the French such lenient terms in the first Peace of Paris. The enthusiastic welcome which Napoleon had everywhere received on his triumphal progress from Grenoble to Paris in March 1815, and the marvellous rally to his standard in May, rendered it ludicrous any more to contend that the nation had been compelled against its will to bow beneath the yoke of the tyrant, or that it had rejoiced in the emancipation and restoration effected for it by the Allies. For the wanton outbreak of the Hundred Days not only the emperor but also the country had to suffer. As to Napoleon, he was sent into perpetual exile in St. Helena. As to

France, the second Treaty of Paris (November 20, 1815) reduced her to her boundaries of 1790, installed an Allied army of occupation in her north-eastern fortresses for a period not to exceed five years, exacted from her an indemnity of 700,000,000 francs, and compelled her to restore the works of art which the Revolutionary and Napoleonic armies had tastefully collected from the museums of the Continent. It has been calculated that the Bonapartist adventure of the Hundred Days cost France from first to last no less a sum than 1,570,000,000 francs. Only with the utmost difficulty did Wellington and Castlereagh prevent the Prussian and Austrian representatives at Paris from enforcing the cession of Alsace and Lorraine.

Before the second Peace of Paris closed the long period of the great wars and restored tranquillity to Europe, the Congress of Vienna had finished its work and had embodied its main decisions in a so-called Final Act (June 9, 1815). These decisions may be summarised as follows: First, in order to provide the barrier supposed to be necessary to prevent the French from breaking out again, Belgium, irrespective of the wishes of its inhabitants, was joined to Holland under the government of the Prince of Orange; the Rhine Provinces of Germany, regardless of the dominant Catholicism of their peoples, were transferred to Protestant Prussia, which was further strengthened by the acquisition of parts

of Saxony and Poland ; the Swiss Confederation was reorganised, and was reinforced by the addition of the three new cantons of Valais Geneva and Neuchâtel ; finally Nice and Genoa, in spite of their pronounced republicanism and in the face of their vehement protests, were delivered into the hands of the king of Sardinia to be joined to Savoy and Piedmont. Secondly, Germany was provided with a constitution the main features of which had been agreed upon as the result of a long series of conferences attended by representatives of the various German states. A *Bund* or Confederation was set up comprising thirty-nine members—six kingdoms, seven grand-duchies, nine duchies, eleven principalities, four free cities, together with the two territories of Holstein (attached to Denmark) and Luxembourg (attached to Holland). Each of the members was an international person, and the diet of the Confederation, located at Frankfort-on-Main, was no more than a permanent congress of diplomatic agents. Executive power was wholly lacking to this loose and discordant simulacrum of a government. Thirdly, Poland was repartitioned between Austria Prussia and Russia, although not quite on the lines of the divisions of 1772-95. Alexander I. received rather more than his predecessors had held, and he was allowed to form it into a constitutional kingdom separate from Russia. Russia, too, was confirmed in her possession of Finland,

Sweden finding compensation in the acquisition of Norway. Of Saxony two-fifths were bestowed on Prussia, the remaining three-fifths being restored to the former king, Frederick Augustus. Fourthly, Italy was parcelled out into eight sections as follows : Austria recovered Lombardy and (as compensation for her surrender of her Netherland and Rhenish territories) received Venetia ; members of the Hapsburg House were replanted in Tuscany Modena and Parma ; the Bourbons returned to Naples and Lucca ; the Pope was re-established in the States of the Church. Fifthly, Denmark was punished for her support of Napoleon by being deprived of Norway, which had been under her rule since the Union of Kalmar effected in 1397 ; Britain, on the other hand, was allowed to take as her reward for her immense exertions and sacrifices such outposts of empire as Heligoland, Malta, the protectorate of the Ionian Islands, Cape Colony, Ceylon, Trinidad, and the Island of S. Lucia.

Other problems had been mooted at the congress, but had been found too contentious to admit of solution. One such problem was the question of the Spanish-American colonies, which were in full revolt against the attempts of the mother country to reassert over them her authority extinct since the battle of Trafalgar. Another related to the slave trade, which Britain was anxious to suppress ; jealousy of British sea-power, however, caused the congress

according to the settlement
made at Vienna, 1815.

English Miles




Boundary of German Confederation.

Prussian Territory.

Austrian Empire

Boundary of Turkey in Europe...



to hesitate to grant or recognise the necessary rights of search, and it merely expressed its moral disapproval of the trade. A third was the Eastern Question, which had been raised by an appeal of the Greeks against the misgovernment of the Turks. This involved matters far too vast and controversial for the diplomats at Vienna even to consider, and it was dismissed as being beyond the pale of their jurisdiction.

Leaving, then, these too-risky problems to the chances of the future, the monarchs and ministers dispersed, not dissatisfied with their accomplished work.

§ 24. THE VIENNA SETTLEMENT

The settlement effected at Vienna in 1815 must be regarded as the foundation of the European state system of the nineteenth century. It has been subjected to a great deal of adverse criticism, and in view of the fact that every one of its main decisions has been reversed, it is easy, from the standpoint of subsequent events, to expose its defects. Some writers, indeed, have gone so far as to contend that the principal task of the hundred years following the congress was to undo its work. Those who adopt this hostile attitude assert that the diplomatists who negotiated and concluded the Vienna treaties were all of them representatives of the old régime, dominated by eighteenth-century prejudices, im-

pervious to the new ideas which were irresistibly moulding the new age. They blame them for devotion to the obsolete principles of "legitimacy" and "balance of power"; accuse them of subordinating the interests of peoples to those of princes; charge them even with a selfish and unscrupulous scramble for plunder, and specially condemn the Great Powers for dispoiling and extinguishing the small. But, above all, they indict them for their disregard of historic antagonisms, as when they delivered over Norway to Sweden and Genoa to Sardinia; and for their violation of the principle of nationality, as when they joined Belgium to Holland and Venetia-Lombardy to Austria.

In mitigation, however, of these unfavourable judgments there is a good deal to be said. Nay, more, the settlement can lay claim to a large treasury of positive merit which must by no means be left out of the account. It has already been noted¹ that the building-up of the victorious coalition against Napoleon during the years 1812-14 had involved the making of so many treaty engagements that the sphere of free action left to the congress was extremely limited. Such doubtful measures as the cessions of Norway to Sweden and Belgium to Holland had been the subject of pledges before the diplomatists met at Vienna, and to have revoked the pledges would have meant not only a breach

¹ See above, p. 96.

of faith but also an inevitable renewal of the war. Within the restricted limits wherein the free will of the negotiators had play, a spirit of moderation was shown, a desire to avoid violent changes, a regard for the interests of Europe as a whole, that were in marked contrast to the levity with which Napoleon had removed landmarks and transported princes. It is true that the congress made much of "legitimacy"; but it did so because it seemed to promise the best hope of future stability. It is also true that the conception of the "balance of power" loomed large in all the discussions at Vienna; but the restoration of a European equilibrium appeared to provide the only possible alternative to that dominance of one power which it had been the prime purpose of the Quadruple Alliance to destroy. As to the alleged disregard by the diplomats of the principle of nationality, two considerations have to be borne in mind. The first is that in France, where the national spirit had manifested its influence in the most striking manner, it had displayed itself as an evil genius of self-assertion and aggression which it was eminently desirable to exorcise. The second is that its manifestations in other countries, such as Spain and Germany, were recent fitful and erratic, and that there was little to suggest to political observers of the time that the new passion of national sentiment was more than a passing concomitant of the wars of liberation, and nothing to cause them

to realise that it was indeed the new vital and formative principle that was to transmute the old Europe of dynastic states to the new Europe of homogeneous and self-conscious peoples. It would be unjust to condemn the politicians because they were not prophets. Certain is it, moreover, that if they had been endowed with prophetic foresight in 1815, and if they had tried at that date to satisfy the still embryonic national aspirations of the inchoate folk of the Continent, they would have precipitated a chaos of conflict compared with which the Napoleonic wars would have been mere skirmishes. Fortunately they were not seers and idealogues, but able and prudent statesmen who kept before their eyes the practical projects of restoring much-needed peace to Europe after a quarter of a century of war, and of providing means to maintain it. In these supremely important purposes they were far from unsuccessful. The system of equilibrium which they contrived to set up preserved general tranquillity among the Great Powers during a priceless forty years—a period of unprecedented material prosperity and intellectual activity. Moreover, the resolution which they adopted, in accordance with a stipulation of the 1814 Treaty of Chaumont, to the effect that in future periodical meetings of the Powers should be held to consider the affairs of Europe as a whole, marked an immense advance in the direction of international government and the organisation of a Con-

tinental Commonwealth. There were some, indeed, who wished to go even farther along the road towards the constitution of a United States of Europe, and formulated schemes for the erection of an authoritative tribunal for the enforcement of international law, the vindication of justice among peoples, and the preservation of perpetual peace. But though the time had not come—has it even yet come?—for the realisation of this splendid dream, the achievement actually accomplished was one of the first importance, viz. the regularisation and organisation on a permanent basis of the Concert of Europe, and the conversion of the General Congress of the Powers, which hitherto had been an instrument merely for the conclusion of wars, into an instrument of equitable administration and pacific control through long periods of tranquillity.

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PART II
THE PROCESS OF EVOLUTION

LECTURE IV

THE ERA OF THE CONGRESSES, 1815-22

§ 25. THE HOLY ALLIANCE AND THE QUADRUPLÉ ALLIANCE

THE principles of the French Revolution had seemed to foreshadow the formation of a cosmopolitan democratic Commonwealth of Europe. The actual outcome of the Revolution and the wars which it had engendered was, however, something radically different, viz. a monarchical and militant concert of the Great Powers pledged to the cause of reaction. The four States—Britain Russia Austria Prussia—whose coalitions had secured the overthrow of Napoleon, assumed possession of the place of ascendancy vacated by him on his fall, and they prepared to exercise over Europe as a whole the same authority as he had made so effective. The objects of their prime concern, as we have already seen, were to keep watch upon France and prevent her from breaking out again in revolution, to safeguard the treaties of 1815 as the immovable founda-

tion of the restored state system of the Continent, and to preserve the peace of the Western world against all persons and all influences that would wantonly disturb it. Their united and unanimous will to achieve these objects was embodied in a formal Quadruple Alliance signed on November 20, 1815, simultaneously with the second Treaty of Paris, whose terms it was the special function of the allies to enforce. The high contracting parties further agreed to meet from time to time "to consult upon their common interests and to consider the measures which at each of these periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations, and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe." In accordance with the arrangements made on this occasion a joint army of occupation, drawn from the troops of the four Powers and placed under the command of the Duke of Wellington, took possession of the north-eastern fortresses of France. The Concert of Europe began its surveillance of France in particular and the Continent in general.

The main purposes of the Quadruple Alliance were entirely definite and precise, viz. to maintain the treaties and to ensure the stability of the European system established by them. But there was room for considerable divergence of opinion respecting the question of what might be regarded as constituting a breach of the peace of Europe, and

also respecting the means which might properly be employed by the four guaranteeing Powers to preserve the peace. The three men whose opinion at that time most mattered were Metternich, Alexander I. of Russia, and Castlereagh. They were all agreed that revolutionary agitations likely to disturb the European equilibrium and the general tranquillity should be suppressed. But beyond that point their views diverged. Metternich represented reaction in its extreme form. Regarding Continental politics from the Austrian standpoint he was the avowed and implacable enemy of both democracy and nationality. He perceived that any concession to the principle of popular government would be fatal to the Hapsburg bureaucratic system, and that any concession to the principle of nationality would mean the disruption of the "ramshackle" Austrian empire itself. Hence he was prepared to stamp out the "Revolution" wherever it might manifest itself and in whatever shape it might appear. Alexander of Russia was at this stage of his erratic career much more liberal than Metternich. He had played a prominent part in compelling Louis XVIII. to grant a constitution to France; he himself had granted one to Poland, and he had been foremost in insisting that a promise of constitutions should be made by all the German princes who entered the Confederation of 1815. Nevertheless, in spite of his liberal sympathies, he was essentially anti-democratic and anti-national.

He held that constitutions to be valid must be voluntarily granted from above, not spontaneously generated from below ; that they must be conceded by princes, not rebelliously proclaimed by demagogues. Further, he had no objection to interfering, in the name of Europe, with the internal affairs of sovereign independent States. To Castlereagh, conservative and apprehensive of revolution though he was, neither of these principles was acceptable. The first invalidated the English constitution, which had been extorted from the Stuarts by means of successful civil war ; the second justified the long intrigues and frequent interventions of the Bourbons on behalf of the exiled Jacobites, and threw doubt on the Hanoverian title to the English crown. These were serious divergences of principle, and they portended the ultimate dissolution of the Concert of Europe. But at first, and for some years, they were concealed by the sense of unity and the desire for harmony which sprang from a consciousness of common perils past, common purposes achieved, and common tasks to perform. Alexander, indeed, made a strenuous and remarkable effort to confirm and supplement the political bond which united the members of the Quadruple Alliance to one another, by proposing the conclusion of a reciprocal personal and religious pact on the part of the princes of Europe generally. On September 26, 1815, he announced the terms of the "Holy Alliance," according to

which all rulers should pledge themselves in mutual aid "to take for their sole guide the precepts of the Christian religion," and "to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind." To the imperial invitation to take this pledge all the European potentates gave an affirmative answer except the Pope, the Sultan, and the English Regent. But no one beside Alexander himself and his friend Frederick William of Prussia took the holy bond seriously. Metternich regarded the whole business as "highfalutin absurdity," yet advised his sovereign to sign it, so as not to offend the Tzar. Castlereagh described it as "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense," and, being suspicious of the Tzar's intentions, he persuaded the Regent to evade committing himself by writing a vague letter of general admiration. The "Holy Alliance" (sad to say!) had no relation to practical politics, and was inoperative from the day of its inception to the day of Alexander's death (1825), when it faded into oblivion. It was on the Quadruple Alliance of November 1815 that the Concert of Europe was based.

§ 26. REACTION AND UNREST, 1815-18

Under the ægis of the Quadruple Alliance the forces of reaction had it all their own way for three

years. The ministers of the old and settled Powers pursued a policy of stern repression of popular movements ; the Bourbon kings of France Spain and Naples returned from exile determined to restore the antique régime in their respective realms ; the petty princes of Italy and Germany resumed the local tyrannies from which the French had expelled them. Ludicrous but ominous stories began to be told of the way in which all over the Continent the historical clock was being set back. The King of Sardinia, for instance, when he re-entered Turin wore the old-fashioned garments in which he had made his hasty departure nearly twenty years before, and as soon as he had resettled himself in his palace he restored, so far as he could, the functionaries who had held office in those remote days ; he repealed the legislation of the interim ; he destroyed the botanic gardens which the French had planted, and interdicted the use by his subjects of Napoleon's great road over the Mont Cenis Pass. In a similar spirit of obscurantism the Papacy abolished street lamps from Rome ; Francis of Modena swept away the reforms of a quarter of a century ; Ferdinand of Spain re-established the Inquisition ; the Elector of Hesse-Cassel claimed all the arrears of taxes which he had not received during the ten years of his exile. These absurd excesses of the smaller fry were paralleled by the more serious measures of the governments of the greater states. Metternich, the

incarnation of the reaction, developed throughout the heterogeneous Austrian dominions, and especially in the restless Italian provinces, a system of vigilant espionage and remorseless repression. Alexander displayed in all the Russias and in the newly-constituted kingdom of Poland the principles and practice of an eighteenth-century benevolent despot—albeit of one in whom, owing to the ingratitude of his subjects, the despotism increasingly prevailed over the benevolence. Castlereagh in England clearly expressed the view that the time had not yet come to imperil the stability of the constitution by making any concessions to the demands of reformers, and at his inspiration the Liverpool ministry passed a series of measures—the Five Acts of 1817, supplemented by the Seven Acts of 1819—under which English liberty sank to a lower ebb than at any period since the days of the Stuarts. In France, too, reaction held sway. Ministers, like Talleyrand and Fouché, who had held office under the Republic and the Empire, no matter how great their services in bringing about the Bourbon restoration, were dismissed. Marshal Ney and others who had assisted Napoleon on his return from Elba were, in spite of warnings and appeals, executed. Surviving regicides, such as Carnot, the “organiser of victory” during the glorious days of Bonaparte’s early triumphs, were driven into exile. The ultra-royalists of the South in a “White Terror,” which the Government did

little to restrain, fell upon the Republicans and the Bonapartists, and exacted a bloody revenge for their sufferings in the "Red Terror" of the opening years of the revolutionary era. The electoral qualification was raised, so that the franchise was retained by only some 80,000 propertied persons. The liberty of the press was restricted. Demands were even made for the restoration of aristocratic privilege, ecclesiastical lands, the Inquisition. Fortunately these extreme demands of the ultra-royalists were resisted by Louis XVIII., a prudent man who had no desire to go on his travels again, and by the moderate and statesmanly Duc de Richelieu, who succeeded to the place and power of Talleyrand as head of the administration. Yet not even Louis XVIII. and Richelieu could contemplate concessions to the "Revolution." For, however much they might have wished "to nationalise the monarchy," the allied army of occupation was established in vigilant force on the north-east frontier of the country, and there was no hope of its departure unless France could show evidence of a return to the ways of conservatism and repose. Hence, perforce, France conformed to the "Metternich system."

It would be unjust to suppose that either the originator or the supporters of the "Metternich system" were actuated by sinister motives, that they were unscrupulous plotters against the peoples whom they governed. They sincerely believed that the principles which they advocated and the measures

which they adopted were necessary for the salvation of the nations from anarchy and bloodshed, from

“red ruin and the breaking up of laws.”

Nor can it be denied that both the reckless words and the sanguinary deeds of the pioneers of the more liberal movements tended to confirm them in their belief. They were further strengthened by the Church wherein, by way of reaction from the ostentatious irreligion of the Revolution, a remarkable ultramontane revival manifested itself.¹ Similarly, in the realms of art and literature, a powerful “Romantic” renaissance showed the same tendency to return to old paths, to revive the traditions of the past, to obey venerable authorities, to eschew doubtful and dangerous novelties. Even philosophy abjured the Revolution; the Utilitarians, radical reformers though they were, condemned with a vehemence that Burke himself could hardly have exceeded the “anarchic fallacies” of the Rights of Man. Everywhere reaction reigned.

But beneath the surface burned the fires of a fierce unrest. The peoples who had felt the breath of liberty could never contentedly remain subject to external authority. The nations in whom the passion of patriotism had been kindled could no longer lie submissive under alien yokes. Democratic

¹ One of the most notable expressions of this religious revival is Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme*.

agitations manifested themselves in England, where the eighteenth-century demands for parliamentary reform and religious emancipation were revived ; in the Latin countries of southern Europe, where the Spanish " Constitution of 1812 " became the rallying cry of the reformers ;¹ above all, in Germany, where literary men, university professors, and associations of students (*Burschenschaften*) discoursed liberally, and demonstrated freely, in a manner most alarming to the potentates. Simultaneous with these democratic symptoms were national upheavals portending serious eruptions in Lombardy-Venetia, in Poland, in Norway, in Belgium, in Ireland. Added to these causes of anxiety were new and ominous evidences of social and economic uneasiness—breakings of machines, demands for repeal of combination laws, agitations against corn laws, protests against enclosures, calls for poor-law reform, claims for insurance against unemployment, attacks on landlords and capitalists.

~ The golden age of rest and recuperation, of goodwill and prosperity, which optimists had expected to follow the termination of the great wars, had not come. The pessimism and cynicism of Metternich seemed to be justified ; all the vigilance of the Powers appeared to be needed to prevent the

¹ This constitution, which was of an extremely revolutionary type, had been proclaimed at Cadiz by the leaders of the opposition to Joseph Bonaparte. It had been rescinded by Ferdinand VII. on his restoration in 1814. Cf. *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. x. p. 206.

"Revolution" from breaking out once more. In order that the Powers might survey the situation, and might decide on concerted measures in respect of it, they agreed to send representatives to a congress to be held at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818.

§ 27. THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle marked the summit of Metternich's European influence. At Vienna he had been thwarted and restrained by the doctrinaire liberalism of Alexander I. But Alexander came to the assembly of 1818 in a chastened and penitent mood. He had been shocked by the democratic demonstrations of the German students; he had been horrified by the discovery of secret societies in his own army; he had been outraged by the revelation of a plot to kidnap himself on his way to Aix. Hence he was fain to admit that Metternich had been right when he declared that to make any concessions to liberalism was to open the floodgates to uncontrollable disorder. The repentance of the Tzar left Metternich indisputably dominant. He moulded the assembled monarchs and ministers according to his will, and at the close of the proceedings he was able to say with some congratulation that he "had never seen a prettier little congress."

The first questions with which the plenipoten-

tiaries had to deal related to France. For three years that country had been in probation under the vigilant and suspicious eyes of the Quadruple Alliance. She had fulfilled their requirements and satisfied their tests. Her monarchy had shown itself to be stable; the ministry of the Duc de Richelieu had manifested a prudent conservatism which seemed full of happy augury for the future. Hence it appeared safe to withdraw the allied army of occupation—a thing ardently desired by the whole French nation—and to admit France as a returned and reformed prodigal into the fraternity of the Powers. This accordingly was done: on September 30 the evacuation was agreed to; on November 4 Louis XVIII. was invited to join his brethren at the congress. He was admitted to the sacred circle of the Holy Alliance; but at the same time, in order to guard against all possible contingencies, the precautionary Quadruple Alliance was secretly renewed.

The second series of problems which came before the congress related to Germany. The Confederation established in 1815, with its Diet of diplomatic agents debating interminably at Frankfort-on-Main, had already existed long enough to reveal itself to the world as a complete and even ludicrous failure. Its lack of experience and the absence of constitutional precedents involved it in hopeless tangles of procedure; its addiction to philosophy lured it into labyrinths of abstract controversy; its want of

executive power made its decisions, on the rare occasions when it arrived at any, the laughing-stock of the recalcitrant princes. Thus the congress was called upon to consider and settle numerous particularist difficulties which the Diet had been impotent to solve. Such were the claims of the ruler of Hesse-Cassel to the title of king; the problem of the succession in Baden; the status of various princes; the boundaries of several contiguous states. But far surpassing these in importance was the problem of the suppression of the "Revolution" as it had manifested itself in the press, in the lecture-rooms of the universities, in the students' associations and the gymnastic societies, in the various free cities, and, above all, in the territories of the liberal Grand Duke of Weimar, whose university of Jena was the hotbed of democratic and national propaganda. The congress itself disposed of most of the particularist questions; but as to the suppression of the "Revolution" in Germany it took the fateful step of leaving the two chief German Powers, Austria and Prussia, to consult together and take the necessary steps. This involved the virtual supersession of the Diet in favour of a dual control on the part of the major states. The representatives of these two states, Metternich of Austria and Hardenberg of Prussia, whose minds were entirely in accord with one another, made arrangements for a conference on German affairs to be held later on; but

meantime, before departing from Aix-la-Chapelle, they had several European concerns to attend to.

At no congress were so many and various matters brought up for discussion as at that of Aix-la-Chapelle. The hegemony of the Great Powers seems to have been generally recognised, and from every part of Europe appeals came to the assembled diplomats as to a High Court of Continental Jurisdiction. Of these the most important were lodged by Denmark and Spain respectively; the former sought successfully for the enforcement upon Sweden of her treaty obligations respecting Norway; the latter begged unavailingly for moral and material aid in the reconquest of her revolted American Colonies. Britain brought forward the matter of the slave-trade; but once more jealousy of British sea-power prevented agreement upon a vigorous policy of suppression. The kindred question of the extermination of the Barbary pirates, whose depredations rendered the Mediterranean insecure, had similarly to be shelved because of British unwillingness to allow a Russian squadron to enter that sea to take part in a joint enterprise. Thus even at the height of Metternich's ascendancy, at the time when the suzerainty of the Concert was most fully admitted, and at the congress where the consciousness of European unity was most profound, suspicions and dissensions were evident. Serious divergencies of interests and grave differences of opinion prevented

the settlement, and even the effective discussion, of any really controversial problem.

In Germany, however, opposition to the Metternich system was crushed out. As a sequel to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, conferences of German Powers were held in 1819 at Teplitz and Carlsbad successively. Their outcome was to establish the guardianship of the Confederation and the execution of the decrees of its Diet in the hands of Austria and Prussia; to appoint curators over the universities; to dissolve the students' clubs and gymnastic societies; to strengthen the censorship of the press; and to appoint a commission to inquire into and suppress secret conspiracies. In the "Carlsbad Decrees" reaction reached its high-water mark.

§ 28. THE EUROPEAN UPHEAVAL, 1818-20

Strengthened by the unanimity of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, the monarchs and ministers returned to their respective countries resolute to suppress the "Revolution." Throughout the Continent generally a régime of unprecedented rigour was established and maintained. In Germany, under the direct superintendence of Metternich, the Diet was controlled, the universities crippled, liberal professors dismissed, the press muzzled, bureaucracy made supreme. In France the ultra-royalist and ultramontane party continued to gain ground under the leadership of

the Comte d'Artois and the Comte de Villèle, and a successful struggle to restrict the franchise still further (1820) prepared the way for the complete triumph of reactionaries over moderates in 1821. In England the Liverpool ministry, dominated by the masterful personality of Castlereagh, pursued with increasing severity its policy of repression unrelieved by reform; the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended, the censorship of the press made rigid, the holding of public meetings restricted, the law of libel rendered more oppressive, the possession of arms interdicted. In the Latin countries of southern Europe—countries where political moderation is unknown and where no thought of compromise or concession ever mitigates the insensate determination of each extremist to get his own way—a veritable royalist reign of terror was instituted; espionage inquisition treachery imprisonment assassination execution, all played their part in an orgy of religious persecution and veiled war of extermination.

Increased reactionary repression, however, everywhere led to increased popular resistance; from all parts of Europe came reports of growing disorder, spreading disaffection, multiplying excursions and alarms. In northern Europe—Germany France England—the governments were strong and prudent enough to keep rebellion in check. But in southern Europe—Spain Portugal Naples—folly and feebleness on the part of the restored rulers co-operated

with violence and unreason on the part of the oppressed populace to produce revolutionary outbreaks of formidable proportions. Everywhere the main demand was the same; it was a democratic demand for constitutions, for responsible ministries, for extensions of franchise, for freedom of thought and speech. Behind it, moreover, everywhere lay vaguely formulated aspirations after larger social equality and greater economic opportunity. Nevertheless, each country had, in addition to these general demands and aspirations, its own peculiar problems, and in each the manifestation of unrest had its own special features.

In Germany the sense of national unity, stimulated by the war of liberation, had declined. Particularism had reasserted itself, and the progressive movement had become broken up into a number of local agitations for an extension of self-government. These agitations were led by, and frequently limited to, small coteries of intellectuals whose prime interests lay in the realm of political theory—democrats of the chair, wordy idealogues devoid of practical common-sense. Well do they deserve the contempt which Treitschke has poured upon them, and rarely has the cause of liberalism suffered more disservice than it did at their incapable hands. In Bavaria Baden and Wurtemberg, whose rulers actually granted constitutions, they speedily made government impossible. In Prussia Saxony Hanover and other North-

German states they passed from vehement words to lawless deeds, and the murder of a reactionary journalist named Kotzebue on March 23, 1819 gave the Powers who were represented at Carlsbad later in the year a valid excuse for the severe measures of repression which they adopted. The agitators were crushed, and they had not deserved to succeed.

In France the progressive movement was much more widespread and popular. It drew its supporters from many and large bodies of men who still held to the doctrines of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, or who still regretted the downfall of the enlightened plebiscitary empire of Napoleon. The reasonable demand of these important and numerous sections of the community for freedom and franchise was one which could not be indefinitely postponed without grave peril to the state ; but for the moment the obstinacy of the ultra-royalist minority which refused concessions was reinforced by the support of moderates who dreaded the recurrence of violence and the renewal of European intervention. Once more, too, the extremists played into the hands of their opponents : the murder of the Duc de Berri, heir prospective to the Crown, on February 13, 1820, seemed to justify the alarm of the moderates and the precautionary measures of the reactionaries. Hence in France too the cause of repression prevailed.

In England industrial distress, agricultural depression, high prices, unemployment, heavy taxation,

corn laws, combined with steady refusal on the part of both parliament and ministry to contemplate alleviation or discuss reform, culminated in the Peterloo riots of 1819 and the Cato-Street Conspiracy of 1820. Both, however, were easily crushed, and the government, still haunted by the terror of the red spectre, pursued its retrogressive course.

In the south of Europe, however, a very different kind of drama was unfolding itself. Here the "Revolution" gained some alarming successes. In Spain, on New Year's Day, 1820, troops destined for the reconquest of the American Colonies rose in revolt under Colonel Riego. The mutiny spread to the rest of the army, and as a result the reactionary Ferdinand VII., deprived of the mainstay of his despotism, was compelled to grant a constitution, suppress the Inquisition, and accept a liberal ministry. A similar military rising in Portugal under Colonel Sepulveda led to the overthrow of the regency and necessitated the return from Brazil of the absentee king, John VI. Before he was allowed to land he too had to swear his acceptance of the radical Spanish "Constitution of 1812." Finally, in Naples, the disaffection which had long been fomented and organised by the secret society of the Carbonari burst forth into rebellion under the leadership of General Pepe. King Ferdinand I., deserted by his army, was constrained to surrender, and to proclaim with a superfluity of oaths his adoption of the

popular—though little understood — “Constitution of 1812.” Having yielded, however, with extreme reluctance, he appealed to Metternich for counsel consolation and assistance. Hence the Congress of Troppau.

§ 29. THE CONGRESSES OF TROPPAU, LAIBACH,
AND VERONA

Metternich had viewed with grave anxiety the successive outbreaks of revolution in the Latin kingdoms of southern Europe during the course of the year 1820. So long, indeed, as they had been confined to the Spanish peninsula he had thought it unnecessary and indeed imprudent to intervene. His attitude of aloofness, however, had been due not to any lack of antipathy to the constitutionalists, but rather to the suspicious and disquieting eagerness of Alexander I. to send a large Russian army across Europe to the aid of the Spanish Royalists, and to his obvious desire to secure the establishment of a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean. Metternich dreaded the Russians at the gates of the West even more than he dreaded the revolutionists. Hence he sent to Alexander a long and bewildering despatch in which he argued that as the causes of the peninsular risings were “material” and not “moral” there was no call for the holy allies to intervene. Metternich was always a remarkable adept in finding general

principles to fit particular cases ; he first decided the policy which Austrian interests demanded, then he sought for eternal and immutable laws, of which that policy might seem to be the exemplification.

The subtle distinction, however, between material and moral causes of rebellion was wholly irrelevant to Austrian interests when the trouble spread from Spain to Naples. Whatever the nature of the revolt, it menaced the Austrian ascendancy in the Italian peninsula too immediately to be allowed to prosper and extend. Even before Ferdinand's appeal reached him, Metternich had resolved that the Neapolitan rising must be suppressed. He tried at first to secure permission from the Powers for Austria to take instant and individual action. To this course, however, strong opposition was manifested from several quarters, and Metternich had to postpone operations pending the assembly of a congress which was summoned to meet at Troppau in Silesia. Having determined to adopt in respect of Naples a policy diametrically opposite to that which he had pursued in regard to Spain, viz. a policy of intervention, he was compelled in the interval prior to the gathering of the diplomats to discover or invent a new general principle applicable to the changed requirements of the situation. This new general principle he announced in due course in a memorandum remarkable for disingenuous skill. He distinguished between revolutions initiated from

above and those initiated from below : the first, however undesirable, were legitimate and could not be interfered with ; the second were illegitimate and ought to be suppressed. The Neapolitan revolution was obviously of the infernal order. Castlereagh, on behalf of the British Government, while not denying the infernal nature of the rising or disputing Austria's treaty-right to intervene to suppress it, definitely declined to accept the new principle enunciated by Metternich which, he contended, would widely extend the scope and radically change the nature of the Quadruple Alliance. He clearly recognised that it was a principle under which the English revolution of 1688 would stand condemned as illegitimate. Thus was heard the first grave and unresolvable discord in the Concert of Europe. When the plenipotentiaries met at Troppau in October 1820 the dissonance was accentuated. True, the actual decision respecting Naples was postponed by being referred to an adjourned congress to be held at Laibach in Carniola, whither Ferdinand was invited ; but the crucial issue was forced by means of a protocol, drawn up by the representatives of Austria Russia and Prussia, which proclaimed the dogma that "States that have undergone a change of government due to revolution, the results of which threaten other states, *ipso facto* cease to be members of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees for legal order

and stability," and pledged the Powers "by peaceful means, or, if need be, by arms to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance." Here was a new principle justifying intervention—a doubtful distinction between internal changes that have and those that have not external results—which Castlereagh felt compelled emphatically to repudiate. It was thus that, in a condition of acute dissension, the congress dispersed to meet after Christmas at Laibach. To Laibach in January 1821 came Ferdinand of Naples to pour his complaints into the sympathetic ears of Metternich and Alexander. He had no difficulty in showing that the Neapolitan revolution had originated from below and not from above. Metternich was able with equal ease to demonstrate that if successful its "external result" would be the undermining of the Austrian dominion in Italy. Hence, in spite of British protests, Austria was commissioned by the congress to suppress the revolution and to restore Ferdinand to his former position. This she at once proceeded to do. Her army entered Naples, defeated the constitutionalists at Rieti on March 7, 1821, occupied the capital, and re-established autocratic government. The original purpose of the congresses of Troppau and Laibach was accomplished. The plenipotentiaries, however, lingered in Laibach until May in order to discuss the affairs of Europe in general. Alexander was now so submissive that it was a pleasure to

Metternich to talk to him. Before the conversations came to an end it happened by a strange fatality that two other revolutions broke out, one of which added new and grave complications to the tangle of Continental politics. The first of the two was merely a military rising in Piedmont, exactly parallel to the Neapolitan revolt. Officers of the army demanded the inevitable "Constitution of 1812," and, when King Victor Emmanuel I. refused it, compelled him to resign. Here clearly was a revolution started from below and likely to have external consequences not less injurious to the Austrian system in Italy than the Neapolitan rebellion. Hence, in accordance with the principle of the Troppau protocol, Austrian troops entered Piedmont and crushed the revolt at Novara (April 8, 1821). Under Austrian protection the reactionary Charles Felix became King of Sardinia.

It was the second of the two outbreaks that caused trouble. This was the national rising of the Greeks against the Turks. It opened up so many novel and dangerous problems that Metternich thought it necessary at first to ignore it as lying outside the scope of the Concert of Europe. Its rapid and formidable spread, however, combined with the interest which it excited in western Europe, soon made the policy of the blind eye impossible. A new congress became imperative. Two already existing problems, moreover, had for some time been

growing in acuteness. These were the problems of the unsuppressed democratic upheaval in Spain, and the problem of the unrecovered Spanish colonies of the New World. To consider these three questions—the Greek revolt, the Spanish revolution, and the Latin-American insurrection—the Congress of Verona was called.

§ 30. BREAK-UP OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

The Congress of Verona, which met in October 1822, saw the definite break-up of the Concert of Europe, the catastrophic collapse of that system of international control on the part of the Great Powers which had been established in 1814–15 at Chaumont Paris and Vienna. When the negotiators first assembled it was the Greek question which seemed most likely to cause a schism; for the interests of Russia in this problem were diametrically opposed to those of Austria. To Russia the revolt was a matter of religion; it was the rising of a persecuted Christian people of the orthodox communion against an infidel tyranny. Hence Russian sympathies were passionately on the side of the Greeks. To Austria the revolt was a mere vulgar rebellion against legitimate political authority. Hence Austrian feeling was wholly on the side of the Sultan. Alexander and Metternich, however, both recognised the danger to the unity of Europe which a discussion of this disruptive Eastern question would involve.

Hence they decided that it should not be discussed. It was declared to relate to concerns which lay "beyond the pale of civilisation," *i.e.* outside that restricted sphere over which the Quadruple Alliance played the part of Providence. For Metternich this decision was a triumph; it left the Turks free to pursue their policy of extermination. For Alexander it was a surrender; it meant that he deliberately sacrificed the leadership of his own nation, the headship of the Orthodox Church, and the very existence of the Greeks, in order to maintain the semblance of international harmony. The Eastern question thus having been shelved, the congress turned to the affairs of Spain, and it was concerning these that the ultimate schism occurred. The struggle in Spain between the constitutionalists and the monarchists had degenerated into a ferocious and sanguinary civil war destructive of all order and good government. The French ministry, now led by the reactionary and ultra-royalist Villèle, was eager to intervene on behalf of Ferdinand VII. Britain, however, through her representative the Duke of Wellington, at last took a firm stand. She expressly declared herself to be opposed to any interference in the internal affairs of a country, and asserted the right of every people to determine its own form of government.¹ The other members of

¹ This policy was formulated by Castlereagh. Before the Congress of Verona assembled Castlereagh died and was succeeded at the Foreign Office by George

the congress were irritated and perturbed by Britain's defection, but they were not deterred from pursuing their policy of intervention. The French were commissioned to cross the Pyrenees as mandatories of the Powers and to reduce Spain to order under the authority of its king. This the French did in 1823. Ferdinand was restored; the constitution was suppressed; the inquisition reintroduced, and a reign of terror inaugurated. Britain, having protested in vain, formally withdrew from the congress, and the Concert of Europe was at an end.

The question of the revolted Spanish-American colonies still remained for consideration and settlement. Inspired and led by Bolivar "the Liberator," first Columbia (of which Bolivar was proclaimed president in 1821) and later Mexico Peru Buenos-Ayres Chile, followed by the Central American states, had set themselves up as sovereign republics. France and Russia were eager to send expeditions to the aid of the King of Spain, and Ferdinand, for his part, was willing to make large concessions of American territory to those who would aid him in recovering his lost empire. France renewed her ambition of dominion in the New World; Russia (to whom Alaska already belonged) formed hopes of the acquisition of all the Canadian and Californian littoral. Both Britain and the United

Canning. The new minister supported the principle of non-intervention with even more determination than his predecessor.

States were thoroughly alarmed. They had alike to face the possibility that their expanding peoples might be cut off for ever from the Pacific, and that the conflicts of the Seven Years' War might be renewed. Hence the British minister, Canning, and the American president, Monroe, agreed upon the policy which in 1823 was formally promulgated as the "Monroe Doctrine." The interference of the European Powers in American affairs was interdicted. Spain, thus deprived of the hope of external assistance in the attempt to reconquer her revolted dominions, soon had to acknowledge that the task of recovery was beyond her strength. Before, however, Spain was compelled to bow her pride to the inevitable recognition of accomplished facts, the United States and Britain, followed by France and the other European Powers, had found that the interests of commerce and the need to suppress piracy required them to open diplomatic relations with the new American republics. The action of Canning in preventing European intervention in Spanish America roused the most violent indignation not only in the court of Ferdinand VII., but also in the wide circles dominated by Metternich. To the Austrian statesman, striving to keep the Concert of Europe together, the new controller of British policy appeared to be a "malevolent meteor hurled by an angry Providence upon Europe." Britain had, indeed, definitely separated herself in respect of the

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affairs of Spain and Latin America from her former allies of the congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle. To Castlereagh, had he been alive, this separation and renewed isolation would have seemed to be a disaster. But Canning welcomed it. "Things are getting back to a wholesome state again," he said. For he recognised that the hegemony of the Great Powers which had been established in the interests of peace stability justice and law had become under Metternich's control an instrument of oppression and interference fatal to the free development of every subject nation.

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LECTURE V

THE ERA OF NATIONAL REVOLTS, 1822-30

§ 31. THE DAWN OF A NEW AGE

THE year 1822 saw a remarkable change in the European situation. The defection of Britain broke up the Concert of Europe, and the break-up of the Concert of Europe removed an intolerable incubus under which the Continent had begun to groan and agonise. It is strange that so hopeful an attempt to organise an international government as that made in 1815 should in seven years have collapsed in so execrable a failure ; it is sad that so sincere an effort to curb the lawlessness of individual states and the ambitions of militarist potentates should have ended so soon in a more than Napoleonic tyranny ; it is ominous that what had been originally a league of peace could in 1822 be properly described by Canning as a league "to bind Europe in chains." It is important to ask what were the causes of this catastrophic disruption of the Confederation of the Continent—particularly important now in view of

the fact that the ravages of the present war and the proved impotence of existing law to restrain anarchic states have revived again dreams of a League of Peace and hopes of a new advance "towards international government."

The failure and the consequent dissolution of the Concert of Europe, 1815-22, were due, first, to the fact that the members of the Concert were legitimist sovereigns and bureaucratic ministers who were out of touch with, and indifferent to, the opinions and aspirations of their subjects; secondly, to the facts that the Treaties of Vienna, to whose maintenance they were committed, were not such as to provide a satisfactory permanent constitution for Europe, and that no arrangements had been made for the revision or modification of these treaties; thirdly, to the fact that those who controlled the policy of the Concert—in particular, Metternich—were filled by an exaggerated and irrational dread of the "Revolution"—a dread which caused them to oppose as subversive of stable government every popular movement, and to suppress as schismatic every national aspiration; finally, to the fact that the Powers had not been able to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of states whose constitutional development displeased them, and had even avowed the principle of such interference as a dogma of their system of governance. In brief, the Concert of Europe as it existed from the Congress of Vienna to

the Congress of Verona failed because it ignored and resisted the growing forces of democracy and nationality. We have seen that it had many reasons, born of painful experience, to regard these forces with hostility and alarm ; nevertheless there is ground for infinite lamentation that there were none among the leaders of Europe at this critical period to perceive with prophetic insight that these were the influences which were to mould the future, and to recognise that it was the function of the statesman not to resist them, but so to guide them as to turn them from their evil work of blind destruction to the work of building up a new and better world. At this juncture, as so often in the history of mankind, the principles of Order and Progress appeared to be opposed to one another in irreconcilable conflict : stability seemed to be incompatible with advance. In 1815 moderate opinion in Europe was so much oppressed by a consciousness of the villainies and barbarities which had been perpetrated in the name of Progress during the revolutionary era that it unhesitatingly gave its omnipotent support to the cause of Order. By 1822, however, Order had shown itself to be so closely identified with stagnation obscurantism reaction corruption cruelty and inquisitorial persecution that moderate opinion had begun to recover its equilibrium.

It was in Britain, happy in her insularity and in her comparatively liberal constitution, that the panic

caused by the Revolution first passed away. The return to political equanimity was indicated, on the one hand by Canning's formal breach with Metternich, on the other hand by a reconstruction of the cabinet and the inauguration of a new era of reform. Both of these events occurred in 1822. Britain's changed attitude in respect of both foreign and domestic policy had a striking and instantaneous effect upon the Continent, and indeed upon the world at large. The leaders of progressive causes, the advocates of change, the pioneers of new ideas, the rebels and the revolutionaries, realised instinctively and at once that the repressive European "Areopagus" (as Canning called it) which for so long had crushed down every popular rising had, owing to the defection of Britain, lost its power to harm. Immediately far and wide a ferment of agitations began, incalculable in number, infinite in variety. There were democratic agitations for a share in political power and extensions of the franchise ; religious agitations for increase of toleration and removal of disabilities ; social agitations for recognition of trade unions, repeal of anti-combination laws, improvement of factory conditions, reform of the poor law ; economic agitations for removal of corn duties and freedom of trade ; educational agitations for elementary schools and for the general opening of intellectual careers. But most marked of all were the nationalist agitations, and it was these that

gave to the following years, 1822-30, their distinctive character. Some of them were premature and abortive, it is true ; the time had not yet come for Germany and Italy to attain to unity, or for Bohemia Hungary Serbia and Bulgaria to secure autonomy. But so many were carried through to a successful issue that they effected a notable modification of the political system of the globe. If we include the Spanish-American republics and the Portuguese empire of Brazil, we have to assign the origin of about one dozen national states to this brief period of eight years in the world's history. When we consider that these new states constitute approximately one-fourth of the total number at present in existence, we shall realise the preponderant importance of the national movement at this time. To the national movement, then, this lecture will be devoted, the other significant movements of the octave being reserved for consideration in the introductory section of the next lecture.

§ 32. THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY

What is the principle of nationality which has had so potent an influence in moulding the modern world? It is almost as difficult to answer this question as it is to say precisely what are such so-called forces as electricity gravitation and chemical cohesion, which play so important a part in the

constitution of the physical universe. Dr. Holland Rose in his recent book, *Nationality in Modern History*, abandons the effort to discover a scientific connotation when he declares (p. 152) that "it is an instinct, and cannot be exactly defined." Professor Ramsay Muir in his brilliant essay on *Nationalism and Internationalism* admits (p. 51) that "Nationality is an elusive idea, difficult to define," but he rightly considers that an attempt at definition must be made unless the hope of understanding and interpreting the meaning and significance of nineteenth-century history is also itself to be given up. In his efforts to arrive at a definition he wisely reduces the abstract term "nationality" to its concrete basis "nation," and asks, What are the distinctive marks of a nation?

Now thus stated the question is much easier of approach, even if its ultimate solution is not appreciably facilitated. For we are surrounded by nations, and it is a matter of extreme simplicity to note what appear to be their common features. Those nations which first occur to our minds seem to be characterised by (1) the occupation of a specific geographical area; (2) a certain homogeneity of race; (3) a unity of language; (4) some uniformity of religion, and (5) a community of economic interests. A little further reflection, however, calls to our thoughts instances of peoples to whom the term "nation" cannot possibly be denied, but who do not exhibit all or any of these

marks. For example, the Jews have no country, the English are heterogeneous in race, the Belgians are bilingual, the Swiss are divided in religion, the French have many and conflicting economic interests. Not one of these marks, then, can be regarded as essential. Nevertheless, this must be said : there are limits beyond which geographical dispersion, racial divergence, linguistic difference, religious schism, and economic strife are fatal to national sentiment. If the Jews have not a country now, they once had one, and they long with a passionate desire for its recovery and their own reunion therein. Every nation, however heterogeneous in origin, is brought by intermarriages some steps along the road towards racial unity ; such alienation as separates black from white in America is incompatible with nationhood. Again, if it is possible for French-speaking Belgians and those of Flemish tongue to combine in an organic national state, that combination is feasible only because basal similarities of structure and vocabulary make it easy for multitudes of citizens to know both languages ; amalgamation between peoples of dialects so diverse as, say, English and Arabic is out of the question. Similarly, there are sufficient common factors in Catholicism and Protestantism to render practicable, if not easy, the growth of a sense of unity ; between Christianity and Islam, or Islam and Hinduism, the conflict is too grave to permit the development of the national sentiment.

These common geographical racial linguistic and religious factors, then, must not be wholly absent. Still, they are not the great essential thing. What is that? It is a common tradition, a common will, and a common outlook. Professor Muir well expresses one aspect of this truth when he says: "It is probable that the most important of all nation-moulding factors, the one indispensable factor which must be present whatever else be lacking, is the possession of a common tradition, a memory of sufferings endured and victories won in common, expressed in song and legend, in the dear names of great personalities that seem to embody in themselves the character and ideals of the nation, in the names also of sacred places wherein the national memory is enshrined.¹ Another aspect is indicated in a definition by Mr. A. J. Toynbee, who says that a nation "is simply a group of men inspired by a common will to co-operate for certain purposes." Taken by itself this definition is inadequate: it suggests a co-operative society rather than a nation; for the purposes of a nation are not certain. But it supplies an element lacking in Professor Muir's analysis: it emphasises the fact that the vital bonds of national union include not only memories of the past, but also activities in the present and hopes for the future. Hence, perhaps, we may define nationality as that principle, compounded

¹ Muir, *Nationalism and Internationalism*, p. 48.

of past traditions present interests and future aspirations, which gives to a people a sense of organic unity, and separates them from the rest of mankind.

The principle of nationality was not unknown in the ancient world. The Hebrew people possessed it strongly : it gave some sort of communion to the Hellenes. Obscured and suppressed by the dominance of imperial Rome, it emerged once more in the Middle Ages. First England, then Scotland and France, finally Spain and Portugal developed into national states. It was indeed the emergence of these national states and their triumph over the Empire and the Papacy that marked the transition from mediæval to modern times. But, though the national principle was thus potent from the period of the Reformation, it was not until it had been accentuated in France by the Revolution and in Europe by the Napoleonic wars that it became definitely formulated as a political dogma and promulgated as a gospel of revolt. Its formulation and promulgation were largely the work of Italian patriots who sought for the deliverance of their country from a foreign yoke, and of German professors who sought for the consolidation of their particularist governments into a unitary state. But in 1822 the day of the triumph of Italian and German nationality was yet half a century distant. During the period with which we are now concerned the national

principle struggled and prevailed only in more humble spheres.

§ 33. INCIPIENT NATIONAL MOVEMENTS

The incipient and unsuccessful national movements of the period 1822-30 manifested themselves mainly within the limits of the four great empires—British Russian Austrian and Turkish,—whose organisation was so strong as to impose an insuperable barrier to the realisation of any separatist ideals of which the rulers of those empires did not approve. Within the British Empire, indeed, the principle of nationality did not as a rule tend towards separatism. In Canada, however, there was an Old French nation whose loyalty was at the time strained to the breaking-point, and in South Africa an Old Dutch nation which found the English governance intolerable. But, generally, the inhabitants of British overseas dominions, though developing distinct characteristics and becoming unmistakably new nations, desired no more than self-government and permission to grow in their own way. The transformation of the British Empire from a unitary monarchy into a federation of free states, which began in the agitations of this period, clearly indicated the manner in which, if ever, the Commonwealth of the world will have in the future to be constituted. It will not be a cosmopolitan *pot-pourri*; it will be a union of sharply-defined

autonomous nations. In Ireland the national movement was (as it still remains) less auspicious. The struggle for Catholic emancipation (secured in 1829) and for the repeal of the Act of Union was accompanied by much hostility towards Great Britain, and a distinct desire for entire separation.

Within the Russian Empire both Finland and Poland were restless with unsatisfied national aspirations. Finland wished for reunion with Sweden, but remained outwardly quiet. Poland, on the other hand, grew increasingly turbulent, until in 1830 it broke into open revolt and proclaimed its independence. Alexander I. so long as he had lived had striven to maintain the constitution which had been granted in 1815, and to govern Poland as a kingdom distinct from Russia on the lines of a western limited monarchy. The hopeless factiousness of the Poles, however, which had caused the ruin of their country in the eighteenth century, frustrated his good intentions, made liberal government an impossibility, and necessitated the suspension of the constitution in 1823. Nicholas I., who succeeded in 1825, was an autocrat by nature, and he had no love for either the Poles or their charter of anarchy. The discovery of a plot to assassinate him on the occasion of his coronation in Warsaw did not tend to conciliate him. Mutual irritation and suspicion, continually growing during the first five years of the reign, culminated on the part of the Poles in a military

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insurrection on November 29, 1830. The rebels made a strenuous but ill-organised struggle for independence. In vain they appealed to liberal support in Britain and France ; they received nothing beyond sympathetic messages which merely served to aggravate the malignity of the wrath of Nicholas. The rising was suppressed with sanguinary completeness. In 1832 the constitution was formally abrogated ; in 1847 Poland lost its last trace of autonomy by being incorporated into Russia.

Within the "ramshackle empire" of Austria half a dozen separate and mutually destructive national movements were in progress. The Magyars of Hungary demanded the official use of their own language in 1825, and in 1828 asserted a claim to political independence. They showed no sign, however, of conceding autonomy to the Southern Slavs of Croatia Dalmatia and Slavonia who groaned under their unsympathetic tyranny. Hence in these regions a so-called "Illyrian" agitation sprang up intensely hostile to Hungarian policy. The Northern Slavs of Bohemia, stirred by the energies of their southern kinsmen, revived the Czech language, renewed the study of their national literature, and (led by the historian Palacky) proclaimed the mediæval glories of their state. They, too, sought to recover their lost rights of self-government. In Galicia the Poles protested against the political ascendancy of the Germans, while the Ruthenes

showed swelling resentment against the social and economic dominance of the Poles. Above all, in Lombardy and Venetia Italian patriots nourished ideals and formulated schemes of an emancipated and united peninsula purged of the hated White-coats.

Finally, within the Turkish empire the Christian peoples began to show signs of late returning national consciousness. The Rumanian principalities had been virtually free from Turkish control since the Russian Treaty of Kutchuk - Kainardji in 1774 : a desire for complete and acknowledged independence, however, found expression during this period, especially amid the Russo - Turkish negotiations of 1829. Serbia was in active revolt against the Turks in 1822, and by 1826, aided by Russia, she forced the Turks to withdraw their garrisons and rest content with a mere formal recognition of their suzerainty. Albania and Montenegro both defied the authority of the Sultan, and sought to secure the status of independent principalities. Bulgaria alone, too near Constantinople to run the risk of political experiment, and too much crushed by Turkish tyranny to respond readily to any vitalising influence, remained impassive in the dawn. It was in Greece, however, that the great bid for deliverance and autonomy was made.

§ 34. GREEK INDEPENDENCE

The people who called themselves Greeks or Hellenes were at the time with which we are now concerned divided into three main groups. First came the Greeks of the Morea, a peasantry ignorant oppressed brutalised addicted to brigandage and murder, yet allowed by the Turkish Government so large a measure of religious independence and local autonomy as to retain some trace of political sense and some rudiments of national organisation. The second group was formed by the Greeks of the islands, a prosperous and progressive commercial community which—taking advantage of the Russian protectorate of 1774, the British occupation of 1798–1815, and the opportunities for trade offered by the Continental blockade of Napoleon—had formed a large mercantile marine and had amassed great wealth. The third section consisted of the Greeks of the Dispersion, scattered throughout the world, but chiefly settled in London Paris and other Continental capitals. These were primarily men of literary artistic and philosophical propensities, and for the most part young men filled with revolutionary enthusiasms.

The Greek national movement began as a Hellenic literary revival in Paris. The poet Rhégas, the scholar Korais, and their fellows, dwelling upon the obvious fact that the language in which they

conversed and wrote was, in spite of corruptions and accretions, essentially that of the Athens of Pericles, persuaded themselves that they and their countrymen were descendants of the great and memorable men who had ruled a free and independent Hellas in the glorious days of antiquity. It was an inspiring hallucination leading them to dream of exploits against the Turks similar to those which their predecessors had wrought against the Persians. They also remembered that Greek-speaking emperors had reigned in Constantinople for a thousand years before the Turk had seized the city, and that the desecrated St. Sophia was the mother church of the Orthodox religion. It was the mediæval Byzantine empire, indeed, rather than the ancient city state that they wished to restore. The lofty aspirations of the literary exiles awoke sympathetic ambitions among the prosperous Greeks of the islands and among their kinsmen in the ports of the Euxine and Aegean seas. Aided by their excellent and far-reaching commercial organisation, they founded in 1814 a militant Secret Society, the *Hetaireia Philike*, whose objects were the deliverance of the Hellenic race, the overthrow of the Turk, the recovery of Constantinople, the revival of the Orthodox empire of the East.

The position of the Greeks in the Turkish empire was at that time far from unfavourable. It was, indeed, one of peculiar privilege. Large measures

of religious tolerance, political autonomy, and commercial monopoly gave them opportunities for self-realisation which may well have excited the envy of Protestants in Spain, Poles in Prussia, or Jews anywhere on the Continent. But there was no security of tenure: all was held in virtue of the uncovenanted grace of the infidel barbarian who had planted his military despotism in the city of Constantine. The prosperity of the Greeks was that of useful slaves whose activities are profitable to callous lords. The Turkish law-courts afforded no protection against injustice; no safeguards existed whereby the incidence of limitless taxation could be avoided. Contemptuous tolerance might at any moment give place to remorseless persecution. It was a situation intolerable for any people in whom a national consciousness existed. The Greek aspirations after emancipation from the Ottoman yoke were further stimulated by the open encouragement of French and English Hellenists, and by the religious sympathy of Alexander I. whose foreign minister from 1815 to 1822 was the Greek Count Capodistrias.

The opportunity for rebellion seemed to present itself in 1821, when a serious Albanian revolt under Ali of Janina called to the shores of the Adriatic the bulk of the Turkish forces. In March 1821 the Greeks of the Danubian principalities (modern Rumania) rose, hoping for Russian aid. It happened, however, unhappily for the rebels, that the Congress of Laibach

was in session at the moment. Alexander I., under the influence of Metternich repudiated the insurrectionists, and the Turks were thus enabled soon to suppress the revolt. Next month a far more general and formidable national uprising occurred in the Morea. The Greeks of the islands lent it their support, in particular the priceless assistance of their fleets. The Greeks of the Dispersion hastened to join their co-linguists. The Hellenists of western Europe (including the English Lord Byron) volunteered so multitudinously on behalf of the cause of classical restoration that the Sultan complained that he was called upon to face, not merely a rebellion of his subjects, but a European coalition as well. The conflict was waged with unmitigated ferocity on both sides ; in point of barbarity there was little to choose between the brigands of the Morea and the Ottoman soldiery. Neither side, however, could gain a decided superiority over the other, and as the war dragged its slow sanguinary course along in sight of a spectant Europe, it became increasingly difficult for the Powers to refrain from intervention. Britain began to suffer much from injured trade ; France felt the stirrings of its old crusading zeal ; but, above all, Russia was outraged by the murders of the Orthodox patriarch and many lesser dignitaries of the Church, by studied insults to the Greek religion, by wholesale massacres of Christians, and by frequent seizures of vessels flying the Russian flag. Austria

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and Prussia alone of the Great Powers sympathised with the Turk and wished him speedy success in the restoration of order in his dominions.

From 1824 the situation of the Greeks changed for the worse. Ali of Janina having been crushed (1822), the Turkish army having been concentrated and reorganised, auxiliary forces of Soudanese *fellaheen* having been brought over to the Morea by Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt (1825), the Greeks, in danger of total extinction, appealed to Christian Europe for aid. A conference of the Powers was held in London (July 1827), to consider the appeal. Russia insisted on intervention to save the Greeks; Austria and Prussia opposed protested and withdrew; Britain and France, moved to some extent by humanitarian and religious considerations, but primarily concerned to prevent isolated action by Russia, agreed to join the Tzar in a joint demonstration. The battle of Navarino (October 20, 1827) was the result. The Sultan in response proclaimed a Holy War; but he was unable to resist the new pressure. The allied fleets compelled Mehemet Ali to take his Soudanese savages back to Egypt; a French army occupied the Morea; Russian forces overran Thrace. Hence by the Treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829) the Sultan was constrained to acknowledge the independence of Greece, which in 1832 became a sovereign kingdom under Otto of Bavaria.

§ 35. BELGIAN INDEPENDENCE

The negotiators who in London, after the Sultan's recognition of Greek independence, debated and settled the status and constitution of the new national kingdom were called upon, before they separated, to deal with a new national problem not less urgent and significant, viz. the revolt of the Belgians against their union with the Dutch. In one respect this raised an even graver question than that presented by the Greek revolt; for it involved one of the leading provisions of the sacrosanct treaties of 1815. Holland and Belgium (to which the bishopric of Liège had been added) had been joined together in the hands of William of Orange under the guarantee of the Powers, in order that the kingdom of the United Netherlands might form an effective barrier against French aggression in northern Europe. The idea of bringing together these two tiny peoples, who numbered only some six million souls in all,¹ was in many ways an excellent one. They had in former times been united under the dukes of Burgundy and under the kings of Spain; there was close racial affinity, at any rate between the Flemings and the Hollanders; in economic matters the agricultural and industrial Belgians admirably supplemented the commercial and maritime Dutch. Nevertheless, the union was

¹ Dutch about two and a half million, Belgians about three and a half million.

effected by the Powers in 1815 so arbitrarily and tactlessly, with so total a disregard of Belgian opinion, and with so aggravating an air of handing over a derelict people as a prize to a good king, that from the first the cause of the union was jeopardised. Moreover, two centuries of separation alienation and religious strife had generated frictions hatreds and hostile traditions which only great mutual forbearance could have lived down. Unfortunately neither of the two peoples showed itself capable of forbearance. Both of them sacrificed the great and obvious advantages of amalgamation and co-operation in order to indulge old-standing rivalries and animosities. The Belgians were restless turbulent obstructive rebellious under the Orange administration; the Dutch were obstinate unsympathetic inconsiderate tyrannical in the enforcement of their authority. The constitution of the kingdom of the Netherlands was itself largely to blame for the conflict between the two nations; for instead of establishing a dual monarchy in which each part had a wide sphere of self-government, it had set up a unitary state in which the three and a half million Belgians had no more power than the two and a half million Dutch. In the actual working of the constitution they had much less than equality. The seat of the administration was placed at the Hague; Dutch was declared to be the official language; six-sevenths of the ministers, seven-eighths of the officers of the

army, the immense majority of public servants of all sorts were Hollanders. Taxation and fiscal policy were regulated in the interests of the Dutch, regardless of the injury which resulted to Belgian industries. Above all, Dutch antagonism to Catholicism led to the enforcement of a policy of religious toleration and secular education in Belgium which, however enlightened and progressive, was intensely repugnant to the religious opinion of that country.

These various grievances, real and imaginary, led to the formation in Belgium of two separate groups of antagonists to the Dutch ascendancy. The one group consisted of Liberal politicians, inspired by the democratic and anti-clerical ideas of the French Revolution, who demanded for the Belgians equal political rights and privileges with their co-partners. The other group consisted of Catholic devotees whose resistance was mainly directed against the Protestant propaganda of the Calvinists. At first these two groups were bitterly hostile to one another, and so long as they remained so the dominance of the Dutch was not endangered. But in 1828 they were reconciled by means of a link of Liberal-Catholics ably organised by Lacordaire and Lamennais, and from that date an insurrection became a grave probability.

The event which precipitated the insurrection was the French Revolution of July 1830, an account of which will be given in the next lecture. Suffice it here to say that the Bourbon despotism gradually

built up by the ultra-Royalists was overthrown by a rising in Paris, and that a constitutional monarchy under Louis Philippe of the House of Orleans was set up in its place. This revolutionary triumph had far-reaching effects throughout Europe. First among these, in order both of time and of importance, was the Belgian revolt which broke out in Brussels on August 25, 1830. At the beginning of the insurrection the demand of its leaders was merely for self-government within the limits of the united kingdom ; but the refusal of the Dutch to make concessions, and their attempt to stamp out the rebellion by force of arms, led the Belgians to take up a more extreme attitude, and on October 4, 1830, they proclaimed their complete independence. This involved a breach of the Vienna settlement and a defiance of the Great Powers who had guaranteed it. Hence the King of the Netherlands, unable with his Dutch forces to reduce the rebels to submission, appealed to the Concert of Europe. But the Concert of Europe no longer existed. Hopeless discords divided and distracted its former members. They were already quarrelling fiercely over the problem of Greece. The Belgian imbroglio threw a new principle of conflict into their midst. Russia and Prussia were eager for immediate intervention on behalf of William of Orange and in support of the treaties ; the outbreak of the Polish insurrection, however, kept them from taking action. Austria

was too much engrossed with troubles in Italy to move in defence of the precious Vienna creation. The new French government, on the other hand, was enthusiastically and resolutely on the side of the Belgians, and Britain (then ruled by Wellington) shrank from the European war which any attempt to coerce the Belgians would have involved. Hence the Conference of London, in spite of the protests of Russia Prussia and Holland, ended by recognising the independence of Belgium and by conferring its crown on Leopold of Coburg (1831). At first the Dutch refused to accept this unexpected and unwelcome decision ; but English and French forces soon compelled their submission. Not till 1839 was formal recognition conceded by King William who at the same time resigned his crown as an indication of his undying resentment. The Powers—Britain France Austria Prussia Russia—joined in a guarantee of the neutrality and integrity of the new Belgian kingdom.

§ 36. THE BREACH IN THE TREATY SYSTEM

Thus in 1830 was made the first breach in the elaborate and carefully co-ordinated treaty system which the diplomats at Vienna fifteen years before had intended to be the permanent constitution of Europe. The principle of nationality which, "beyond the pale of civilisation," had been actively

at work dissolving the oriental despotism of the Turks and securing the liberation of Rumanians Serbians and Greeks ; that principle which beyond the Atlantic had called into existence the new world of the Latin-American republics to redress the balance of the old world where autocracy had re-established itself ; that principle which had been vainly agitating the spirits of Poles Finns Magyars and Czechs, had at length secured a conspicuous triumph within the consecrated circle wherein the Holy Alliance had once been dominant. It was a triumph due, first, to the pre-occupation of the reactionary monarchs of Russia Austria and Prussia ; secondly, to the support of the new and liberal bourgeois régime in France ; and, thirdly, to the pacific opportunism of Wellington, who always viewed politics from a military standpoint and showed a soldierly readiness to abandon principles whose defence seemed likely to lead to disaster. The event was one of resounding importance, not only because it marked the beginning of the demolition of the diplomatic Europe artificially constructed by the treaties of 1812-15, and the consequent re-constitution of the Continent on national lines ; but also because it displayed in a conspicuous and unmistakable manner the magnitude of the schisms and dissensions which now separated the Great Powers from one another, rendering their effective co-operation impossible. As soon as the settlement

of the Greek question had removed the one serious source of friction between Russia and Austria, these two Powers and Prussia drew together as a triple alliance in defence of what remained of the treaty system. Over against them France, under Louis Philippe, placed herself openly on the side of the "Revolution"; avowed her sympathy with national movements such as that of Belgium, and democratic movements, such as that of Spain; declared her antagonism to the treaties of 1815 which had meant for her so much humiliation and loss; and proclaimed that her new attitude was but a reversion to the splendid but misunderstood policy of Bonaparte—an attempt to realise the great and liberal "Napoleonic Idea" which when announced by the far-sighted emperor had been too apocalyptic to be comprehended by a gross and retrogressive generation. Britain speedily took her stand by the side of France, resolute to encourage the national aspirations of fettered peoples, and to oppose anti-democratic interventions on the part of autocratic monarchs in the internal affairs of states other than their own. The resignation of the ultra-Tory Wellington in 1830, and the succession of the advanced-Whig Grey severed the last links which bound Britain to the party and policy of Metternich. Henceforth, during the crises and the conflicts of the troubled 'thirties, Britain and France could be counted on to maintain the causes of oppressed

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peoples and struggling proletariats against the forces of reaction.

It was during this fateful period that the newly emancipated American colonies, and the newly constituted European states passed through the crucial testing-time of their apprenticeship. As to America, the year 1824 saw the definite recognition by Britain and the United States of the independence of Columbia (including Venezuela and New Granada) Mexico and Buenos Ayres (the nucleus of the Argentine Republic). Next year Peru Bolivia Chile and the Central American communities completed their emancipation and secured the status of independent republics. The Portuguese dependency of Brazil, determined to submit no longer to European control, proclaimed its separation from its mother country in 1822. It manifested, however, no hostility to the not-unpopular reigning house of Braganza and, instead of following the republican precedents set by the Spanish rebels, it proclaimed itself an empire, entirely friendly to Portugal, under Pedro I., son of the Portuguese king, John VI. The tactful mediation of Canning secured from the distressed and offended mother country a recognition of the daughter-empire's independence in 1825. As to the new European kingdoms: Belgium prospered greatly under the wise and constitutional rule of Leopold I.—once the husband of the English princess Charlotte, and later the close friend and

confidential adviser of Queen Victoria. The peace and security which his just and strong rule maintained allowed universities to be founded, schools to be increased, railroads to be built, commerce to be fostered, liberty of religion and freedom of press to be introduced. The Belgian revolution of 1830 was justified by a sequel of unprecedented progress. It was otherwise in the case of Greece. The country was poor, thinly populated, devoid of natural resources. It had, moreover, been devastated by ten years of the most savage and destructive warfare. The inhabitants, lawless and turbulent, were unfitted for constitutional government or indeed for civilised life of any sort. Hence Otto of Bavaria, when in 1833 he arrived to take up the task which the Powers had entrusted to him, found himself faced by almost insuperable difficulties. He did not show conspicuous prudence in meeting them; in particular, he alienated the sensitive citizens of Athens (the heirs of the traditions of Demosthenes and Themistocles) by filling his court with Germans and administering the country through their agency. The conflicts to which his conduct gave rise culminated in his deposition and expulsion in 1862. But meantime the attention of Europe had been diverted from the national affairs of the Balkan Peninsula, and had been concentrated upon the democratic upheaval which had torn and shaken all the states of the Continent. To a cursory survey of that upheaval we must next turn.

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LECTURE VI

THE ERA OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT,
1830-48

§ 37. NEW CONDITIONS AND NEW IDEAS

THE national movement of the period 1822-30, dealt with in the preceding lecture, was accompanied by a parallel democratic movement hardly inferior to it in interest and importance. The relations between the two movements were by no means everywhere and always the same. In some countries, as for example in Italy, the two were so harmonious and so mutually helpful that it was rarely possible to distinguish them: the passion of Lombardy for the expulsion of the Austrians was largely due to an eager desire for constitutional self-government; democratic advance implied national independence; it was not easy to say whether Mazzini and Garibaldi were primarily patriots or primarily proclaimers of the rights of peoples against princes. In other countries, as for example in Belgium, democracy and nationality were causes far removed from identity:

the strong Catholic party which strove with ardent zeal to throw off the yoke of Protestant Holland was by no means eager for a democratic franchise which would have placed political power in secularist hands. In some countries, as for example in Austria-Hungary, the two movements were actively oppugnant to one another: the Democrats of Vienna who clamoured for a constitution were the implacable enemies of Bohemian independence; the Magyars of Buda-Pesth who extolled political liberty relentlessly repressed the national aspirations of the Southern Slavs who groaned under their yoke. Nevertheless, in spite of occasional and local clashes such as these, the two movements were so much the result of one and the same revolutionary impulse that they in general aided one another and prepared one another's way.

The democratic movement, however, had, during the period following the collapse of the Concert of Europe, certain fresh and additional stimuli all its own. The industrial revolution continued to exert its disintegrating effects upon the old society. In England, which had secured a long start in economic development ahead of all other nations, these were especially marked. Great concourses of wage-earning artisans were being drawn from scattered country districts and planted as new communities in hideous agglomerations of dwellings rapidly put together in the neighbourhood of the coal-fields and

the iron-mines. The peaceful and picturesque old England of quiet villages and sleepy market-towns was being displaced by a struggling and formless new England of factories and warehouses with their appendant mazes of mean streets. The new artisan population, which lay for the most part outside the existing political and religious organisations of the country, began to regiment itself, in spite of legal restrictions, into unions and societies which bade fair to exercise a powerful influence in the direction of democracy. Other countries followed the lead given by England ; but their industrial development was slow, and the organisation of their artisan classes slower still. On the Continent, indeed, the pioneers of the democratic movement were not the hand-workers in their unions, but the thinkers in their studies and the teachers in their lecture-rooms. Continental democracy was therefore of the doctrinaire order, rich in abstract principles, but hopelessly divorced from experience and practicability. It still concerned itself with theoretical "Rights of Man," with philosophical bases of freedom, with ideal claims to liberty of thought and speech, with airy and inoperative generalisations. In England, on the other hand, was evolved a democratic dogma of an intensely practical and effective order, well fitted to supply a working political creed to the new industrial organisations which were coming into being. This was the philosophical radicalism of

Jeremy Bentham and his circle—that notable circle which included James Mill, John Austin, George Grote, and (with some reservations) John Stuart Mill. Its basis was the utilitarian ethics elaborated by Bentham ; its working principle was the maxim, “the greatest good of the greatest number” ; its first great object was the abolition of iniquitous privileges and the levelling of inequalities ; its programme included numerous and far-reaching reforms in every department of life. The *Westminster Review*, founded by Bentham in 1824, became the main organ of its propaganda. The philosophical radicals were optimistic enthusiasts ; for, though they had no belief in God, and no illusions respecting the benevolence of Nature, they had a profound faith in the perfectibility of man. They held that man’s native vigour, if developed by education, made effective by co-operation and voluntary association, and provided with opportunities by means of judicious legislation, could lift both the individual and the race to the highest heights of felicity. They advocated democratic self-government, not only because they considered that the many were the best judges of their own legislative requirements, but also because they were convinced that participation in affairs of community and state had an educative value essential to the development of the perfect individual man. The English philosophical radicals were reformers and not revolutionists ; because, great as

were the changes which they advocated, they accepted the existing Constitution in its essentials, and merely demanded modifications in its details and in its mode of working. The Continental democrats, on the other hand, were almost necessarily revolutionists. They had to deal with governments that were beyond reform, with bureaucracies that resisted all changes, with despotisms consecrated to reaction. For them there could be no hope of securing a freedom which should slowly and peacefully broaden down "from precedent to precedent." Theirs was the more perilous task of striking down their oppressors, of destroying the ancient régime, and of constructing a new administration. It was a perilous task because, as the events proved all too often, it was by no means easy, having opened the road to progress, to restore the order requisite for its attainment.

§ 38. DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENTS PRIOR TO 1830

On the Continent the period 1822-30 was one of severe repression on the part of governments, of grave and increasing unrest on the part of subjects. In Britain, on the other hand, movements of reform, started in the eighteenth century but suspended during the era of revolution and war, began again to display activity with the advent of a more liberal element into Liverpool's ministry in 1822. Peel at

the Home Office revised the criminal code and improved the police system; Huskisson at the Board of Trade hastened the removal of obsolete mercantilist restrictions on freedom of exchange; Robinson at the Exchequer devoted himself to financial reconstruction. But more important still, although outside official circles, the long-suspended agitation for parliamentary reform and extension of the franchise was taken up once more and pushed on with unprecedented vigour. So far back as the early years of George III.'s reign, the need for a radical reorganisation of the whole electoral system had been evident. Schemes of reform had been formulated by men so various as Chatham Wilkes Richmond and Pitt. But nothing had been done when the outbreak of revolution in France frightened reformers and converted them into conservatives. During the long years of peril and reaction Sir Francis Burdett in the House of Commons prevented the matter from wholly sinking into oblivion, but it was not till 1821 that a revelation of flagrant and general corruption in the Cornish constituency of Grampound brought the question once more within the sphere of practical politics. A strong agitation immediately commenced under the leadership of Lord John Russell, which culminated in 1830 in the overthrow of Wellington's ministry and the formation of a cabinet under Earl Grey pledged to deal with the problem.

In Germany the "Metternich System" reached the height of its efficiency in the years that immediately followed the Carlsbad Conference, wherein Austria and Prussia agreed to take joint action to suppress throughout all the states of the Confederation every manifestation of the "Revolution." Fortified by this guarantee, the reactionary princes, prominent among whom were William of Hesse-Cassel and Antony of Saxony, rigorously repressed popular demonstrations and punished agitators. The situation in no two of the petty principalities was the same. Hence the German democratic movement, in so far as it passed beyond the limits of philosophic treatises and academic lectures, became an unco-ordinated particularist propaganda, doomed to futility.

In Italy the failure of the partial and premature risings of 1821 was followed by a decade of unparalleled tyranny on the part of the reinstated autocrats. In Piedmont the whips with which Victor Emmanuel I. had scourged constitutionalists gave place to scorpions in the hand of his resolute ultra-clerical successor, Charles Felix; in Lombardy-Venetia a system of espionage and terror drove into exile all popular leaders who were fortunate enough to escape the prison and the scaffold; in Naples the corrupt and incapable Bourbons proceeded to establish among their turbulent and undisciplined people that mode of administration which was later described as a "negation of God"; in the Papal States reactionary

cardinals vehemently struggled to maintain order by force. Everywhere the counter-revolution reigned supreme ; but its sole source of strength lay in the Austrian army of occupation established in the fortresses of the Quadrilateral (Verona, Mantua, Peschiera, and Legnago) and fed by the lines that linked it to Vienna over the Brenner Pass. Against this force Italian nationalist-democrats could not at this time openly contend. The wilder among them, organised in secret societies, such as that of the Carbonari, made such reply as they could by means of riot conspiracy and assassination.

In the Peninsula constitutional struggles began whose still-uncompleted ferocities have had the effect of depriving both Spain and Portugal of whatever importance they once had in the politics of the world. As to Spain, Ferdinand VII., restored by French arms to absolute power in 1823, found in Calomarde a repressive minister after his own heart. For ten years—a period known as the “Days of Calomarde”—they waged unrelenting war upon the advocates of the principles of 1812. As to Portugal, the more liberal but weaker John VI. preserved some show of constitutional rule till his death in 1826. Then broke out the embittered civil war between the clerical reactionary party led by his younger son, the regent Miguel, and the anti-clerical progressive party which proclaimed his granddaughter, the girl-queen Maria, as their chief.

It was in France, however, the home of the "Revolution," that the crucial conflict took place between democracy and despotism. The ultra-royalist ministry of Villèle, established in 1821, held office until 1828. So long as the cautious and timid Louis XVIII. lived, he managed to keep some check upon the dangerous desire of his government to restore the privileged orders of the old régime to the position which they had held before 1789. But with his death in 1824 and the accession of his reactionary brother, the Comte d'Artois, as Charles X., the forces of the counter-revolution had full sway. The army was purged of officers who had served under Napoleon; the *émigré* nobles of the period of the Revolution were compensated for their confiscated estates, and to provide the requisite funds the interest on the public funds was lowered from five to three per cent; the Jesuits were readmitted to the schools, and the secularist *École Normale* was closed; the censorship of the press was made more strict; the law of sacrilege was strengthened; the bourgeois National Guards were disbanded; efforts were made to tune the Chambers by means of a septennial act, electoral regulations, and a free creation of peers. In these circumstances an opposition, compounded from many and various groups, gradually formed itself, and events moved rapidly towards a catastrophe.

§ 39. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

The growing unpopularity of Villèle and the rising flood of antagonism to the retrogressive policy of Charles X. were strikingly manifested in 1828, when, in spite of strenuous efforts on the part of court and ministry to manipulate the constituencies, a liberal majority was returned to the Chamber of Deputies. Villèle felt compelled to resign. The obstinate king, however, instead of yielding to the clear indications of the general will, placed in power the Vicomte de Martignac, a member of Villèle's party and a man actively identified with its most obnoxious measures. Martignac, it is true, when in office, felt it necessary to moderate his policy; he relaxed the censorship, and he reduced the power of the Jesuits. In doing so he merely succeeded in alienating the ultras, without in the least conciliating the liberals. After a year and a half of growing disaffection Charles decided that it was "time to call a halt" to concession; time to end the hopeless attempt to satisfy the radical Cerberus with sops, and to return to a vigorous and whole-hearted policy of reaction. "Concessions ruined Louis XVI.," said Charles. Accordingly in August 1829 he dismissed the temporising Martignac from office, and summoned from the French embassy in England the Prince de Polignac, a clericalist notorious as an ultra among

ultras. Wellington, when he heard of the appointment, at once recognised its sinister significance and ventured to utter some solemn admonitions. Even Metternich and the Tzar Nicholas were perturbed and sent messages advising caution. But admonitions and messages of caution were wholly disregarded. "There is no such thing as political experience," Wellington was constrained to remark; "with the warning of James II. before him, Charles X. is setting up a government of priests, through priests, for priests." The establishment of Polignac in power was indeed perceived by all the parties concerned to be a definite challenge to mortal combat. Polignac frankly announced his programme to be "the reorganisation of society, the restoration of their political influence to the clergy, and the creation of a powerful and privileged aristocracy." The new minister was not blind to the peril of his position; but he had a policy from which he expected a triumphant issue. The French nation, he had gathered from a study of the career of Napoleon, preferred glory to liberty; they were willing to do without a constitution provided they could have an empire. In order, therefore, to distract attention from domestic controversies he embarked on the adventure of the conquest of Algeria—an adventure which veritably achieved much success, and indeed laid securely the foundation of the present French

dominion over that region. Success, however, came too late for Polignac's purpose. Before it displayed itself, both the prince and his patron were gone. The crisis in which they were hurled from power was precipitated by the issue, on July 25, 1830, of four ordinances of an extremely reactionary type : the first dissolved the Chamber of Deputies ; the second altered the franchise in a manner intended to deprive liberals of all electoral influence ; the third ordered new elections on the new register ; the fourth suspended afresh the liberty of the press. Even some of Polignac's colleagues were apprehensive of the probable consequences of the publication of these ordinances, and pointed out to him disquieting similarities between his proceedings and those of the English Earl of Strafford. But he was not to be turned from his purpose by the doubtful lessons of history.

The lessons of history, however, played a prominent part in determining the conduct of the opposition. Among those who resolved to resist the ordinance were Thiers and Guizot and Mignet, men to whom the precedents of the English antagonism to the Stuarts was a constant source of inspiration and guidance. On July 26 they drew up a strongly worded protest against the royal violation of the chartered liberties of the French nation. Next day the incensed populace began to make attack on the houses of ministers and on public buildings.

The Government ordered out the troops ; but the troops were inadequate in numbers to deal with the rapidly increasing tumult ; their ammunition became exhausted ; some of them deserted and joined the rioters. On July 28 the Hôtel de Ville was stormed ; on July 29 the Louvre and the Tuileries fell, and the royalist troops had to evacuate the city. Recognising at last that he was face to face not merely with a revolt but with a revolution, Charles (who was at St. Cloud) tried to save the situation by withdrawing the ordinances and dismissing Polignac. But if concessions had ruined Louis XVI., they were not destined to save his brother. Louis may have made them too soon : Charles certainly made them too late. Already a provisional Government had been set up in Paris, and a National Guard had been enrolled under the command of the elderly Lafayette, who as a young man had held the same office in the revolution of 1789. There was in the capital a violent conflict of opinion as to the form of constitution which should be adopted ; but all were agreed that the Bourbons with their fleur-de-lis, their clerical entourage, and their dogma of divine right should go. Lafayette himself and the vast majority of those who had organised and carried through the revolution wished to restore the republic ; but statesmen like Thiers, and men of affairs like Laffitte, pointed out that the Powers would not

tolerate a repetition of 1789, and would certainly intervene to suppress a revolutionary commonwealth. The monarchical form of government, they said, must be retained, no matter how republican the spirit of the administration. Their prudent opinion prevailed, and the followers of Lafayette were persuaded to accept, as "king of the French," Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, son of the Jacobin "Philip Égalité," a man of liberal traditions who himself had fought for republican France under the tricolour flag at Jemmapes. Louis Philippe, having taken a solemn constitutional oath, was proclaimed on August 9. Five days later Charles X. departed from Cherbourg for England.

§ 40. DEMOCRATIC ADVANCE, 1830-48

The news of the July Revolution in France created a profound sensation throughout Europe. The autocrats of the Eastern monarchies were horrified at this victorious recrudescence of the revolutionary spirit which for fifteen years they had striven so hard to suppress. At first it seemed probable that, in spite of the cautious moderation of the Orleanist leaders, hostile intervention would take place. Nicholas I. of Russia was eager to lead his armies to Paris, and he confidently counted on the co-operation of Frederick William III. of Prussia: only with difficulty did his ministers dissuade him

from entering on a political crusade which would probably soon have embroiled the whole Continent. Metternich used his influence in the same direction of moderation; for, much as he hated the new bourgeois régime, he was too much occupied with the affairs of Germany Italy and Greece to contemplate fresh engagements. Wellington in England was not pleased at the change in the French government; but he objected on principle to intervention, and in no event was he prepared to do anything to restore the impossible Polignac to power. Hence for the moment Louis Philippe escaped molestation and obtained opportunity to attempt to establish himself in the confidence and favour of a people the majority of whom—including Legitimists, Bonapartists, and Republicans—regarded him as a necessary evil, a temporary compromise, a momentarily convenient but permanently undesirable stopgap.

The triumph of the revolution in France (even though it was arrested half-way) had far-reaching effects on neighbouring countries. Precisely four weeks after the overthrow of Charles X. occurred that national revolt of the Belgians against the Dutch which has already been described. This was followed in November of the same year by the ill-advised and disastrous revolt of the Poles against the rule of the Russian Tzar, the one beneficial effect of which was experienced by the French and the Belgians who were relieved by it of all lingering

apprehension of Russian intervention. Germany and Italy also felt the stirrings of the revolutionary impulse. In the one country, particularist revolts, involving the falls of ministers and the resignation of princes, led to the establishment of constitutions in Hesse-Cassel (1830), Saxony (1831), Brunswick (1832), and Hanover (1833). In the other country, rebellions in the Papal States Parma and Modena were all crushed with so much ease and with such extreme severity by Austrian troops that Italian patriots were forced to face the conclusion that the liberation of Italy could not be effected without assistance from without.

The most notable effect of the July Revolution, however, was the change which it engendered in the Concert of Europe, and the modification which it introduced into the balance of the Powers. France under Charles X. had been a consistent supporter of the "Metternich System"; under Louis Philippe she became (especially during the decade, 1830-40) an ally of Britain in defence of a more liberal policy. She necessarily championed constitutional government against despotic oppression; she safeguarded Belgian independence, expressed sympathy with Polish struggles for emancipation, and encouraged Italy's efforts to achieve national unity. Belgium, too, under Leopold I. took her stand by the side of the progressive Powers. The net result was a considerable diminution in the preponderance of the forces of

reaction in Europe, and a material increase in the opportunities of unimpeded popular advance in all lands.

Democracy did not fail to take advantage of the occasions for progressive movement which presented themselves during the succeeding eighteen years (1830-48). The period was one of great material prosperity. The rapid building of railways, the increase of swift steamship communication, the development of postal and telegraph services, a luxurious outburst of labour-saving and wealth-producing inventions raised the standard of life, restored buoyancy and hope to the war-shattered Continent, and engendered dreams of an era of universal happiness and peace. Political idealists found inspiration for new Utopias in the improving conditions of the time. St. Simon (d. 1825) had already formulated the theory of a society reorganised on an industrial basis. Robert Owen elaborated his views in the *Book of the New Moral World* (1834-1841), and further tried in a succession of interesting though unsuccessful experiments to exemplify in practice the principles of co-operation and communism. Joseph Proudhon in France (1840) asked the formidable question "What is Property?" and answered it in a socialistic sense. Karl Marx, not yet a disciple of Proudhon, advocated advanced democratic doctrine in the *Rheinische Zeitung* (1842-43) until he was forced by reactionary pressure to seek

security in flight to Paris. Everywhere there was movement among the masses—movement engendered not by despair but by hope, caused not by increasing oppression but by the consciousness of the possession of new powers and possibilities.

Great Britain witnessed in 1832 the notable democratic triumph of the first Reform Act, which swept away the mediæval parliamentary system and introduced an intelligible if still narrow popular franchise, together with a more equitable distribution of seats. This breach in the ramparts of privilege was followed by a remarkable series of progressive measures of which the Poor Law Act of 1834 and the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 were the most important. All these reforms, however, were essentially middle-class in their benefits, and the still unsatisfied aspirations of the artisans and labourers found vent in the famous but futile Chartist Agitation (1837-48). On the other hand, one serious hindrance to the development of industry and the prosperity of the artisan classes was removed by the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.

Germany saw no great democratic triumphs during this period, but witnessed increasingly grave unrest. The "Metternich System," moreover, showed unmistakable signs of falling to pieces. Its eponymous founder was growing old and weary; the sense of failure weighed upon him and sapped his vigour. The autocrats, also, for whom he toiled, gave him

but little assistance, whether material or moral. Ferdinand of Austria was feeble and vacillating to a degree beyond remedy. Frederick William IV. of Prussia—who came to the throne in 1840—soon showed himself to be impulsive and incalculable, and travelled rapidly along that road of eccentricity which ultimately led him into the lunatic asylum. As the system of repression weakened, democratic demonstrations grew bolder. Notable among these were the Hambach Festival of 1832, the protest of the seven Göttingen professors in 1837, and open conferences at Heppenheim and Heidelberg in 1847-48.

Italy, still held fast in the Austrian vice, was able to show no more than movements preliminary to emancipation. Charles Albert, who succeeded the repressive Charles Felix in Piedmont in 1831, had liberal leanings and a fixed resolution to secure the expulsion of the Austrians from the peninsula. Mazzini and his "Young Italy" party commenced their active and powerful propaganda in 1835. In 1846 the advent of a reforming and anti-Austrian Pope, Pius IX., roused high the hopes of all Italian patriots. The first symptoms of the great and general European upheaval of 1848 came, indeed, from Italy. At the beginning of the year Charles Albert granted a constitution to his subjects and agreed to lead them against the Austrians. In Naples a successful rebellion shook to its very foundations

the despotic throne of "King Bomba," the Bourbon Ferdinand II.

Once more, however, it was events in France that induced the cataclysm.

§ 41. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1848

The position of Louis Philippe, king of the French, was, from the first, one of almost untenable difficulty. The insurrection which placed him upon the throne was "a revolution arrested half-way," and he himself was a *quantum quid*. His sole zealous supporters were the comparatively small and politically weak community of the well-to-do middle class. None of the great parties regarded him with more than contemptuous toleration. To the Legitimists he was the hated ex-Jacobin and supplanter of Charles X.; to the Bonapartists he was the man who for the ten years 1804-14 had been the implacable enemy of the great emperor; to the Republicans he was the consecrated obstruction to the realisation of the ideals of 1789. Hence, throughout the eighteen years of his troubled reign, he was harassed by constant hostility intrigue and treachery. In 1832 the Duchess of Berri—daughter-in-law of Charles X., and mother of the legitimist heir the Comte de Chambord—organised a Bourbon revolt in La Vendée; in 1834 republican insurrections, which were intended to inaugurate a new revolution,

broke out in Paris Lyons and other cities ; Louis Napoleon, nephew of the emperor, made two separate attempts—one at Strassburg in 1836, the other at Boulogne in 1840—to overthrow the July monarchy and effect a Bonapartist restoration. Apart from these overt attacks upon the Orleanist government, no less than six efforts to assassinate Louis Philippe himself were made during the course of the period.

In the vital matter of the determination of his policy the bourgeois king found himself painfully situated between the devil and the deep sea. On the one side the revolutionists who had accepted him as ruler expected him not only to maintain constitutional government at home, but also actively to support democratic and national movements abroad : no sooner was he on the throne than they clamoured for French intervention on behalf of Belgium Poland and Italy. On the other hand, the unfriendly Powers of Europe, who with difficulty brought themselves to recognise Louis Philippe at all, were ready at the first symptom of meddlesomeness to combine to drive him from his rickety throne. In the circumstances he felt compelled to follow a course of compromise, hesitating vacillating insincere timorous—a course which alienated by its inactivity the liberals at home, and nevertheless alarmed by its liberal loquacity the autocrats abroad.

The first two years of the reign (1830–32) were occupied mainly by an embittered struggle between

the republicans and the constitutional monarchists for ascendancy in the new administration. Finally the republicans were routed; Lafayette and Lafitte compelled to retire; and a strong conservative ministry formed under the capable leadership of Casimir Périer (1831). He, however, unfortunately died after fourteen months of invaluable labour which had definitely established the constitutionalists in power.

The death of Casimir Périer was followed by eight years of conflict (1832-40) between a "whig" party led by Thiers whose main concern was to reconcile the French nation to the Orleanist monarchy, and a "tory" party led by Guizot whose chief preoccupation was to render the Orleanist monarchy acceptable to the European Powers. The means by which Thiers and his friends hoped to attain their end were, first, the carrying through of liberal reforms in domestic affairs, and, secondly, the recovery of influence in foreign affairs and the attainment of glory abroad. Thiers himself was a profound admirer of Bonaparte—whose history he later wrote in his great work on *The Consulate and the Empire*—and he felt that the best hope of the establishment of the Orleanist dynasty to the respect and affections of the French was that it should frankly adopt the policy of the emperor (as the emperor himself had expounded it from St. Helena after his fall) and should proclaim itself as the realiser of the

"Napoleonic Idea."¹ In his search for glory, and in conscious imitation of Napoleon, Thiers inter-meddled in the affairs of Egypt, and all but succeeded in involving his country in a war with a Quadruple Alliance, consisting of Russia Britain Austria and Prussia, pledged to prevent the disintegration of Turkey. This led to his fall, and to the definite establishment of Guizot in power (1840).

For the last eight years of the reign Guizot maintained himself in office. He succeeded in conciliating the autocrats by his cautious foreign policy, and by his steady refusal to be drawn into any adventures on behalf of popular movements in other countries.² France, however, ceased to count in the affairs of Europe, and the French nation was bored and humiliated by the inactivity and impotence of the government. The shade of Napoleon, invoked by Thiers, was a constant reminder and rebuke. Nor did Guizot's domestic policy tend to retrieve his popularity : it was persistently and unintelligently reactionary and repressive.

The opposition grew vehement and insistent ; "dynastic reformers," led by Thiers, joined themselves to the ever-restless republicans, and demanded drastic changes. They were reinforced by new and

¹ In 1840, under the influence of this Napoleonic revival, the remains of the Emperor were brought from St. Helena and buried with great demonstrations in Les Invalides at Paris.

² Great Britain, however, was alienated from France in 1846 by the policy of Guizot and Louis Philippe in respect of the "Spanish marriages" ; see *Camb. Mod. Hist.* vol. xi. p. 554.

ominous allies in a large body of communists who had pledged themselves to carry into operation the visionary ideals of Louis Blanc's *Organisation of Labour*. In order to suppress agitation Guizot vigorously restricted the freedom of the press. His assailants replied by arranging a series of banquets at which inflammatory speeches were made. The banquets were prohibited, and then the explosion came. In February 1848 riots broke out in Paris. Guizot fell from power. Still the tumult continued. Louis Philippe, losing heart and fearing to lose head as well, gave up the struggle in wholly needless despair. His reign ended characteristically. Having abdicated in favour of his grandson, he sent for a cab and drove away for England. On reaching the English shore in ordinary civilian garb, when asked his name, he replied, "Mr. Smith."

His abdication and departure did not save the dynasty. The Chambers, under pressure of the Parisian mob, decided upon a republican constitution and appointed a provisional government to carry their decision into effect.

§ 42. THE GENERAL UPHEAVAL

The news of the February Revolution in Paris fell upon Europe like a bolt from the blue. To ordinary observers of public affairs the Orleanist monarchy had seemed entirely free from menace at

the dawn of 1848 : the ministry had for eight years been securely seated in power ; it commanded an easy majority in the Chambers ; it was in high favour with the most powerful monarchs of the Continent ; no rumour of war disturbed the international air. Only those whose insight into French politics was profound knew the rottenness of the foundations on which the kingship of Louis Philippe was erected. But, shaky as was the structure, it need not have fallen in 1848 had either Guizot or the king possessed any sort of capacity to meet a crisis, or courage to brave peril. The February Revolution was the nemesis of incompetence and pusillanimity, rather than of oppression and unwisdom.

The very unexpectedness rapidity and completeness of the democratic triumph, and of the transformation of France, had a cataclysmic effect throughout Europe. Everywhere the long-rising but pent-up floods of liberalism burst their barriers and deluged the Continent. It was heterogeneous Austria, particularist Germany, and unrealised Italy that felt their force most severely ; but no less than fifteen separate revolts of some magnitude marked this *annus mirabilis* of revolution — 1848. First in order of time and most significant of all, on March 13, Vienna, the very headquarters of the European reaction and the home of the Holy Alliance, rose in tumult, demanded a constitution, and surged in

furious attack upon Metternich. The once mighty minister, controller of the Continent and supreme representative of the anti-revolutionary régime, was driven into panic-stricken flight: he escaped from his palace in disguise, and made an unostentatious exit from the city which he had so long dominated, concealed amid the contents of a laundry-cart. He did not stay his course until he reached England, where he had an opportunity of comparing experiences with Louis Philippe. The fall of Metternich was an event of historic importance: it indicated the end of an age, the passing away of an antiquated system of government. Its effect was instantaneous. Within a week Austria Germany and Italy were ablaze. On March 15, spontaneously and independently, but as though according to a prearranged plan, Hungary was in revolt, demanding a "people's charter" and national autonomy; Bohemia was tumultuously claiming a constitution and a responsible ministry of its own; Croatia and its Illyrian allies were rising and arming to throw off the Magyar yoke. On March 15, too, the Pope, deprived of Austrian and French support, felt constrained to grant a constitution to the States of the Church. On March 18, Milan rose and expelled its Austrian garrison; on March 22, Venice followed its example and proclaimed itself an independent republic once more; on March 23, Charles Albert of Sardinia, deeming that the hour of Italy's deliverance had

come, declared war upon the shaken Hapsburg power.

Meanwhile in Germany events not less notable and startling were taking place. On that self-same March 15 which saw such scenes of revolution in Vienna Pressburg Prague and Rome, Berlin also broke into rebellion and threw up barricades. For two days the tumult increased, and then on the third Frederick William IV. yielded. He accepted the principle of constitutional government, not only for Prussia, but also for Germany as a whole ; on the 21st he went in procession through the streets of his pacified capital decked in the red black and gold emblems of the triumphant Revolution ; finally he authorised the sending out of summonses for a general German National Parliament which should endeavour to frame a new form of popular and centralised government for the united folk of the Fatherland. Without waiting, however, for the fruits of the "glorious German Revolution" to mature, Bavaria drove its absolutist king, Lewis I., to abdicate, and established a liberal administration ; Baden demanded and secured freedom of the press and the formation of a citizen army ; Saxony forced its king to dismiss an unpopular ministry, and inaugurate an era of reform. Even the British Isles felt the influence of the Continental upheaval. In April the Chartist agitation came to a head, and London prepared itself for a gigantic demonstration and a possible civil war. In

July the "Young Ireland" movement, led by Smith O'Brien, culminated in an armed insurrection. Not for half a century had there been seen so great a tumult of the peoples. The powers of reaction seemed to be broken and routed. Everywhere democracy appeared to be well on the way to dominance.

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LECTURE VII

THE ERA OF THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALITY,
1848-71

§43. THE DEMOCRATIC *DÉBÂCLE*

FOR a few delirious weeks in 1848 the triumph of democracy seemed to be assured. It looked as though the Atlantic Ocean had definitely asserted its superiority over Mrs. Partington's mop. Nevertheless the triumph declined into disaster, and the mop emerged in the hands of a reinvigorated Mrs. Partington to clean up the relics of a most appalling mess. Democracy in the four years of its probation (1848-52) discredited and disgraced itself; in the end it fell not so much through the strength or machinations of its enemies, as through its own incredible follies and vices. Its failure to rise to the height of its opportunities, and particularly its failure in Germany, was the cause of incalculable calamity to Europe. It may indeed, as we shall see more fully later on, be regarded as the remote source of the great catastrophe of 1914. Democracy failed be-

cause once more, as in the four years of its former trial (1789-93), it alienated by its violence, its lack of prudence, its menace to order and property, its garrulity incompetence and unpracticality, that mass of moderate opinion which ultimately judges and determines the fate of all forms of government whatsoever.

In England the Chartist demonstration, after having caused the utmost perturbation and apprehension, died out in a ludicrous fiasco. The demonstrators, faced by a levy of 200,000 special constables (among whom, by the way, was Louis Napoleon, at that time a refugee in London) and by reserves of troops under Wellington, discouraged by inclement weather, and uncertain of themselves, instead of taking their petition to Parliament in formidable array, sent it inconspicuously in three cabs and then unostentatiously withdrew into oblivion.

The more serious risings in the Austrian dominions subsided amid scenes of bloodshed and outrage, of which Prague Vienna and Budapest were the main centres. The Bohemian revolution seemed actually to have achieved its purpose and to have secured from the emperor a grant of constitutional autonomy, when (June 12, 1848) the extreme doctrinaire liberals, dissatisfied with the settlement, rose in mad fanatic fury, and so gave the Austrian commander, Prince Windischgrätz, an excuse to crush the whole movement in slaughter—a thing

which he did with decisive thoroughness on June 15. Similarly, in Austria Proper democracy induced its own destruction. On April 25, 1848, the emperor conceded a constitution drawn up on the most popular lines. Its basis was universal suffrage. On this basis elections at once took place and resulted in the return of a Slav majority. This was not at all according to the expectations or intentions of the Viennese advocates of democratic control. They were not prepared in any circumstances to forfeit the Teutonic ascendancy. Hence when the new Reichsrat met on July 11, 1848, they soon reduced its proceedings to chaos, roused the mob of the capital against the Slavonic deputies, and established in the city a reign of Germanic terror. Both the emperor and the Slavs had to seek safety in flight; Ferdinand betook himself to Olmütz (October 7, 1848), the deputies to Prague. Then Windischgrätz did unto Vienna (October 28-30, 1848) what he had a few months earlier done to the Bohemian capital, and all reasonable men recognised the painful necessity of his action. The Hungarian revolt, national as well as democratic, was more formidable and more prolonged. It would certainly have been successful but for the persistent refusal of the Magyars to grant to the Croats the liberties which they demanded for themselves. The Croats, accordingly, under their own leader Jellacic, threw in their lot with the Austrian government and helped it to crush the

rising of their oppressors. Even so, however, the Magyars, inspired by Kossuth and well led by Görgei and other commanders, made a determined fight for independence. Not until Russia sent an army to the aid of Austria was the insurrection crushed at Vilagos (August 14, 1849). In the midst of these tumults the weak Emperor Ferdinand resigned and handed over his crown to his nephew, Francis Joseph (1848-1916), an apt pupil of Metternich.

In Italy the collapse of the revolution was even more disastrous and complete. At first three patriotic parties, led respectively by the then liberal Pope Pius IX., Charles Albert of Sardinia, and Mazzini, combined for the expulsion of the Austrians. But soon they broke their alliance and turned their forces against one another. The Pope, alarmed at the irreligion of the republicans and fearful of the defection of Austria from the Catholic fold, abandoned the national cause in April 1848; Charles Albert mismanaged his campaign and suffered such serious defeats at Custozza (July 25, 1848) and Novara (March 23, 1849) that he felt compelled to resign his crown; Mazzini, who was joined by Garibaldi, wasted his energies in a wild experiment at republican government in no less a city than Rome itself, whence the Pope had been driven in November 1848. This brought the French into the Peninsula as defenders of the Holy

See: Rome was recovered for the Pope (July 1849); Mazzini and Garibaldi were driven into exile. The same month Venice was reconquered by Austria, and with the suppression of its ill-starred "Republic of St. Mark" the unhappy discordant unco-ordinated Italian efforts after emancipation and self-government came for a season to an end.

If the Italian failure was tragic, the German failure was ridiculous. The National Parliament, summoned as the result of the successful Berlin rising of March 1848, met on May 18 at Frankfort-on-Main. At once its academic members plunged into interminable controversies respecting the abstract "rights of the German people," the respective merits of various types of constitution, the geographic limits of the regions to be included in the new Teutonic union, and other kindred topics (among which was that most complex of all diplomatic puzzles, the Schleswig-Holstein problem). The Parliament finally decided to establish a democratic German Empire, the crown of which—regardless of the opposition of Austria and the minor powers—they offered to Frederick William IV. of Prussia. The Prussian king, however, refused to exchange his monarchy by divine right for an imperial sovereignty derived from popular vote, and certain to be repudiated by most of the other German princes. Hence he made "the great refusal" which destroyed the hope of the unification of Germany

by peaceful means. The German National Parliament dwindled out of existence, and nothing remained but to restore the ineffective Confederation of 1815. This accordingly was done in 1851. Said an acute observer of the events of that critical period—a man then inconspicuous and unknown but destined not long to remain so—Otto von Bismarck by name: “Not by speeches and resolutions of majorities are the mighty problems of the age to be solved, but by blood and iron.”

§ 44. THE SECOND FRENCH REPUBLIC

While in other countries democratic and national movements were, one after another, coming to a climax in catastrophe, in France also the new republic was hastening along the road to ruin. The revolution of February 1848 had been made exclusively in Paris, and in that city the dominant agency had been the irresponsible mob of discontented artisans and visionary students, all alike inflamed by the doctrines of the new socialism, and inspired by fantastic hopes of a soon-to-be-regenerated world. On the day on which Louis Philippe fell and the Provisional Government organised itself in the Palais Bourbon, this Parisian proletariat seized the Hôtel de Ville and instituted on its own account a Committee of Public Safety, whose purpose was to govern France, carry through the social revolution,

and extend the benefits of the new order to the whole of the Continent. The leading members of the Committee were Louis Blanc, Marrast, and a workman named Albert. The statement of their principles showed how great a change had passed over French democracy since 1789. The first revolution had been idealistic, inspired by a passion for equality, directed against privilege, essentially individualist in its spirit. The second was materialistic, inspired by a desire for better economic conditions, directed against property, essentially socialist. One of its more extreme representatives, Marche by name, stated its aims in the following words addressed to the Provisional Government: "We demand the extermination of property and capitalists; the immediate installation of the proletariat in community of goods; the proscription of bankers, the rich, the merchants, the bourgeois; . . . the acceptance of the red flag to signify to society its defeat, to the people its victory; to Paris the terror, to all foreign governments invasion." This was a formidable programme and one by no means acceptable either to the parliamentary leaders or to the majority of the *bourgeoisie* and peasant proprietors of the country. It revealed the fact that there was a profound schism of opinion in the land. With two such separate governments established in Paris—the one moderate parliamentary constitutional conservative middle-class in the Palais

Bourbon; the other extremist tumultuary anarchic proletarian at the Hôtel de Ville—instant civil war seemed inevitable. For the moment the danger was averted by Lamartine, leader of the parliamentary group, who showed remarkable skill and promptitude of action. He effected an amalgamation of the two executives, brought Louis Blanc, Marrast, and Albert into the provisional ministry of the Palais Bourbon, and so healed the schism superficially. But he did so only by making a complete surrender to the socialists in the matter of principle; by agreeing to recognise the "right to work"; and by promising to promote the setting up of "national workshops." It was in essence an abdication of authority, and it left supreme power in the hands of the Paris mob, which exercised control over the Provisional Government partly from within by means of Louis Blanc and his colleagues, but mainly from without by means of riotous demonstrations and assaults. Then began a great experiment in socialist reorganisation which in less than four months brought France to the verge of economic dissolution. The "national workshops" were set up, and all who lacked occupation were invited to present themselves on promise of employment, or at any rate of wages. The response to the appeal wholly exceeded the capacity of the organisers of labour to deal with it. From all over the country turbulent and dissatisfied men left useful avocations and flocked

to Paris to be maintained in insubordinate idleness on doles extorted by heavy taxes levied on the industrious peasantry. Before the end of May the tributary crowd of state dependents in the "workshops" had swelled to 100,000 men, and their presence had grown to be a grave menace to the community. By this time, however, it had become evident that, although the red flag was dominant in Paris, the tricolour of the moderates had overwhelming support in the provinces. The proclamation of universal suffrage placed the ultimate control of the situation in the hands of the peasantry of France, and the socialists saw themselves likely to be defeated by democracy. Hence, with a frank and flagrant defiance of the democratic principle, and once more by means of mob-violence, they strove to procure the postponement of the appeal to the people. The Provisional Government yielded as usual to the pressure, but only so far as to put off the election to April 23, 1848. They took some courage from their realisation that the day of deliverance was at hand. When the election took place and the returns were sent in, it was found that Lamartine and the moderates had swept the country, and that Louis Blanc and the extremists were in an impotent minority. The extremists were not, however, prepared to accept their defeat at the polls, and, hopeless of repairing it by constitutional means, they once more essayed armed revolution (May 15).

But this time the Provisional Government—backed by the new assembly, strong in the knowledge of the sanction of the nation as a whole, and supported by the National Guard—did not yield. It suppressed the rising and replied to it by closing the “national workshops”—centres of laziness pauperisation insurrection and corruption—and by ordering the return of the pensioners to their former places of abode. The evil done could not, however, be so easily undone. The pensioners refused to disband, and on June 24 broke out in furious rebellion. For three days Paris was the scene of a conflict more deadly than any battle of the Napoleonic wars: the rebels were in the end defeated, but only at a cost of 10,000 casualties all told. The shock of this appalling struggle, in which organised society fought for its very existence against the incalculable terror of anarchy, determined the nature of the republican constitution adopted by the assembly. The assembly decided, it is true, on a legislature of a single chamber elected by universal suffrage; but it balanced this by a wholly separate and independent executive vested for a term of four years in a president also directly appointed by means of a plebiscite. To this office of vast and unregulated power was chosen by a preponderant vote Louis Napoleon, son of the former king of Holland and nephew of the great emperor. The choice was significant. It indicated that the party of order had triumphed over the party of

progress : that the *bourgeoisie* and peasantry, terrified by the menace of revolutionary socialism, and taking advantage of the excesses of the socialists, had asserted their ascendancy and acquired a long lease of conservative influence.

§ 45. THE EMPIRE OF NAPOLEON III.

Louis Napoleon owed his election to his name. During the long reactionary years of the Bourbon restoration, during the dull inglorious middle-class régime of Louis Philippe, the Napoleonic cult had been developing. The great emperor had become a hero of romance ; a legend had gathered round him ; he had grown mystically into a tradition and a symbol. He himself, in his captivity in St. Helena (1815-22), had generated the cloudy nucleus of the myth. In magnificent defiance of the records of history he had announced that the principles on which his empire had been based, the ideas which throughout his career he had striven to realise, were democracy, nationality, peace, and religion. If he had not always succeeded in making these principles manifest in action, this was due to the constant antagonism by which he was beset on the part of perfidious Albion and her subsidised allies ! The myth thus promulgated was developed into a passionate cult in the writings of Thibaudeau, Thiers, Lamartine, Victor Hugo, and above all

Louis Napoleon himself, who, in 1839, published his notable book *Des Idées Napoléoniennes*. To the four principles enunciated by the captive of St. Helena these true believers added four others, viz. glory, efficiency, social reform, and antagonism to the treaties of 1815. The new president of the Second Republic summed up not inadequately the creed which he embodied when he said (October 31, 1849): "The name Napoleon is a complete programme in itself: it stands for order, authority, religion; the welfare of the people at home, national dignity abroad." To carry this programme into effect, however, it was essential first of all to secure the abrogation of that stipulation of the constitution of 1848 which restricted the president's tenure of office to four years: nothing could be done without permanence of power. The formidable move in the direction of autocracy which this implied was strenuously opposed by the Legislative Chamber. Louis Napoleon, therefore, having won the army by a promise of glory, and the proletariat by a promise of prosperity and reform, destroyed the Chamber by a military *coup d'état* (December 1, 1851), and secured a new constitution by means of a plebiscite which showed him to have seven and a half million of supporters against 640,000 opponents. In the new constitution the presidency was extended to ten years and the power of the president was made supreme over both executive and legislature. Little

but a change of name was required to transform the reconstituted republic into an hereditary empire, and this change was quietly effected by means of another plebiscite a year later. The second empire was proclaimed on December 2, 1852, the president taking the title of "Napoleon III."—a title which implied recognition of the hereditary claim of the great emperor's son, the Duke of Reichstadt (d. 1832), to the title of "Napoleon II."

The new emperor was well aware of the fact that he and his dynasty were only on probation; that he and it had been elevated by popular will expressly in order to carry out a programme, and that permanence depended upon success. The country demanded at home security from the red peril, an orderly strong efficient administration; abroad it demanded a recovery of its lost hegemony in Europe, a restoration of its vanished glory, a vigorous foreign policy. The national spirit in France manifested itself once again in an eager desire for primacy on the Continent. Circumstances at first enabled Napoleon to gratify this desire, and for eight years all seemed to go well for him and his house. He firmly suppressed socialist agitation, encouraged industry and commerce, carried through large and impressive public works, maintained a brilliant and conspicuous court. In the interests of the Catholic religion and in support of French influence in the East (seriously jeopardised by Louis

Philippe's ineptitude) he embarked on the Crimean War, which terminated victoriously in a congress of Paris (1856), the most important assembly held in Europe since that of Vienna. The French capital once more became the cynosure of Europe. In the interests of nationality he effectively supported Serbia and Rumania in their efforts to throw off the last remains of their long subjection to the Turks; then, with still more spectacular success, he lent aid to Italy to expel the Austrian intruder from the Peninsula, led across the Alps an army which defeated the White-coats at Magenta and Solferino (1859), and dictated to Francis Joseph terms of peace according to which Lombardy and Parma were cleared of the alien for ever and handed over to the national kingdom of Sardinia. The glory of 1797 seemed to have returned. The hated treaties of 1815 were defied. Again France stood forth as the arbiter of Europe. The sequel was even more gratifying to French national pride. For in order to secure Napoleon's consent to the entry of Tuscany Modena and the Romagna into the growing Sardinian monarchy, the bribe of Savoy and Nice had to be offered. Accordingly in 1860 France saw her borders enlarged and new provinces included which gave her once again her natural frontier on the Alps. In 1860 Napoleon stood at the height of his prosperity and power. Superficial judges of character and casual observers of affairs even jumped

to the conclusion that the new emperor was as great as the old, and that the second empire was as formidable as the first. This, however, was not the view of the more acute and sober among European statesmen. Bismarck, for instance, had already detected in Napoleon III. "a great though concealed incompetence," and had perceived that his apparent triumphs had been due to fortune rather than to capacity. After 1860 fortune deserted him, and his incompetence—his muddle-headedness, his infirmity of will, his unscrupulousness, his meddlesomeness, his rashness—became patent to the world. The "Napoleonic idea" had in fact become overloaded with incompatibles. The emperor found himself committed to principles which could not be reconciled with one another. "*L'empire c'est la paix*," he had announced; but peace was inconsistent either with glory or with the destruction of the treaties, either with the extension of French frontiers or with the establishment of a European hegemony. The empire was based on the sovereignty of the people; but this could not in practice be harmonised with concentration of all authority in the imperial hands. The empire stood for nationality and so was pledged to the furtherance both of German and Italian unity. But, as Thiers pointed out, a united Germany would be an unparalleled menace to French security; and, as the Empress Eugénie pointed out, a united Italy would involve the spoliation of the Pope whom

Catholic France was bound to defend. Hence both in respect of Germany and Italy Napoleon was torn by conflicting forces which he could neither reconcile nor control. From 1860 he lost his hold upon affairs both at home and abroad. In France a liberal agitation commenced to which he felt compelled to make a series of concessions, fatal both to his power and to the Napoleonic theory. Abroad, he drifted from one resounding failure to another. In 1863 the Poles urgently sought his aid in a national revolt against the Tzar : he replied with fair and forceful words which filled them with false hopes and alienated the Tzar ; but he did not follow up his words by acts, and the Tzar, treating his communications with contempt, crushed the rebellion in blood. Next year he intervened in Mexican affairs, and sent an army across the Atlantic ; but the United States, as soon as its own civil war was over, compelled the French intruders to make a humiliated return to Europe. It was in respect of Italy and Germany, however, that his last and irremediable errors were perpetrated. It was these errors that ended not only in his own destruction, but in the ruin of his devoted country.

§ 46. THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY

The tragic and unmitigated failure of the Italians in 1848-49 to expel the Austrians ; to effect the unification of their peninsula ; and to establish a popular

national government, made it clearly evident that a change of policy and method was necessary. Up to that time three rival schemes had contended with one another for adoption ; but all alike had been based on the assumption that Italy could accomplish her own salvation. *Italia fara da se*. Mazzini had dreamed of an emancipated Italy united in the form of a democratic republic ; the pious Gioberti had propounded a scheme according to which deliverance should be secured by means of a federation of states under the presidency of the Pope ; Sardinian politicians had seen in their monarchy the only hope of successful resistance to Austria. The events of 1848-49 had shown that not one of these schemes—republic, federation, or monarchy—could be realised without external aid. The man who first frankly recognised this fact, and set himself with infinite skill and tireless determination to secure the necessary aid, was Count Cavour, whom the new Sardinian king, Victor Emmanuel II., called to office in 1852. The country to which he made his earliest approaches was England ; but though he found the most cordial sympathy among the people generally, and even among such prominent statesmen as Palmerston Russell and Gladstone, he soon perceived that no active assistance was to be looked for there. Hence he turned next to Napoleon III., who in his younger days of wandering had actually been a *carbonaro*, and had taken part in the abortive risings of 1830.

Napoleon, if his alliance could be secured, would be invaluable as an aid in the expulsion of the Austrians from Lombardy and Venetia. This, after all, was the first and all-important step towards the unification of Italy. Cavour realised, however, that he would not be able to count upon Napoleon's assistance, but rather would have to anticipate his strenuous opposition, in the further steps that lay beyond, viz., the annexation of the Papal States and the absorption of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Carefully veiling, then, his ultimate designs, he sought French aid against the Austrians. By a stroke of diplomatic genius he offered to Napoleon the support of Sardinian troops at a critical stage of the Crimean War (January 1855), and Napoleon's acceptance of the offer placed France heavily in Sardinia's debt. The valuable services which the Sardinian troops rendered in the Crimea enabled Cavour to claim a prominent place in the peace conference at Paris in 1856, and when there he took the occasion of laying before Napoleon France and the world at large a damning statement of Italy's case against Austria. He followed this up by persistent negotiations, conducted with masterly ability, which culminated in the famous Compact of Plombières made with Napoleon on July 20, 1858. According to the terms of this agreement, Napoleon should aid Sardinia to expel the Austrians and to reconstruct Italy as a federation of four states, viz.

(1) the kingdom of Sardinia enlarged by the addition of Lombardy Venetia Parma Modena, etc. ; (2) a kingdom of Central Italy which should include Tuscany and Umbria ; (3) the Papal States ; (4) the kingdom of Naples. Napoleon, as a reward for his assistance, should receive Savoy and Nice. Having secured this formal pledge of French co-operation (which was cemented by the marriage of Victor Emmanuel's daughter to Napoleon's cousin), Cavour made it his business, first, to prepare for war, and, secondly, to precipitate the conflict before Napoleon should have time to change his mind. He aggravated and alarmed Austria by menacing mobilisations, by press attacks, by hostile tariffs, by active support of disaffection in Lombardy and Venetia, until Francis Joseph, in an outburst of reckless fury (strikingly similar to that which he displayed more than half a century later in the case of Serbia), ended the matter as Cavour wished by sending an ultimatum demanding instant disarmament (April 23, 1859). Sardinia proclaimed a state of war on April 26, and France was constrained to follow suit three days later.

The campaign of 1859 was soon concluded. The Austrians were defeated at Magenta on June 4, and thereby were compelled to evacuate Milan. The allied armies, rapidly following up their initial success, inflicted another crushing blow upon the retreating foe at Solferino on June 24. The

Austrian power in the peninsula was broken and the complete emancipation of Italy seemed to be already accomplished. Then suddenly, without consultation with Sardinia, Napoleon made peace with Francis Joseph and withdrew, leaving the all-but-finished work undone (Truce of Villafranca, July 9, 1859). Three things, in truth, had happened to give him pause and to fill him with apprehension. First, spontaneous risings had taken place in Tuscany Parma Modena and the Papal States, and Napoleon saw that a united Italy under Victor Emmanuel, and not a fourfold federation under the Pope, would be achieved if the Austrians were utterly expelled: therefore he decided to leave them in Venetia. Secondly, the French clericals, strongly supported by the Empress Eugénie, had risen in vehement protest against the threatened spoliation of the papacy: therefore Napoleon decided that the Papal States must be restored to the obedience of Rome. Thirdly, the Prussians had begun a precautionary mobilisation on the Rhine (June 24, 1859), and Napoleon feared an attack on the eastern frontier of France: therefore he felt it necessary to make a speedy end of his Italian adventure and hurry home. Hence the Truce of Villafranca, according to which (1) Austria should keep Venetia and the fortresses of the Quadrilateral; (2) Sardinia should acquire Lombardy and Parma; but (3) Tuscany and Modena should be restored to their

respective dukes and the revolted Romagna to the Pope. When Cavour heard the terms of this treacherous treaty he was mad with rage and despair. Victor Emmanuel, however, took the matter more coolly, realising that the determination of the future of Italy had passed out of the hands of diplomatists into the hands of the people. The event speedily justified his equanimity. Tuscany Modena and the Romagna refused to return to the sway of their former rulers, and in face of their resolute resistance both Austria and France had to acquiesce in their absorption into the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel (March 1860). Then occurred a revolt in Sicily against the inefficient tyranny of the Bourbon, Francis II. (April 1860). To the help of the Sicilians went Garibaldi with his marvellous Thousand, and before the end of September 1860 not only the island but also the mainland kingdom of Naples had achieved emancipation. Garibaldi was eager to march on to Rome and conquer the Patrimony of St. Peter ; but Cavour intervened to prevent a move which would certainly have brought both France and Austria resistant into the field. By all-but-unanimous plebiscites Sicily and Naples declared for union with the kingdom of Italy, and on November 9, 1860, Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi entered Naples together in triumph and amid universal acclamation. Only Venetia and Rome now remained outside the kingdom ; but before they could be secured it was

necessary that on the one side Austria (the owner of Venetia) and on the other side the Napoleonic Empire (the protector of the temporal power of the Papacy) should be overthrown. These necessary preliminaries were accomplished as *parerga* by Prussia.

§ 47. THE FOUNDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

While the kingdom of Sardinia under the guidance of Cavour had been rapidly expanding into the kingdom of Italy, at the same time north of the Alps the kingdom of Prussia under the masterful impulse of Bismarck had been taking the first steps towards the founding of the German Empire. Both Cavour and Bismarck had the same end in view, viz. the unification into a national state of kindred peoples long sundered by circumstances ; but in spirit and in mode of operation they differed widely from one another. Cavour (however unscrupulous and violent he might be on occasion) was a liberal who sought to give effect to the popular will, who worked where possible by means of parliaments and plebiscites, who was prepared to sacrifice the kingdom of Sardinia and the metropolitical primacy of Turin if he might thereby establish the united kingdom of Italy. Bismarck was a reactionary, an enemy of democracy, a despiser and oppressor of parliaments, a votary of force and craft, a Prussian who was not prepared to

merge Prussia in Germany, but was determined to effect the unification of Germany by subjecting all its rulers and peoples to Prussia.

On the collapse of the German National Parliament and the resuscitation of the Confederation in 1851, Bismarck had gone as a Prussian representative to the Diet at Frankfort-on-Main. At Frankfort he had remained for eight years, and while there had come to the definite conclusion that "Germany is too narrow for Austria and Prussia," and that consequently the first move towards the unification of the country under Prussian hegemony would have to be the forcible ejection of Austria from the *Bund*. He faced this conclusion without dismay; but he was not in a position to do anything towards carrying it into effect until 1858, when the lunacy of the feeble and Hapsburg-ridden Frederick William IV. called his more resolute and independent brother William to the regency.¹ Bismarck* was soon brought from Frankfort to act as informal adviser to the regent; in 1859 he was sent as minister to Russia to secure the all-important neutrality of that country in the impending conflict; in 1862 he was transferred to Paris in order to bamboozle Napoleon—a task which he found supremely easy; thence he was recalled to Berlin (September 1862) to take office as president of the cabinet and minister for foreign

¹ He succeeded Frederick William IV. as king January 2, 1861, and became first German emperor January 18, 1871.

affairs in the midst of a formidable constitutional crisis on the issue of which the future of both Germany and Europe hung. Shortly before his call to Berlin he had paid a visit to London, and while there had made a surprisingly frank confession of his prospects and his programme to Benjamin Disraeli, in whom he found a congenial spirit. "I shall soon be compelled," he had said, "to undertake the leadership of the Prussian government. My first care will be, with or without the help of parliament, to reorganise the army. The king has rightly set himself this task. He cannot, however, carry it through with his present councillors. When the army has been brought to such a state as to command respect, then I will take the first opportunity to declare war with Austria, burst asunder the German Confederation, bring the middle and smaller states into subjection, and give Germany a national union under the leadership of Prussia." It was the struggle over the reorganisation of the army, indeed, which brought Bismarck back to Berlin and placed him in power. The regent, with the aid of Moltke and Roon, had undertaken vast military schemes involving increase of forces, severer conscription, sterner discipline, re-armament, new tactics and strategy. The Prussian Diet, dominated by liberals, opposed these schemes and refused to vote the necessary credits. The struggle between the executive and the legislature resolved itself into a constitutional

conflict of the first magnitude, in which the issue at stake was no less a one than that which had been fought out in England in the middle of the seventeenth century. William and Bismarck took up the attitude of Charles I. and Strafford and resolved to govern without, and in defiance of, the Diet. Unhappily for Germany and for Europe, they succeeded where Charles and Strafford had failed. The feebleness factiousness short-sightedness and garrulity of the Prussian liberals delivered the cause of democracy and nationality into the hands of the enemy. William and Bismarck carried through their militarist schemes, regardless of opposition, and careless of the fact that they were the worst hated and most abused men in the Fatherland.

Then, having secured an invincible army, Bismarck set to work to isolate Austria diplomatically, and to find an occasion to attack her when isolated. From his first entry into office he showed a steady and evident anti-Austrian bias. He refused to admit Austria to the Prussian Zollverein—a customs-union which since 1819 had been gradually giving an economic unity to an increasingly large part of Germany; with unfriendly haste he recognised the new kingdom of Italy and concluded a commercial treaty with her; he supported Russia in her suppression of the Polish rising of 1863, while Austria was distinctly anti-Russian in sentiment; he opposed Austrian policy respecting Schleswig and Holstein;

finally, he proposed a reform of the German constitution, the fundamental feature of which was the exclusion of Austria altogether. In 1864, it is true, the two powers combined to crush Denmark and wrest from her the two duchies; in 1865, further, at Gastein an agreement was made between them, according to which, pending a definitive settlement of the fate of the duchies, Prussia should administer Schleswig, while Austria should exercise authority in Holstein. But Bismarck was only "papering over the cracks" which portended the everlasting disruption, until such time as his military and diplomatic preparations for the schism should be complete. In 1866 the long anticipated moment arrived. Napoleon III. had been persuaded to remain neutral, lured apparently into fatuous quiescence by promises (never put into writing and never meant to be kept) of some "compensations" for France in Belgium or on the Rhine, in case Prussia should gain an increase of territory or power in Germany.¹ Italy was secured as an active ally (April 8, 1866) by a binding engagement to the effect that, in return for her assistance, she should receive the coveted prize of Venetia. The benevolent neutrality of Russia was assured. Austria thus having been cut off from hope of external assistance, Bismarck at once proceeded to complete his

¹ The decisive interview between Bismarck and Napoleon III. occurred at Biarritz on September 30, 1865. Exactly what transpired still remains, and probably always will remain, a mystery.

military preparations and precipitate the quarrel. He pressed on his scheme for the reorganisation of the German Confederation with the exclusion of Austria, and ostentatiously began to mobilise. Austria replied by reopening the Schleswig-Holstein dispute and by presenting an ultimatum (April 26, 1866) demanding Prussian disarmament. The outbreak of war was delayed by diplomacy for a few weeks, but on June 12, ambassadors were mutually withdrawn and armies set in motion. Within three weeks Austria was utterly overthrown in the battle of Sadowa or Königgrätz (July 2, 1866).

§ 48. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE

The decisive and spectacular victory of Prussia over Austria in 1866 had far-reaching effects not only upon the two countries primarily concerned, but also upon France. The battle of Sadowa was hardly less a defeat for Napoleon III. than it was for Francis Joseph. It marked the bankruptcy of the French emperor's crafty diplomacy, the end of his influence in Europe, the beginning of the end of his stability in France itself. He had calculated on a long war, an evenly contested war, a war in which Austria would ultimately be successful, a war which would leave Germany more hopelessly weakened and divided than ever, a war into the midst of which

he himself would eventually be able to descend as a *deus ex machina* imposing terms and receiving compensations. All his calculations were disarrayed by the speedy and overwhelming triumph of the reorganised Prussian army. At once he began to bustle about seeking to repair his irremediable errors : he strove to prevent the union of Germany under Prussia ; he strove to become the medium through which Venetia should be ceded to Italy ; he strove to procure the promised compensations for France ; he threatened intervention on behalf of Austria. But Bismarck was incomparably more than a match for him. Having defeated Austria and having thus secured her exclusion from Germany, he perceived that his policy was to make terms with her at once, to treat her with the greatest possible leniency, and to win her friendship and alliance at the earliest feasible moment. With Austria as a non-German Power he had no cause of quarrel whatsoever. Hence he prevented the victorious Prussian army (to its great chagrin) from inflicting upon Vienna the humiliation of a triumphal entry, and he made no demands for cessions of territory. Pushing on negotiations with the utmost rapidity, so as to conclude them before the agitated Napoleon could make up his mind what to do in the matter of meddling, he completed the Peace of Prague on August 23, 1866. According to the terms of this agreement (1) the Confederation of 1815 was dis-

solved, and Austria ceased to be counted as a German power ; (2) Prussia was allowed to annex Schleswig-Holstein Hanover Hesse and other small territories, and, further, to organise all the German states north of the Main into a North German Confederation under her own headship ; (3) Italy was confirmed in the occupation of Venetia—but Venetia shorn of the Trentino Istria and Dalmatia, the *Italia irredenta* of modern times. Napoleon, utterly baffled by the presentation of this accomplished settlement—secured not only without his aid but with entire disregard of his opinion and in known opposition to his wishes—could only withdraw in disgust and rage to seek for means to restore his shattered prestige and to remove the new and formidable peril to French security which his folly had permitted to take shape in the North German Confederation. Bismarck was under no illusions as to Napoleon's attitude, and he clearly perceived that before any further steps towards German national union could be taken the power of Napoleon would have to be broken.

Whilst Bismarck was devoting his marvellous abilities to the preparation of the Franco-Prussian conflict which he felt to be necessary and intended to procure at his own good time, Francis Joseph of Austria was busily employed in reconstructing his "ramshackle empire" which had been severely shaken and disorganised by its simultaneous ejection from Germany and from Italy. With the aid of

the Austrian minister Beust and the Hungarian patriot Déak, he established the Dual Monarchy. The terms of its constitution were contained in the famous *Ausgleich*, or Compromise, of 1867. Their effect was that the Austrians admitted the Hungarians to equal partnership in the supreme power, on the understanding that they two should dominate and exclude from control all the other races of the empire. The anti-national and anti-democratic character of the Hapsburg dominion was emphasised, and Hapsburg policy was diverted from western to eastern Europe. The *Drang nach Osten* was inaugurated.

Western Europe, however, rather than the East was the main concern of Bismarck during the period 1866-70, and indeed for many years after. His business, which he accomplished with complete success, was (1) to keep Russia friendly and make sure that she would not intervene in any Franco-Prussian war: this he did by encouraging her designs against Turkey Persia and Afghanistan, and by expressing his consent to her repudiation of the Black Sea clauses of the treaty of 1856; (2) to cultivate the friendship of Austria-Hungary, so as to prevent her from seeking revenge on Prussia by means of an alliance with France: this he achieved by enlarging upon the Pan-Slavonic peril by which both the Teutonic Powers were threatened—a peril which he said demanded their closest co-operation; (3) to keep Italy faithful

to the Prussian alliance : this he did by holding out the supreme lure of Rome, which the troops of Napoleon were holding for the Pope ; (4) to secure the alliance of the South German States—Bavaria, Baden, Würtemberg and Hesse - Darmstadt — on whose aid against the menacing ascendancy of Prussia Napoleon confidently counted in case of a Franco - Prussian war : this supremely important but difficult alliance he procured by judicious revelations of Napoleon's demands for "compensations" at the expense of Germanic territory. Before 1870 France was isolated diplomatically, as Austria had been in 1866, and then on the principle that "Prussia strikes when Prussia's hour has struck," Bismarck sought occasion for war. He had not to seek long or far, for by that time the position of Napoleon was so shaken in France that the dominating empress, if not the pusillanimous emperor, felt that it could be re-established only by a successful war. With both sides, therefore, lusting for a fight—the one in confident hope, the other in necessitous despair—nothing but a pretext was required to set the armies marching. This pretext was found in the Hohenzollern candidature for the then vacant Spanish throne (July 1870). On July 14 war was declared, and by September 2 the French forces were shattered, and Napoleon himself a prisoner, at Sedan.

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LECTURE VIII

THE ERA OF IMPERIAL EXPANSION,
1871-1901

§ 49. THE SEQUEL TO SEDAN

FEW events in the world's history have had immediate results more tremendous than those that flowed from the military *débâcle* of France which culminated in the disaster of Sedan. First and foremost it was fatal both to the Napoleonic idea and to the Bonapartist dynasty. That idea, which professed to connote amongst other things nationality efficiency and peace, had in practice been found to mean jealous antagonism to German and Italian unification, corruption and incompetence beyond all precedent, incessant wars and rumours of wars. That dynasty, which had been called to the throne to restore French prestige after the inglorious impotence of Louis Philippe, had brought upon the country such crushing calamities as she had never known since the days of the mediæval invasions. As soon as the news of Sedan reached Paris (September 4, 1870), a spontaneous

revolution overthrew the empire, and set up a provisional government of national defence, to endeavour to save France, as the Convention had saved it in 1792. It was called upon to face still further military disasters—the worst of which was the capitulation of Bazaine at Metz in October; it had to endure the prolonged agony of the Siege of Paris (September 19, 1870, to January 28, 1871); it was compelled to convene a National Assembly to make with victorious Germany the humiliating Peace of Frankfort (May 10, 1871) which deprived France of Alsace and Lorraine, and mulcted her of an indemnity equivalent to £200,000,000 sterling. No sooner was peace concluded than the National Assembly had to confront the red spectre of revolutionary socialism once more, and to suppress “The Commune” in a desperate conflict which involved a second Siege of Paris (May 21–28), and the slaughter of over 17,000 of the communards.¹ It accomplished its painful tasks, and, having appointed Thiers “chief of the executive” (later “president”), it proceeded, first, to restore the shattered prosperity of France, and, secondly, to consider the form of a permanent constitution. Thiers showed himself to be a man of consummate ability, limitless energy, and unextinguishable faith. Under him France made a recovery more rapid and complete than men

¹ Some authorities, *e.g.* Hanatoux, estimate the casualties at a much higher figure: some say not less than 70,000.

had believed to be possible. Before the end of 1873 the indemnity was paid off; the country was cleared of Germans; universal military service was introduced; local government was reorganised; the frontier was refortified; industry and credit were revived. Thiers, however, thought it unwise to press the problem of constitutional settlement to an immediate solution, because Legitimists Orleanists and Bonapartists, as well as Republicans, were active and aggressive. All were prepared temporarily to accept the provisional government, but none were willing permanently to surrender their claims. Not till 1875, when M'Mahon was president, was the matter of the constitution decided. Then the Third Republic was established, not because there was any overwhelming enthusiasm for it, but because, in view of the rivalries of the various dynastic groups, it was the form of government which divided Frenchmen the least.

If Sedan destroyed the French Empire, it created the German. What philosophical discussion and parliamentary votes had not been able to achieve, that Bismarck's policy of blood and iron had accomplished. The revelation of Napoleon's designs upon German territory, the consciousness of the peril in which small states would stand amid the newly constituted Great Powers of Central Europe, pride in the might and success of Prussia, and desire to share her glory and prestige, overcame the reluctance

of the South German States to sacrifice their independence. Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt entered the Germanic Confederation, and assisted in its conversion into a Federal Empire. On January 18, 1871, at Versailles, the new constitution was proclaimed, and William, King of Prussia, assumed the additional title of German Emperor. Thus militarism triumphed, and the German nation, "drunk with victory," consoled itself for the loss of freedom and self-government by the thought that it had become dominant in Europe—a people before whom all rivals would tremble, and by whom all foes could be trampled down.

The completion of Italy's unification was a pendant to that of Germany. In the Franco-Prussian struggle Italy had been fortunate enough to "back the winner." At one time France might have had her aid; but the indispensable condition which Italy attached to her assistance was the withdrawal of the French troops from Civita Vecchia, and Napoleon's permission for the annexation of Rome and the Papal States to the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel. "Better the Prussians in Paris than the Piedmontese in Rome," had said the Empress Eugénie; and Napoleon, in fear of losing the clerical prop of his tottering throne, had felt it necessary to endorse her statement. Hence Italy had turned to Bismarck, who had no sort of objection to seeing the Pope despoiled of his territories. The early reverses of the French in the

war necessitated the recall of the Imperial troops from the neighbourhood of Rome (August 19, 1870), and scarcely had they departed when Italy announced her intention of occupying her natural capital. In vain the Pope protested ; in vain his feeble forces resisted. On September 20, 1870, the Italian army occupied the Eternal City, and the king took up his abode at the Quirinal.

The Pope, still a sovereign independent potentate,¹ found his dominion restricted to two buildings with the appurtenances thereof—the smallest state in the world. There he continued, and still continues, a life-prisoner in his palace, to maintain a travesty of government. His effective temporal power has passed away. But by a curious coincidence, at the very moment when his position as a secular ruler was being destroyed, his position as a spiritual monarch was being raised to a height of unprecedented magnitude. For in 1869 had been summoned the Vatican Council—the first general council held since that of Trent in the sixteenth century—and on July 18, 1870, by an all-but-unanimous vote the Council had proclaimed the dogma of papal infallibility.

¹ By a printer's error the novel word "potentiate" appeared here in the first proof. Professor Grant thinks that it might well be allowed to stand. I lack courage, however, to leave it.

§ 50. THE NEW EUROPE AND ITS PROBLEMS

The changes effected in the international system during the five years 1866-71 were so radical as virtually to destroy the Old Europe of Metternich and the Treaties, and to bring a New Europe into existence. The Europe of 1871 had one advantage over the Europe of 1815 in that it was founded upon triumphant nationality; Germany and Italy, which in the Vienna Settlement had been reduced to the condition of mere geographical expressions, had achieved unity self-consciousness statehood. Germany and Italy, that is to say, had attained something of that organic completeness, that definiteness of boundary, that finality of structure to which England France and Spain had arrived at the close of the fifteenth century. This was so much to the good; for it meant the removal of numerous sources of intrigue, and the elimination of causes which had for many centuries disturbed the peace of the Continent and retarded the progress of western civilisation. Over against this advantage, however, had to be set the facts that whereas the settlement of 1815 had been international, that of 1871 was imposed by the will of a single power; and that whereas the Treaties of Vienna were based on definite generally accepted principles, that of Frankfort-on-Main was based on the arrogant lawless and purely self-regarding will of one over-victorious state. Not only did Germany

effect her national unification by means of force and fraud, through aggressive war and lying diplomacy ; she completed it with a contemptuous repudiation of the claim to consideration of any nationality other than her own. For military reasons she tore away from France the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, from Denmark the duchy of Schleswig ; just as for the same reasons she had seized in the eighteenth century, and continued to keep, the Polish dominion of Posen. Thus the new German Empire included not only Teutonic peoples welded together in consciousness of kinship and in pride of victory, but also subject French Danes and Poles restless in their servitude and resentful of the pressure brought to bear upon them to crush out their memories of non-German ties. If then, as we have seen, Italian unity was still incomplete because of the unredeemed Trentino Istria and Dalmatia, so also for the opposite reason was German unity incomplete because of the forcible incorporation of unwilling aliens. The existence of *Italia irredenta* kept alive the old and deep-seated antagonism between Italy and Austria ; the seizure of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany filled France with a burning sense of humiliation and wrong, inspired her with a passionate longing for revenge, and prevented the dawn of any hope of reconciliation. These facts then dominated the New Europe of 1871—the indisputable supremacy of Germany on the Continent, the temporary elimina-

tion of France as a great power, the continued hostility of Italy to Austria, the new and implacable Franco-German antagonism generated by the Prussian occupation of Alsace and Lorraine. The European state system was disarrayed; the Concert of Europe destroyed; the balance of power upset; the foreign policy of all the governments of the Continent placed in need of readjustment. How Bismarck and his contemporaries dealt with the complex international situation I shall endeavour to show in detail in the next lecture. Here I must content myself with saying that more than a quarter of a century was destined to elapse before the definite outline of the readjusted state system began clearly to shape itself in the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. Meantime, while the statesmen of the Continent were feeling their way cautiously towards the new international order, three series of pressing problems demanded their immediate attention. First, they had to face a number of acute domestic questions raised in their respective countries during the upheaval of the Prussian wars; secondly, they had to deal with the riddle of the Near East presented to them for urgent solution by the growing national consciousness of the Balkan peoples, by the development of the Austrian *Drang nach Osten*, and by Russia's countermove towards the Dardanelles and the Mediterranean; thirdly, they had to guide and control a remarkable outburst of commercial

maritime and colonial activity which the peoples of all the leading European nations simultaneously displayed.

With domestic problems peculiar to the individual countries of Europe we are not concerned in this course of lectures, except in so far as they absorbed the attention of the statesmen of these countries and so modified their activity in general continental concerns. Suffice it, therefore, to say that each of the leading countries of Europe for some time after 1871 found intense occupation in internal affairs. France, for example, had to settle the form of her constitution. As we have seen, it was not until 1875 that she organised the Republic. Not, indeed, until Grévy succeeded M'Mahon as president in 1879 did she cordially accept the new form of government. A second source of serious trouble and anxiety arose from the antagonism which early manifested itself between the Republic and the Catholic Church. The Church proclaimed itself monarchical, legitimist, anti-republican; and the government, taking up the challenge, replied by secularising education, expelling the Jesuits, dissolving religious orders, confiscating ecclesiastical property, and finally (1905) repudiating the Concordat which, since the days of Napoleon I., had regulated the relations of church and state in France. A third cause of unrest sprang from the spread of socialistic doctrine and the formation of industrial

unions and syndicates which were first recognised as lawful associations in 1884.

In Germany, as in France, catholicism and socialism presented themselves as two of the most dangerous disintegrants of the new order. To Bismarck catholicism at first seemed to be the more formidable ; for it resented and resisted the transference of German hegemony from faithful Austria to infidel Prussia, and it was resolute to keep control of German education. Hence from 1872 to 1878 Bismarck exerted the immense power of the Prussianised empire against the Church in the famous *Kulturkampf*. He was in the end baffled by the insuperable patience and unshakable resolution of his antagonists, and in 1878 he was glad to effect a reconciliation with the clergy in order that church and state could combine against the common enemy of a secular social democracy, which had adopted a fighting creed from Karl Marx and a militant organisation from Ferdinand Lassalle. Bismarck's struggle against social democracy was conducted with a good deal more skill and success than had been his struggle against clericalism. He recognised the justice of many of the demands of the enemy, and sought to undermine the power of their leaders by adopting and putting into effective operation several of their most important proposals, e.g. state insurance against sickness (1883), accident (1884), and incapacity (1889). Nevertheless, in spite of

sops and concessions, the social democratic party continued to grow at a remarkable rate. It was, indeed, impossible that at the close of the nineteenth century a great people, highly educated and keenly interested in political affairs, should be content to remain subject to a despotism however paternal benevolent and efficient. So much engrossed was Bismarck by his conflicts with clericalism and socialism, and by his efforts to safeguard the infant German Empire from attacks on the part of European foes, that he regarded the re-emergence of the Eastern Question in 1876 with comparative indifference. It was not worth, he said, the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. That attitude of aloofness, however, was far from being shared by either Russia or Austria, either Britain or France. For several years the affairs of the Turkish Empire occupied them to the subordination of all other international problems.

§ 51. THE EASTERN QUESTION

Eastern Europe, and in particular south-eastern Europe, is several centuries behind western Europe in its development. Its retardation has been due to three main causes: first, the Slavonic peoples, who form the basal element in its population, entered later than the Teuton, and much later than the Celt, into the heritage of the civilisation of the ancient world;

secondly, when the Slavonic peoples came into contact with Greece and Rome both were decadent, and consequently the East inherited and became subject to the worst and not the best traditions of antiquity, viz. Greek orthodoxy in religion and Roman autocracy in politics; thirdly, while western Europe has been comparatively sheltered and peaceful, eastern Europe has been exposed to a succession of devastations and invasions (culminating sometimes in lasting conquests and occupations) by the nomadic hordes of Asiatic barbarians—Huns Avars Bulgarians Magyars Tartars and Turks. On the Balkan Peninsula the incubus of the later degenerate Roman Empire has lain specially heavily: from Vienna has radiated the anti-national and anti-democratic influence which the Hapsburgs represent as the successors of the Western Cæsars; in Constantinople have for four and a half centuries ruled the Turkish sultans, who claim to have inherited the cosmopolitan and despotic powers of the Byzantine emperors. Even on the Balkans, however, the democratic and national movements of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era in western Europe had their effects. We have seen how they led to the revolt of the Greeks and to the establishment of the Hellenic kingdom. They caused Montenegro—never fully reduced by the Turks—formally to proclaim her independence in 1796. They encouraged Serbia to rise in national rebellion in 1804 and to struggle in

desperate valour until, through Russian support, the Convention of Akermann (1826) and the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) reduced the Turkish control to a merely nominal suzerainty. They spurred Rumania to secure the extinction of the Phanariot rule (1822),¹ the virtual expulsion of the Turks (1829), and the full recognition of autonomy from the Powers assembled in Paris at the close of the Crimean War (1856). In face of these successful national revolts, the Turks themselves abandoned their Byzantine attitude and policy. They ceased to regard themselves as the rulers of an empire comprehensive and tolerant, including within its limits Europeans and Asiatics, Mohammedans and Christians, men of various races and diverse creeds. Under the guidance of Mahmoud II. (1809-39), a sultan of remarkable prescience and ability, they converted their cosmopolitan empire into an Asiatic national state whose heart is Anatolia. This nationalised Turkish state—fiercely angry at its recent spoliations and humiliations—developed a new centralisation of government, a new and immense conscript army, and a new religious intolerance. The lot of the subject Christian peoples who still remained beneath the Turkish yoke became one of increasing hardship and horror, particularly after the fatal Anglo-French adventure of the Crimean War had destroyed the

¹ "Phanariot" is a term applied to a Greek in the Turkish service. It originally meant an inhabitant of the Phanar, or Greek, quarter of Constantinople.

safeguard of Russian protection and had given a new lease of immunity to the Sultan. The cries of the Serbians of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the Greeks of Thessaly, of the Bulgarians of the central Balkans, of the mixed races of Macedonia, were poured into the ears of the Powers. In vain were humanity and reform pressed upon the Porte by the ambassadors of the western states : the Turk gave promises freely, but kept them not at all. In vain did the rulers of Austria and Russia consult together in the hope of finding some method of redress. In 1872 they met in Berlin in the presence of their new colleague the German emperor ; but all that the *Dreikaiserbündnis* of that occasion stipulated was that, whatever action might be required in the East, it should be taken by the three in common.

In these circumstances of European inactivity and ineptitude the oppressed peoples took their fates into their own hands and rose in desperate revolt. The rising began in Herzegovina during the summer of 1875 ; in the autumn Bosnia came in ; in 1876 Bulgaria entered. Serbia and Montenegro threw in their lot with their oppressed fellows. The Turks replied to this challenge by ferocious and sanguinary repression. Their reorganised national army easily asserted its ascendancy, and, inspired by intense religious fanaticism, it inflicted upon both the conquered foe and the crushed rebels the most appalling barbarities. In particular the " Bulgarian

Atrocities" of 1876 sent a thrill of horror through Christendom. The Powers conferred together and sent notes—the most important of which was the Andrassy Note of December 30, 1875—but the exasperated Turk repudiated or ignored them. Then Russia urged European intervention (May 1876); but this most hopeful course was vetoed by the unhappy opposition of the British prime minister, Disraeli, who was possessed by an ineradicable suspicion of Russian designs in the East, and by a Semitic tenderness for the Turk. Hence negotiations were resumed; conferences were held in Constantinople (December 1876) and London (March 1877); more notes were sent to replenish the Turkish waste-paper baskets. But nothing was done, and meantime the ghastly programme of massacre and spoliation was pursued with redoubled fury by the Ottoman hordes. Finally, Russia, unable any longer to stand aside and watch the extermination of the Bulgarians, came to an understanding with Austria and declared war (April 1877).

The Russo-Turkish war was a stern and protracted struggle. The Turkish forces—a nation in arms—fought with magnificent if fanatical valour. In particular Osman Pasha's defence of Plevna (July-December 1877), in spite of the fact that it was a military mistake, won the reluctant admiration of the world. But early in 1878 the overwhelming masses of the Russian armies bore down resistance

and compelled the Sultan to sue for peace. The January 20 Adrianople fell, and Constantinople itself lay at the mercy of the hosts of the Tzar. Then, with the great prize actually under their eyes and all but in their grasp, the Russian armies were stayed in their triumphant progress. Disraeli announced that he would regard a Russian occupation of Constantinople as a *casus belli*; Austria also prepared to intervene to prevent complete Russian dominance in the Balkan Peninsula. With infinite chagrin, therefore, the Tzar paused and made with the Sultan the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878), by which *inter alia* the full independence of Serbia Montenegro Rumania and Bulgaria was unconditionally conceded by Turkey. The territorial arrangements of the treaty, however, were unacceptable to Britain and Austria, and to avoid a European war Russia was constrained to submit them to revision in a congress called at Bismarck's suggestion to meet at Berlin. There, acting as "honest broker," Bismarck negotiated the Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878), which settled the status of the Balkan peoples for thirty years. By this treaty the Turkish power in Europe was resuscitated; Bulgaria was reduced to less than one-half of the area assigned to her in the San Stefano arrangement; Bosnia and Herzegovina were placed under Austrian administration; Russia, in return for her vast efforts and sacrifices, received only Bessarabia (taken from Rumania in exchange for the

Attrnquered Dobrudsha) Batoum and Kars, together with a small pecuniary indemnity. Filled with not unnatural anger, specially directed against Disraeli and his persistently Turkophile and anti-Russian policy, Russia turned in disgust from the Near East to pursue schemes of expansion, extremely alarming to Britain, in Middle and Farther Asia.

§ 52. THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE

In 1878 the relations of the European Powers to one another, disturbed by the events of 1864-70, seemed once again to be defined and established. The Western Question had been solved, for the time at any rate, by the Franco-Prussian War; the Eastern Question by the Congress of Berlin. All the leading Continental statesmen, for one reason or another, were anxious to avoid the reopening of awkward problems of international politics. Consequently, with singular unanimity, they began to seek in regions remote from Europe outlets for national energy, spheres for imperial expansion, openings for commercial and industrial enterprise.

Russia, as we have just seen, was spurred to great activity by profound wrath at the frustration of her Near Eastern designs. Not unjustly, she regarded Great Britain as the prime cause of her recent disappointment and discomfiture; for it was, indeed, a fixed principle of British policy, under Disraeli's

determination, to prevent Russia from reaching the Mediterranean, and from thus gaining power to menace the Suez Canal and Anglo-Indian communications. Russia, therefore, was strongly disposed to retaliate by threatening India from the side of Central Asia, and by causing the Indian Government as much anxiety as possible in respect of its north-west frontier. But other and deeper causes impelled Russia eastward. The growth of her population, the rapid development of her agriculture and dairy farming, the increase of her industries under the fostering care of German organisers, the extension of her foreign commerce, all imperatively demanded that she should have more ample access to open seas. Hence, while westward she sought (to the alarm of Sweden and Norway) an ice-free port on the Atlantic, eastward she naturally groped her way towards the Persian Gulf and towards the Middle Pacific. The Russian advance into Asia became marked soon after the close of the Crimean War. A notable event in the Far East was the founding of Vladivostok in 1858. In the central regions of the Asiatic Continent the main stages of the Muscovite progress were signalised by the occupations of Tashkend (1864), Samarcand (1868), Khiva (1873), and Khokand (1876). At the time of the Treaty of Berlin the frontier of Afghanistan had been reached. Only the turbulent and incalculable kingdom of the Ameer lay between the Russian hosts and

the Khyber Pass, the immemorial gateway into the Indian plains. Before the close of the year 1878, the reception of a Russian mission by the Ameer, and his refusal to receive a countervailing British mission, led to the Anglo-Afghan War (1878-79), in which Lord Roberts gained so great renown. Its effect was to check Russian advance in the direction of India by placing on the throne of Afghanistan an Ameer bound by close ties to Britain and heavily subsidised by the Indian Government. Checked however, in this region, Russia moved in another. She completed the conquest of Turkestan in 1881, occupied Merv in 1884, and reached Penjdeh in 1885, where again British antagonism brought her to a pause. In 1891 she invaded the Pamirs, and thus caused fresh friction with Britain, until a joint commission in 1895 delimited here also the frontier of the two empires. The year of the invasion of the Pamirs saw the beginning of that great engineering enterprise, the making of the Trans-Siberian Railway (completed 1905). In 1898, too, by means which do not bear ethical examination, Russia secured for a season in Port Arthur the ice-free Pacific harbour which she so much coveted.

While Russia was thus extending her power over Asia, France was energetically occupied in building up a colonial dominion, primarily in Africa. Bismarck showed a benevolent interest in her enterprise, and encouraged her to pursue it, partly because he wished

to divert the attention of Frenchmen from Alsace-Lorraine and schemes of revenge, partly because he hoped and believed (rightly as the event proved) that colonial activity in Africa would enbroil France in disputes with both Italy and Britain, and so would perpetuate her diplomatic isolation so desirable for Germany's repose. Algeria had been French since 1830, and its development had been one of the most creditable and enduring achievements of the prosaic reign of Louis Philippe. In 1881 the French occupied Tunis which Italy had earmarked as her own share of the Turkish heritage whenever the day of partition should come. The result was thirty years of Franco-Italian unfriendliness—a triumph for German diplomacy. Soon afterwards the peaceful penetration of Morocco began—a process which created acute dissension between France and Spain until 1904 when an agreement as to spheres of influence was reached. In 1891 the Ivory Coast was occupied, in 1892 Dahomey, in 1895 Madagascar. Three years later (1898) the arrival of a French mission at Fashoda on the Upper Nile led to so grave a crisis in the relations between Great Britain and France that war seemed imminent. The approach of this great catastrophe, however, and the evident satisfaction with which it was anticipated in Germany, caused both the angry Powers to pause and think. Their cogitations and observations led them to perceive a new meaning

in German foreign policy, a sinister meaning which turned their hearts to alliance rather than to fratricidal strife.

Germany herself was late in entering the colonial field. Bismarck, intent on serious problems of domestic politics, and anxious, above all things, to keep the newly constituted empire at peace until it should have attained to organisation and self-consciousness, discountenanced overseas adventures and discouraged would-be settlers. "We do not wish to colonise," he said, "nor can we do so. We shall never possess a fleet. Nor are our workmen, our lawyers, our retired soldiers worth anything for colonisation." But the *Zeitgeist* was too strong even for Bismarck. In 1882 the *Deutscher Kolonialverein* was founded, followed in 1884 by the *Gesellschaft für deutsche Kolonisation*, and the activities and immense popularity of these two spontaneously-generated bodies forced Bismarck's hand. Hence he had to recognise and support the occupations of "Luderitzland" (South West Africa), Togoland, the Cameroons, and German East Africa, all of which were annexed in 1884. Next year the beginning of an extensive dominion in the Pacific Ocean was made by the granting of imperial letters of protection to a New Guinea Company which gradually—by purchase, by treaty, or by mere seizure—added island to island until, before the end of the century, nearly a quarter of a million square

kilometres of Pacific territory were under German control. Finally, in 1897, Kiao-chau was "leased" from China.

Italy, not to be outdone in the race for overseas possessions, tried, but with disastrous results, to establish authority over Ethiopia (1882) and Abyssinia (1896). Belgium, or rather her king, Leopold, with much success—although by means which shocked humanity—built up an empire on the Congo. Even Austria conferred the name of her sovereign upon an island, inhabited only by wild-fowl, in the Arctic Ocean—Franz-Joseph Land (1872).

§ 53. THE EXPLOITATION OF THE WORLD

The eastward trend of Russia, together with the colonial activity of France Italy Belgium and above all Germany, roused Great Britain from a state of curious apathy—not to say antipathy—towards overseas dominions which had characterised her during the century. The loss of the American colonies in the reign of George III. had, in fact, filled her with disgust for dependencies. She had found them but sources of conflict humiliation and expense, and she had unreservedly accepted Turgot's view that colonies, like ripening fruit, are inevitably destined sooner or later to drop from the parent stem. Disraeli was merely expressing the common British opinion current during the century that followed the revolt of the

American Plantations, when in 1852 he said, "These wretched colonies will all be independent in a few years, and they are a millstone round our necks."

It was Disraeli's own ministry (1874-80), however, which saw the change in the attitude of Britain towards her overseas offspring; and it was Disraeli himself and his colleague, Lord Carnarvon, who were among the pioneers of the new imperialism. Circumstances, indeed, had been profoundly modified between 1852 and 1880. Not only had Europe been remodelled; not only had the general scramble for the unclaimed portions of the world begun; but an unprecedented rivalry in commerce and industry had developed, a struggle to secure new markets and fresh sources of raw materials. Moreover, the opening up of rapid railway and steamship communications, the extension of telegraphs and the laying of ocean cables, the organisation of postal services, and the dissemination of information by means of newspapers—all these things removed the barriers of distance inaccessibility and ignorance which in earlier days had been insuperable obstacles to any sort of union or co-operation. In the changed conditions the British mother-country and her colonies began to view one another with less alien eyes, and even fell to speculating whether ultimate separation from one another was inevitable. They were further spurred to serious effort to find some form of federal unification by the growing militarism of the world.

The immense increase in the size and power of the armaments of the modern states, and the tendency of non-moral supermen to the ruthless spoliation of the weak, made both Britain and the Dominions realise that the terminus of isolation would be ruin. In 1883 Seeley pointed the moral in his splendid lectures on *The Expansion of England*; in 1884 the Imperial Federation League was inaugurated, and henceforth all the more far-sighted of British statesmen—notably Lord Rosebery, Mr. W. E. Forster, Sir Charles Dilke, and Mr. Joseph Chamberlain—devoted anxious thought to the problem of how to weld together in some organic bond the scattered and heterogeneous fragments of the then-misnamed “British Empire.”

In 1884, however, the problem of imperial federation was not the only question, nor indeed the most pressing question, which confronted the British Colonial Office. This was the very year in which, as we have seen, Germany suddenly, with much rattling of her formidable sabre, and with open proclamation of large and menacing designs, planted herself on four distinct and important sectors of the African coast. The older colonising Powers—Britain France Spain Portugal and Belgium—were gravely perturbed by the advent of this mighty and unexpected rival. They had, of course, no right to resent the German entry; but they wished to set bounds, if possible, to the new-comer’s ambitions.

Fortunately Bismarck was eminently moderate in colonial matters, for they did not greatly interest him. A conference was held at Berlin (1884-85), and as the result of its sessions arrangements were made for the partitioning of Africa into "spheres of influence" of the various European Powers concerned. Britain was not slow in staking out her claims, although it was private enterprise rather than official prescience that was the operative factor. Bechuanaland was secured for Britain by John Mackenzie (1884); Nigeria is the enduring memorial of Joseph Thomson's energy (1885); Rhodesia bears the name of the great empire-builder to whom its acquisition was due (1889). Meantime the British hold over Egypt and the Soudan was being strengthened, in spite of the temporary set-back which was marked by the death of Gordon at Khartoum (1885). Farther south, British East and Central Africa were being developed—a notable addition to their territories being made when in 1890 Zanzibar was secured from the German sphere in exchange for the North Sea island of Heligoland. Before the close of the nineteenth century the European partition of Africa was nearly complete.

Simultaneously with this scramble for Africa, a scramble for Oceania was going on. Germany, Britain and the United States were all busily engaged in picking up unappropriated islands. Serious conflict was threatened, particularly in the Samoan

Archipelago where each of the three Powers obtained a foothold. Finally, in 1900, an agreement was reached, and Oceania, like Africa, was divided out into spheres of influence.

From Oceania the idea of partitionment was extended to the continent of Asia. Here, however, it was not undeveloped forests or barbaric islands that were in question, but the vast and apparently derelict empire of China with over four hundred millions of inhabitants. Not only did Russia seize Port Arthur, Germany Kiao-chau, and Britain Wei-hai-wei (1898), but the various Powers who at the point of the sword were pushing their commercial interests in China agreed to divide the populous provinces of the empire into exclusive spheres for mercantile exploitation. Two things occurred, however, to give them pause. One was the Boxer rising of the Chinese themselves who strove, though vainly, to expel the foreign devils (1898); the other was the forceful and effective intervention of Japan (1904), who had rapidly raised herself into the position of a first-rate naval and military power expressly in order that she might prevent the European spoliation of Asia.

Not only upon Asia, but also upon South America, did the enterprising European Powers cast longing eyes. Germany, in particular, coveted Brazil, whither annually large numbers of her citizens emigrated. But over South America the United States stood as

a vigilant and formidable guardian. Not until the Monroe policy of the great Republic should have been challenged and defeated would it be possible for Germany or any other Power to exploit any portion of the New World.

§ 54. THE END OF AN AGE

The year 1901 marked in a more than conventional manner the end of an era in the World's history. When the twentieth century dawned the Great Powers had been for over a couple of decades at peace with one another, and this long period of tranquillity had been characterised by unprecedented material prosperity—by marvellous scientific discoveries, by wonderful mechanical inventions, by vast increase in industrial efficiency, by unequalled elaboration of commercial organisation, and (as we have just seen) by extraordinary colonial activity. It had also been notable for the energy and freedom of its thought, for the extension of popular education, for the cheapening of books and papers, for the hundred-fold increase of reading, for the inestimable widening of the circles within which intelligent interest in social and political problems could be found.

Together with the termination of the nineteenth century, however, the period of more or less secure tranquillity came to a close. Menaces to peace began to appear. These menaces to peace can be broadly

classed under the two familiar heads of democracy and nationality ; but each of the two in 1901 manifested itself in forms which would have appeared strange in 1850, forms which had been totally unknown in 1815. First, as to democracy. In all the countries of Europe the claim of the people to share more fully in political power had, during the closing decades of the nineteenth century, been strongly asserted and vehemently pressed. In many it had secured important recognition and noteworthy triumph. Britain, for instance, had immensely extended the sphere of popular control by means of the Ballot Act of 1872, the Parliamentary Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884, the County Councils Act of 1888, and the Parish Councils Act of 1894. Measures of enfranchisement, varying in nature and degree, had been granted in Italy 1881, France 1885, Spain 1890, Belgium 1893, Austria 1896. In Germany, more than in any other country, the tide of democracy had been dammed ; but the fact that there too it was rising was revealed with unmistakable clearness to the autocratic government by the steady increase of the socialist vote at elections to the Reichstag—a body eloquent if impotent.¹

¹ The table showing the increase in the social-democratic vote is instructive. It is roughly as follows :

1871 =	124,000	1874 =	352,000
1877 =	493,000	1881 =	312,000
1884 =	549,000	1887 =	763,000
1890 =	1,427,000	1893 =	1,786,000

1912 = 4,250,000 (more than $\frac{1}{2}$ of the total electoral vote).

But neither in Germany nor in any other country was the prime aim of the democracy any longer political. If the people sought for votes and for influence in the state, it was in order that they might exercise control over social and economic conditions. No more as a fortuitous concourse of isolated individuals did they demand each for himself the "rights of man"; rather as members of powerful trade unions industrial syndicates and co-operative societies did they claim a larger share of that wealth in the production of which they played so great a part. Inspired by the unbalanced and largely erroneous economic theories of Karl Marx, they girt up their loins for the "class war," and the twentieth century opened with ominous signs (which have grown darker rather than lighter as the years have passed) of the social revolution.

Secondly, as to nationality. Among peoples whose national aspirations had remained unsatisfied the old agitation for independence and self-government continued, but raised to a higher pitch of intensity by reason of the successes which the national principle had achieved—in Germany Italy and the Balkan Peninsula—during the preceding period. Thus the dawn of the new century saw Ireland Poland and Bohemia restless with unrealised desire; saw Alsace-Lorraine still holding out her hands to France; Schleswig to Denmark; Trentino to Italy; Slavonia to Serbia; Transylvania to

Rumania. But these were not the most disturbing manifestations of nationality. Its most alarming symptoms were displayed by those states which had attained the goal of sovereign unity, and particularly by new-made Germany. To some extent in all European national states, but to a marked degree in Germany, patriotism had developed from love of country into love of more country ; while in the colonies it had grown from passion for the native land into passion for the lands of the natives. In the case of the older colonising nations this inflammation of the patriotic spirit—although it tended to cause grave oppression of aboriginal races—was comparatively harmless internationally ; because all these nations, and notably Great Britain, had vast tracts of magnificent undeveloped dominion in which to operate. Not so in the case of Germany. She had begun to colonise late and in a world already for the most part occupied and portioned out. The relics which she picked up and collected assiduously during the closing years of the nineteenth century proved to be sources of acute disappointment. In vain she fostered them by her power, and lavished upon them money equivalent to £100,000,000 sterling. They did not prosper ; they did not pay ; they did not answer the purposes for which they had been annexed. Their prime object had been to provide outlets for the surplus population of Germany, which during this period was draining

away from the Fatherland at the average rate of 2000 a day. But they were too much "places in the sun," too tropical, to be attractive to, or even tolerable by, white men ; and (in spite of encouragements profusely held out by the imperial government) when the war broke out in 1914 the total German population in all the colonies put together was only 16,000 ! The second purpose of German colonisation had been to provide markets for the surplus products of Germany's over-protected and over-prolific industries ; but although in area the overseas dominions of Germany were more than four times the size of the Fatherland itself, their population consisted of a scanty twelve and a half millions of impecunious savages, whose numbers and whose wealth tended to diminish rather than increase under the influence of German *Kultur*. The third purpose of German expansion had been to secure sources of raw material for German manufactures ; but, though the rubber and the palm oil of the equatorial African colonies, the diamonds of the south-west, and the copra of the Pacific, were valuable, the variety of products was not great, while constant troubles with the natives kept the quantity low. Hence in 1901 Germany was disillusioned and full of dangerous jealousy.

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LECTURE IX

THE ERA OF THE SCHISM OF EUROPE, 1901-14

§ 55. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AFTER SEDAN

FROM 1901, in an ever-increasing degree, Germany became a menace to the unity of Europe and the peace of the World. Her unsatisfied colonial ambitions caused her to cast greedy and threatening eyes upon the delectable dominions of Spain and Portugal, Holland and Belgium, France and Britain. The ominous growth of the social-democratic party within her own borders, and the rising insistence of the popular demand for political power, so seriously alarmed her governing class that (like the Napoleonic bureaucracy of 1870) they felt that a vigorous foreign policy was the only alternative to a domestic revolution. Further, the claims of her artificially stimulated industry, her monopolistic commerce, her subsidised mercantile marine, her speculative and unsound finance, made the acquisition of new markets, new dependencies, new outlets to the sea, new spheres of enterprise, new sources of supply,

essential. Finally, her aggressive and incalculable diplomacy—accompanied by ostentatious exhibitions of mailed fists and shining armour—turned her into an intolerable neighbour and a source of constant irritation and alarm to the Continent.

In order that we may understand the international situation at the beginning of the twentieth century, and may be able to appreciate the nature of the German menace, it is necessary that we should revert for a moment to the position of affairs immediately after Sedan. As we have already seen, that battle placed Prussia in a position of indisputable dominance in Europe. It destroyed the balance of power—the peace-preserving equilibrium among the Continental states—and established a German hegemony. No one was more fully and proudly aware of this than Bismarck ; for he himself enjoyed a regard and exerted an influence such as had belonged to no individual in Europe since the fall of Napoleon I. But Bismarck wisely and cautiously wished to conceal, rather than to display, the fact of Germany's ascendancy : because he perceived that for some considerable period it would be insecure ; knew that peace would be necessary for its establishment ; and realised that it might easily be destroyed during its early years by a hostile coalition. Time and freedom from interruption were, moreover, urgently necessary to him, in order that he might deal with certain important matters ~~and~~ internal

politics, some of which we have already noted. He had to face and surmount the persistent particularism of the but-lately independent members of the new federal empire ; had to persuade or force them to merge themselves in the German nation ; had to reduce them to subservience to the Prussian will. He had, further, to meet and overcome the deep-seated antipathy of the Catholic Church towards the new Protestant substitute for the Holy Roman Empire, the Germany whence the Hapsburgs had been expelled. Again, he had to endeavour to soothe the swelling Cerberus of socialism by means of sops laboriously concocted from recipes contained in the Marxian cookery book. In these circumstances of domestic difficulty and anxiety he felt it necessary above all things to maintain peace abroad, to calm the natural fear of the other European states at the rise of this mighty military empire in the heart of the Continent, to persuade the World that Germany with all her power was essentially pacific. This he was able to do with all the more success because after the Treaty of Frankfort he himself believed in Germany's pacificism. He had, as a matter of fact, accomplished and completed his great life-work in 1871 ; he had effected the unification of Germany under Prussia. Henceforth his prime concern was to conserve the product of his toil. After 1871 he was as genuine a lover of peace as had been Robert Walpole in the critical years of the settlement of the

Hanoverian dynasty on the English throne. He would have liked to be on terms of diplomatic friendship with all the Powers, and it was a matter of real regret to him that he had to recognise that friendship with France was impossible. The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 had left no rankling wounds in the breast of the defeated, because Bismarck had been able to prevent annexation of Austrian territory and all unnecessary humiliation of the Hapsburgs. Very different had it been in the case of the Franco-Prussian War. The Prussians had had Jena to revenge ; the military men had been determined to have a new strategic frontier which should include Strassburg Metz and, if possible, Belfort. Hence the French had been spared no element of insult or spoliation : their capital had been entered, their provinces of Alsace-Lorraine taken from them, the savings of their thrifty peasantry drained away to fertilise German industry. In vain had Bismarck, regardless of the future, urged some moderation upon the victory-intoxicated militarists. They had prevailed against him ; and so had left him and his successors to face a France whose hatred was implacable, whose passion for revenge undying, whose determination to recover the lost provinces unshakable, whose antagonism to Germany in every part of the globe inevitable. Since, then, Bismarck knew that the one certain factor in all the international problems which he would have to solve would be French hostility,

he made it his principal business to keep France isolated ; to prevent her from forming alliances ; above all, to render it impossible for her to build up a coalition antagonistic to the German Empire. He managed this business with consummate skill and with conspicuous success, to the immense immediate advantage of Germany, but with disastrous results to the Commonwealth of Europe. He sowed dissensions, fostered hatreds, insinuated suspicions, suggested policies which tended to conflict, set the whole Continent by the ears, displayed a Macchiavellian patriotism devoid of moral scruple and regardless of all save German interests. To obviate a rapprochement between France and Russia—a thing which above all others he dreaded—he encouraged France to establish a republican rather than a monarchical form of government. To alienate France from Italy he supported the French annexation of Tunis. To embroil France with Britain he favoured the British occupation of Egypt. To prevent Austria from being drawn into an anti-Prussian fellowship with France he cultivated her friendship himself, and found means to bind the Central Empires together in the bonds of a close alliance. Throughout the whole of the remainder of Bismarck's career as a statesman (1871–90) France was kept solitary and impotent.

§ 56. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

The segregation of France in Europe may be called the negative side of Bismarck's foreign policy. But his policy had also a positive side. If he had a horror of anti-Prussian coalitions, he had a counter-vailing affection for alliances in which Prussia was the dominant partner. The two Powers that he was most anxious to have as friends were Austria and Russia: the alliance of either of them with France would have exposed Germany to grave peril; the alliance of both of them with France would have been fatal. With Italy he did not concern himself much; she was weak from the military point of view, and was much distracted by religious and social dissensions. Nevertheless, he thought it worth while to maintain the good relations of 1866 and 1870, so as to prevent the natural gravitation of the Italians towards the French, and to check any tendency towards a recrudescence of the immemorial Austro-Italian antagonism which might embarrass German policy. As to Britain, he regarded her with dislike mingled with contempt. He had nothing either to hope or to fear from her. True, the court of Queen Victoria was thoroughly German; but it was German of the obsolete musical and sentimental type, not of the current blood-and-iron order. Bismarck disliked the English form of government — its parliaments, its responsible ministries, its freedom

of political criticism. He resented the pious and humanitarian influence which the English queen brought to bear upon the old emperor (who was not wholly impervious to moral considerations in affairs of state), and the still more intimate control which was exerted over the crown prince Frederick by his English wife. The policy of English statesmen, however, caused him no alarm. Disraeli was so emphatically anti-Russian that he could be trusted to keep on good terms with the only Power capable of checking Russia in Europe. As to Gladstone, he was so feeble in foreign politics that he could be ignored. Bismarck spoke of him as a "professor"! He could not have found a term expressive of more profound contempt. "Professor Gladstone," he said, in 1882, "perpetrates one piece of stupidity after another. He has alienated the Turks; he commits follies in Afghanistan and at the Cape; he does not know how to manage Ireland. There is nothing to be done with him."

Such were the general principles of Bismarck's foreign policy. The following were their main exemplifications. In 1872 Bismarck brought about in Berlin a meeting of the three emperors, Alexander II. of Russia, Francis Joseph of Austria, and William I. of Germany. Under his guidance they entered into an agreement which strikingly resembled a renewal of the Holy Alliance of 1815. The *Dreikaiserbündnis* stipulated that the three autocrats

should act together first to suppress revolution, *i.e.* nihilism in Russia, socialism in Germany, nationalism in Austria-Hungary ; secondly, to delimit boundaries ; thirdly, to settle the Eastern Question. This pact entirely satisfied Bismarck, and he hoped that it might always be possible for Germany to remain in equally close and cordial alliance with both her imperial neighbours. Three things, however, showed him within the next three years that this hope would be impossible of realisation. To begin with, he found that Russian and Austrian interests in the Balkans conflicted too sharply to permit of genuine co-operation, and that Germany would have to decide which of the two she would support at Constantinople. Next he discovered that the Pan-Slavonic movement, fostered by Russia, gravely menaced both German authority in Posen and Austro-Hungarian authority in Bohemia Galicia Croatia and Slavonia. Finally, in 1875, he was made to realise, to his intense annoyance, that Russia was not prepared to acquiesce in any further humiliation or spoliation of France on the part of Germany. In that year the remarkable recovery of France from the blow of 1870-71 (which Germany had meant to be, and had believed to be, destructive) roused the wrath of the German militarists, and led by Moltke they demanded another war which would enable them to administer to France the *coup de grâce*. Bismarck was not unprepared to yield to the soldiers

and to engineer a *casus belli*; nor would he have been deterred by the letters of protest and appeal which Queen Victoria addressed to William I. Conditions were radically changed, however, when at the height of the crisis Alexander II. paid a special visit to Berlin and reinforced the arguments of the English lady with the more masculine ones of Russian dialectic. France was saved from wanton attack; but Bismarck had learned the limits of Russian friendship. Hence in 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, when he officiated as a disinterested and "honest broker" at the discussion of the Eastern Question, he did not hesitate to further a settlement which gave to Austria, who had done no fighting, advantages as great as those which were allowed to Russia on whom the heavy burden of the campaign had fallen. Russia felt that she had been betrayed and deeply wronged: her representatives went away from the German capital in intense irritation and chagrin. Bismarck perceived that the *Dreikaiserbündnis* was at an end, and that the day of choice had come. His course was quite clear. He drew nearer to Austria, and in 1879 made with her the famous Dual Alliance—a defensive pact, expressly stated to be an instrument of mutual guarantee against Russia, which has endured as the fundamental fact of European diplomacy from that day to the present moment. The existence of this Alliance was kept secret for some time, for fear lest knowledge of its

terms should irritate the Power against whom it was directed into some hostile act. When knowledge of it leaked out, Lord Salisbury, on behalf of Britain, made one of those remarks which show how impossible it is for even the most able and well-informed students of foreign affairs to estimate the meaning of contemporary events. "To all those," he said, "who care for the peace of Europe, and take an interest in the independence of nations, I would exclaim, 'A crowning mercy has been vouchsafed to the world.'" He was still more gratified when in 1882 the Dual Alliance was converted into the "Triplice" by the admittance of Italy, who entered through anger at the French occupation of Tunis; through desire to counter the strong Catholic agitation for the restoration of Rome to the Pope; and through fear of internal revolution.

§ 57. THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF WILLIAM II.

Although Bismarck had thus definitely allied Germany with Austria as against Russia, he still made it a cardinal principle of his policy to maintain good relations with Petrograd. He greatly dreaded a conflict with the empire of the Tzar, and was specially anxious to avoid any course of action which would drive Russia into the arms of France. Hence in 1884 he was glad to take advantage of circumstances which caused both

Germany and Russia to apprehend British hostility—the one respecting African colonisation, the other respecting Central Asian encroachments—and to effect with the Tzar a three years' "reinsurance treaty," in which each Power promised the other benevolent neutrality in case of war. This treaty Bismarck renewed in 1887; but, when in 1890 the time once more came round for its reconsideration, Bismarck had fallen from power, and German policy was in the hands of a young autocrat who contemplated serious departures from Bismarckian ideals.

William II.—confident in the military might of his empire, rendered doubly bold by the stability of the Triple Alliance of which he was the controlling head, and confronted only by a number of isolated and mutually unfriendly Powers whose possible opposition to his schemes he felt he could safely disregard—determined from the time of his accession in 1888 to adopt a more aggressive and enterprising policy than, under the guidance of Bismarck, either his grandfather or his father had pursued. His first utterance to his army had sounded an ominous warning in the ears of the neighbours of Germany: "I solemnly vow always to be mindful of the fact that the eyes of my ancestors are looking down upon me from the other world, and that one day I shall have to render to them an account both of the glory and the honour of the army." It was a weird idea,

this conception of a supplementary German Day of Judgment devoted exclusively to Hohenzollern military affairs; but it was characteristic and significant. From the beginning, in fact, the young emperor cultivated enlarged and flattered his army, because from the beginning he contemplated vast schemes of Germanic expansion and world-dominion, the success of which would ultimately depend on military might.

The first of these schemes—first in order both of time and of importance—was that which had as its object the mastery of the East. He had become possessed by the glamour of the Orient. He perceived that in Asia Minor Syria and Persia, those seats of ancient empire and immemorial wealth, lay the key to the lordship of the Earth. He believed (and everything indicates that he still believes) that if he could, in conjunction with his Austrian ally, secure control over Turkey, break down the Serbo-Bulgarian barriers which divide the Ottoman dominions from Central Europe, he could establish a Germanic control over the World which nothing could shake. Hence the significance of the fact that the first of all European courts which he visited after his accession was that of the ruler whom neither his father nor his grandfather would have dreamed of visiting in any circumstances: in 1889 he paid ostentatious homage to that sultan who has been appropriately distinguished by a master of

English phraseology as "Abdul the Damned"—a sultan called to "his infernal throne" by the party of reaction and massacre, a despot whose career throughout its whole horrible and abominable course was an unbroken record of treachery and bloodshed. Nine years later (1898) a second visit to Constantinople revealed the inner meaning of the Kaiser's eastern excursions. At a time when the other Powers were vainly trying to bring pressure upon the unspeakable Turk to restrain his atrocities in Armenia, William II. proclaimed himself the friend of the murderer, the protector of the Ottoman empire, the patron of the Mohammedan religion throughout the world, the ally of Allah. At the same time he secured the secret prize of his apostasy, the sultan's concession (openly announced in 1902) of the right to construct the Bagdad Railway. On the building of this railway, on the linking of it with the systems of Vienna and Berlin, on the consequent economic exploitation of the Orient, on the ultimate political and military domination over the Turkish empire, on the destruction of the British power in Egypt, on the extension of German influence to the Persian Gulf—on these and on other magnificent eastern projects the Kaiser's limitless ambition has mainly nourished itself.¹ He, of

¹ Dr. Paul Rohrbach, a prominent Pan-German, in his book on the Bagdad Railway, says: "The Bagdad Railway from the beginning was intended to unite directly Constantinople and the military strong points of the Turkish Empire in Asia Minor with Syria and the provinces of the Euphrates and the Tigris.

course, clearly realised that the accomplishment of these designs would inevitably involve conflict with Russia, and the reduction beneath the Teutonic sway by one means or another of all the Balkan peoples. Hence he laboured to render his army equal to all the calls that could possibly be made upon it. He did not want war. On the contrary, he sincerely desired peace. But the peace which he desired was a German peace, a peace which involved complete acquiescence in the imperial policy on the part of all other Powers, and entire submission to the Teutonic will.

The second of the great schemes of William II. was the building up of a really effective and valuable colonial empire. He had none of Bismarck's indifference to overseas dominions; he wanted Germany's ascendancy in Europe to be matched by an equal supremacy in the other continents of the world. He regarded with extreme dissatisfaction the position and prospects of the dependencies seized by Germany in 1884 and the following years; they did not attract settlers; they provided no important markets; they did not pay their own expenses. He felt it to be monstrous that the Holy German Nation, with its pre-eminent virtue and its inimitable *Kultur*, should be debarred from successful colonial

Naturally it was foreseen that the Bagdad Railway would supplement the Syrian and Arabian railways in throwing troops in the direction of Egypt."—Quoted, *Daily Chronicle*, 15th January 1917.

activity merely by the fact that other and less progressive peoples had iniquitously taken previous possession of all the delectable parts of the world. The French Morocco, the Portuguese Angola, the British South-West Africa, the Belgian Congo, the Brazilian Republic—all these presented themselves as desirable fields of German enterprise. But to get any of them meant war or, at any rate, threat of war. Hence the need of still more armaments, in order that peace might be maintained without sacrifice of prosperity.

It was these colonial ambitions of the Kaiser, these demands of the great and growing expansionist party whose policy he expressed and enforced, that necessitated the inauguration of the third of his main schemes, viz. the creation of a powerful battle fleet. For the realisation of the German projects involved the throwing down of a challenge to every maritime Power in the world; and the maintenance of an overseas empire founded on spoliation implied the establishment of that "freedom of the sea" which is synonymous with exclusive German control. Hence the significance of the utterances of the emperor: "The trident must be in our hand" (1897); "Our future lies upon the water" (1898); "Germany is in bitter need of a strong fleet"—owing to the lack of which she was powerless to intervene in the South African War. Hence the still more sinister significance of the German Navy Laws of 1898 onward.

Not only, however, was the German navy needed to back up the new aggressive colonial policy ; it was also needed to support German commercial expansion which was being carried out in an aggressively militant spirit and by methods of acute tariff warfare. In 1879—as the result of a severe financial crisis, one of the unexpected fruits of the French war indemnity—Germany had commenced her system of high protection with all its fatal *sequelae* of over-production, under-selling, dumping of goods, and destruction of rivals. Its pursuit involved her in bitter struggles, and imposed upon her the necessity of constantly opening up new and exclusive markets.

But even beyond dominance in Europe, control of the East, colonial supremacy, command of the sea, and the monopoly of world-markets, the imperial megalomania extended even to the establishment of a general overlordship of the planet. Said the Kaiser at the launching of a battleship in 1900 : “The Ocean teaches us that on its waves and on its most distant shores no great decision can any longer be taken without Germany and without the German Emperor.”

§ 58. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

The activities of the Germans and the utterances of their emperor during the closing decade of the

nineteenth century not unnaturally caused considerable alarm throughout the world at large. The French were conscious of an incessant menace both on their eastern frontier (across which the Germans cast greedy eyes upon French coal and iron fields) and in their colonies; Russia became aware of an adverse influence constantly thwarting her in the Balkans, insidiously working in her own Baltic and Polish provinces, making things more difficult for her in the Far East; Britain was compelled to recognise that Kruger telegrams (1896), Navy Laws (1898), and Bagdad Railway projects indicated the rise of a new and deadly enemy to British peace and security in the world, and also that German commercial methods seriously threatened that trade ascendancy which Britain had established early in the century; the United States could not remain blind to the peril which lurked in the German penetration of Brazil,¹ or in the tariff war which the German Government was waging against American manufactures.

In 1888, the very year of William II.'s accession, France and Russia began to draw together. Russia was in need of money; she found it more difficult than it had formerly been to raise a loan in Berlin; the French financiers easily and willingly procured

¹ At the outbreak of the war 350,000 Germans occupied 8000 square miles of territory and formed the dominant element of the population of the three southern states of Brazil, viz. S. Catalina, Parana, and Rio Grande. See Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, p. 212.

for her 500,000,000 francs from the savings of their thrifty countrymen.¹ The rapprochement thus commenced was rendered more close by the exchange of naval courtesies: the French fleet visited Cronstadt in 1891; a Russian squadron returned the visit at Toulon two years later. In 1896 the Tzar Nicholas II. himself accepted an invitation to Paris; and when in 1897 the French President, M. Faure, went as the Tzar's honoured guest to Petrograd, no one was surprised to receive the formal announcement that a Franco-Russian Alliance had been concluded. The "nightmare coalition" against which Bismarck had so long and successfully struggled had actually come into existence. It was not, however, merely fear of Germany that had driven France and Russia together. At that date the two states were also drawn towards one another by common antagonism to Great Britain.

The position of Great Britain at the close of the nineteenth century was one of isolation, described by those who approved of it as "splendid," by others as "dangerous." In 1899 the Boer War broke out, and it revealed the fact that Britain had not a friend in the world. At one time, indeed—soon after the "Black Week" of British reverses at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso (December

¹ In 1887 a Franco-German frontier incident, relating to a certain French police commissioner named Schnaebelen, had threatened to give Germany an excuse to fall upon France. Alexander III. of Russia had intervened in the interests of peace, and thereby had gratified France and irritated Germany.

1899)—a Continental coalition against Britain seemed probable. It was the German hostility that was the most startling to the people of this country; for the supposed racial kinship of the two nations and the close connections of their courts had accustomed Anglo-Saxons to regard Germans as cousins bound to them by "relations of sympathy and friendship beyond all others."¹ But, however intimate past associations may have been, there could be no doubt respecting the energy of the German detestation of Britain in 1899. Said the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* in December of that year: "If the question were put in Berlin 'Which nation would you like best to chastise?' ninety-eight per cent of the residents in the capital would answer 'The English.'" Treitschke's successor, Professor Hans Delbrück, confirmed this statement the next year in the words: "The German nation, which once celebrated with delight the memory of the Alliance of Blücher and Wellington at Waterloo, has now directed its hate against England." The British were amazed at this novel and mysterious exhibition of antagonism. Many of them obstinately shut their eyes to its significance. The more perceptive, however, recognised the fact that Germany's new policy of oriental adventure, colonial acquisition, commercial aggrandisement, maritime expansion, and quest for world-dominion, had indeed generated a

¹ Lord Salisbury's Mansion House speech of 9th November 1899.

fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the ideals purposes and interests of the two Teutonic peoples.

The unfriendliness of Russia and France towards Britain were at that date taken more as a matter of course. As to Russia ; the friction of 1878 had been perpetuated by clashes of policy respecting Penjdeh (1885), Bulgaria (1886), the Pamirs (1891), and China, where the Russian occupation of Port Arthur in 1898 was a matter of grave dispute. Lord Salisbury continued the traditional Russophobe policy of Palmerston and Disraeli. As to France ; old-standing causes of dissension kept the two Channel Powers apart. Questions relating to New-foundland, Egypt, Tunis, Nigeria, Siam, Madagascar (annexed by France, 1896), and Fashoda (temporarily occupied by French troops, 1898) kept the governments of London and Paris in a constant condition of mutual irritation and opposition.

The critical situation of 1899 and 1900—*Britannia contra mundum*—warned the statesmen of this country that the day of safe isolation was past. The more prescient of them—first among whom must be placed King Edward VII. (who succeeded to the throne in 1901) and Lord Lansdowne (Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1900–1905)—realised that, whereas the new hostility of Germany to Britain was radical and irremovable, the old quarrels with France and Russia were mere anachronisms. Fortunately, in

both these countries eminent men were found who shared this view. In France M. Delcassé, soon after he accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in 1898, said: "I should be sorry to leave office before I had established a good understanding with England." Before German pressure compelled his resignation in 1905, a series of Anglo-French agreements had removed the main causes of friction, and had substituted the *Entente Cordiale*. In Russia, Baron Isvolsky heartily welcomed the approaches of Sir Edward Grey (Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1905-16), and, having settled with him troublesome questions relating to Thibet, Afghanistan, and Persia, he prepared the way for the completion of the *Triple Entente* in 1907.

§ 59. EXCURSIONS AND ALARMS

By 1907 the natural reaction against Germany's aggressive and menacing policy had manifested itself. The three Powers most directly threatened, viz. France Russia and Britain, had drawn together, not into any formal coalition to which Germany could legitimately object, but into a friendly association whose powerful existence Germany could not ignore. Germany, as a matter of fact, bitterly resented the formation of the *Triple Entente*. She realised that it tended to put a limit to her large designs, and she determined to do her best to break

it up. She was the less careful concerning the means which she employed to this end, because she knew that Russia was temporarily in no condition to go to war. Russia in 1904-5 had suffered a serious defeat at the hands of Japan, and this had been followed by a political upheaval within her own borders which had still further weakened her. Hence, even before the completion of the *Triple Entente*, so early as 1905 (within a month of the decisive Russian reverse at Mukden), the Kaiser had subjected both the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1896 and the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 to a crucial test by going to Tangier within the French sphere of influence in Morocco, ostentatiously neglecting to consult France about his visit before making it, and when in Tangier openly flouting French claims, treating the sultan as an independent potentate, and proclaiming his intention to protect German rights in Morocco against all comers. This challenge flung publicly in the face of France, with every possible accompaniment of insult, was followed up by a formal demand for an international convention to discuss *ab initio* the Moroccan situation. Hence the Algeiras Conference of 1906. This Conference disappointed the Kaiser. Britain supported France whole-heartedly; Russia did the same, and she, having now made peace with Japan, was no longer a negligible factor in western politics; Spain and Italy opposed the extreme German claims; even Austria

was so lukewarm in her support of her truculent ally as to bring down upon herself the Kaiser's anger, veiled in the form of thanks for her performance of the rôle of a "brilliant second" to Germany. The upshot was that, on the one hand, the predominant French interest in Morocco was recognised, and that, on the other hand (an incomparably more important thing), the strength of the bonds which linked Britain and Russia to France were experimentally demonstrated. The cordial co-operation of the three Powers at Algeciras prepared the way for that completion of the *Triple Entente* in 1907 which has already been noted.

The second German challenge to the friends of France came in 1909, this time in the form of a direct ultimatum to Russia. The subject-matter of the challenge related to concerns of vastly greater moment to Germany than those which had been at issue in 1905. They related to no less vital a question than the control of the Balkans and the opening of the Teutonic road to the East. In 1908 the Young Turk revolution—which cast out Abdul Hamid, and left his house empty swept and garnished, ready for the entry of seven spirits worse than himself—was followed swiftly by Bulgaria's declaration of complete independence, and Austria's formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The latter—a flagrant violation of the Treaty of Berlin, under which Austria had accepted the trust of administering

the two provinces on behalf of Turkey and the Powers—roused a storm of anger in Serbia (who saw herself forever cut off from her kindred Slavs in the neighbouring regions), and led to strong protests from Russia France and Britain. Serbia went so far as to threaten war. This necessitated an Austrian mobilisation, which in turn caused Russia to move troops towards the Austrian frontier. A serious clash seemed imminent. It was at this stage that Germany intervened with dramatic effect. She ranged herself by the side of Austria in “shining armour,” and informed Russia that any military movement on her part would bring the German armies down upon her. Since France and Britain were not prepared to join Russia in a general European war in defence of the Berlin settlement of 1878, Russia was constrained in deep humiliation to withdraw her support from Serbia, see the Southern Slavs subjected to crushing indignities, and look on impotently while the Central Empires reaped the fruits of their diplomatic triumph, and established their control over Young Turkey.

The great success of the Teutonic blow to Russia in 1909 encouraged the Kaiser to administer a similar chastisement and warning to Britain in 1911. Britain was at that time immersed in domestic controversies so acute that in Germany’s opinion they precluded her from taking any cognisance of happenings abroad. In those circumstances, on the pre-

tence that France was exceeding her mandate in Morocco, and that German interests were menaced, she sent a gunboat to Agadir, and manifested an evident intention of converting that Atlantic port into a German naval base. The threat to British trade routes — Mediterranean African and South American — was palpable. Not even the pacific ministry then in power could tolerate it. The British public temporarily composed its domestic differences and prepared to unite for the defence of its vital maritime interests. The unexpected vigour of the British response to the German challenge in 1911, combined with the firm stand made by the French in support of their rights as recognised at Algeciras, caused the departure of the gunboat from Agadir and the closing of the incident. The German navy was not yet in a condition to defy the combined navies of France and Britain. The face of Germany was saved by the transference to her, under the name of compensation for surrendered claims, of a large and valuable tract of the French Congo. In spite, however, of this unmerited acquisition, the Pan-Germans were furious at the withdrawal from Agadir.¹ Their wrath fell

¹ The Pan-German League was founded in 1891. Within the next twenty years it became the most powerful political organisation in Germany, having over 200 branches throughout the Empire. An early revelation of its large ambitions was given in an official publication, *Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950*, issued in 1895. This was supplemented in 1911 by *Deutschland und Weltmacht*, a massive volume of 850 pages. An enlightening statement of Pan-German aims is presented in O. R. Tannenberg's *Grossdeutschland die*

primarily on Britain, the superiority of whose naval power alone had prevented the final settlement with France from being made. The words of Treitschke, which long had been working in the German mind, now generated an intoxication: "We have reckoned with Austria and France; the reckoning with England has yet to come." The enigmatical toast, *Auf den Tag*, drunk with increasing frequency and fury, indicated the concentration of Teutonic hatred upon the unsuspecting and pacific Island Empire which blocked Germany's road to world-dominion. But though the *furor teutonicus* was vented in full flood upon Britain, neither France on the one side nor the German Government on the other side wholly escaped. There was intense resentment that the "second-rate power" of the Republic should successfully have resisted the imperial Colossus, and burning anger with the government that had subjected itself to such humiliation. "Public opinion," confidentially reported the French Military Attaché to his Chief in Paris, "public opinion has forgiven neither them nor us. People are determined that such a thing shall never happen again." The prospects of the maintenance of European peace were at the close of 1911 exceedingly remote.

Arbeit des 20ten Jahrhunderts (1911; new edition, 1916). From this it appears that the Pan-Germans claim (1) all lands inhabited by peoples of Germanic stock, e.g. Holland and Denmark; (2) all lands which have ever been Germanic, e.g. Switzerland; (3) all lands where Germans have settled, e.g. Brazil; (4) all regions that Germans want, e.g. the Universe.

Germany was in such a condition of war fever that scarcely a pretext, real or imaginary, was needed to cause her to run amok. The Kaiser, for his part, was constrained to see that to disappoint his Chauvinists a second time would be as much as his throne was worth.

§ 60. THE DRIFT TOWARDS WAR

Such evidence as is at present available seems to show that in 1911 the war party definitely gained the ascendant in Berlin, and that the emperor and the government recognised the impracticability of their any longer holding it in check. Before the end of the year there was published that classic exposition of the creed and that lurid revelation of the purposes of the German militarists, Bernhardt's *Germany and the Next War*, the very frenzy and wickedness of which blinded readers in other countries to the awful significance of the menace of the new Odinism. The beginning of 1912 saw the passage through the Reichstag of exceptional and sensational army and navy bills making such immense and unprecedented additions to the forces of the empire as alone were sufficient to suggest the imminent precipitation of war. The German government defended these measures on the ground that the events of the summer of 1911 had demonstrated their necessity. Another cause of anxiety, moreover, emphasising this

necessity and calling for further military watchfulness, had arisen in the autumn of the same year, when Italy—to the great embarrassment of Austria and Germany—had picked a quarrel with Turkey (that cherished protégé of the Central Empires ; that indispensable link with the East) and had taken possession of Tripoli. Further, before this unwelcome struggle between the two allies of Austria and Germany was concluded, another and still more disquieting conflict had begun, viz. the so-called First Balkan War (October 1912). As the result of one of the most brilliant diplomatic triumphs of modern times, a group of patriotic Balkan statesmen—notably M. Guéchoff of Bulgaria and M. Venezelos of Greece—had effected an alliance of the four Christian powers, Bulgaria Serbia Greece and Montenegro, against their ancient common enemy. The purpose of the alliance was primarily the deliverance of Macedonia and Thrace from Ottoman misgovernment. But there can be no doubt that behind this immediate and avowed aim lay the ulterior object of preventing any further increase in the threatening Austro-German control of the peninsula. The unexpectedly complete victory of the Balkan allies, the disgracefully entire collapse of the military organisation of the incompetent and corrupt Young Turks, seemed to forebode the establishment of a strong Christian federation in the Balkans, and, therefore, the total frustration of the

great Austro-German *Drang nach Osten*. It became, therefore, a matter of vital concern to the diplomatists of the two Kaisers to break up the Balkan league. Austria took the first step to this end by announcing that in no circumstances could she allow the Serbians to gain an outlet to the Adriatic, and that Serbia would consequently have to evacuate such parts of Albania as she had occupied. Serbia, thus deprived of one of the main objects of her entry into the war, viz. that access to the sea which was essential to her economic development, was compelled to ask Bulgaria for such a modification of the Macedonian partition on which they had agreed before the war as would give to the Serbs an outlet to the Aegean. This request King Ferdinand—acting, it is said, under Austrian influence, and with a definite promise of Austrian support in case of trouble—was injudicious enough to refuse. Thus the relations between Serbia and Bulgaria, to the great satisfaction of the Teutonic Powers, were restored once more to their normal condition of strain and antagonism. Russia, seeing with deep regret the threatened disruption of the Balkan union, endeavoured to intervene with offers of arbitration. The situation seemed to be saved: the Bulgarian cabinet accepted the Russian offer and prepared to send a representative to lay its case before the Tzar. Unhappily, however, the king and the militarists, incited by Austrian intrigue and confident of victory,

took the matter into their own hands and wrought the ruin of the common Balkan cause by making a sudden and treacherous attack upon the Serbian forces (June 29, 1913). It was one of the most lamentable and disastrous events of recent history. For the Bulgarians themselves it was immediately fatal. The Serbians defeated them; the Austrians failed them; the Rumanians intervened and attacked them; the Turks renewed the war and took from them the great prize of Adrianople. They were compelled in humiliation and disgust to accept the extremely hard and unfavourable terms of the Treaty of Bucarest (August 10, 1913). Serbia secured the whole of the disputed portion of Macedonia, and (by arrangement with Greece) gained access to the sea at Salonika.

The result of the Second Balkan War was a matter of profound disappointment and disgust to the Central Empires. It made their own intervention to destroy the Treaty of Bucarest inevitable. From the moment of its signature, there can now be no doubt, they resolved on war and merely hesitated respecting the time and pretext for its declaration. Signor Giolitti, the Italian statesman, has made the important disclosure that only three days after the conclusion of the Bucarest Treaty (August 1913), Austria sounded Italy as to her readiness to join the other members of the Triple Alliance in an attack on Serbia. Italy's reply that the Triple Alliance

was a defensive and not an aggressive one postponed the projected assault. It did not, however, in the least modify the purpose or change the policy of the Central Empires. The elimination of the Serbian barrier to Constantinople and Salonika had become the first requirement of their statecraft. The fact that active preparations for an early war had been for some time going on in Germany is proved by a most important secret *Memorandum on the Strengthening of the German Army* (dated Berlin, March 19, 1913), a copy of which was procured by the French military attaché in Berlin: it prescribes methods by which German public opinion can be educated to regard "an offensive war" as "a necessity in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries"; it urges the hampering of these adversaries by the stirring up of rebellions in Russia Egypt Tunis Algeria and Morocco; it contains the assurance that "neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French Chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending *Deutschtum* all the world over."¹ The Treaty of Bucarest concentrated the attention of the apostles of *Deutschtum* upon the Balkan Peninsula, and the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo on June 28, 1914, gave a convenient pretext for the precipitation of the long-projected conflict.

¹ French Yellow Book, Cd. 7860, p. 130.

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LECTURE X

THE CRISIS OF 1914-15

§ 61. THE SITUATION IN GERMANY

THAT Germany deliberately prepared for, organised, and precipitated the War of 1914 is no longer a matter of speculation or argument. If it was ever in doubt, all doubt has long since been submerged by cumulative evidence. Everything confirms the truth of the frank confessions made by Herr Maximilien Harden in his injudicious organ, *Die Zukunft*, in those early days of the War when German victory seemed secure. "Why not admit," said he, on August 1, 1914, "what is and must be the truth, namely, that between Vienna and Berlin everything was fully prepared? We should be mere slaves, unworthy of the men who achieved predominance in Germany, if fifty years after Königgrätz things could be otherwise." Again a little later: "Cease the pitiful attempts to excuse Germany's action. Not as weak-minded blunderers have

we undertaken the fearful risk of this war. We wanted it.”¹

The fact which Herr Harden so freely admits, or rather so triumphantly asserts, is indeed obvious. Germany in 1914 wanted a war, was spoiling for a war, was determined to have a war. Those various causes of dissatisfaction irritation and unrest which have already been indicated had all worked jointly and severally to the same end, and a war—which was confidently expected to be short and decisively victorious—was regarded as the only way of escape from international decline and domestic disaster.

First, in the sphere of foreign affairs it was clear that German diplomacy had reached the limits wherein success could be achieved by mere bluster and bluff—by the simple rattling of sabres, exhibition of shining armour, and shaking of mailed fists. Russia could not be expected to tolerate a repetition of the humiliation of 1909; France had made her last surrender in Morocco; Britain had taken a definite stand in refusing to allow the establishment of a German naval base at the flank of her Atlantic trade-routes. All three Powers, in alarm at German truculence and in apprehension of Germany's swelling armaments, were strengthening their defences and making the task of their aggressive enemy less

¹ *Die Zukunft*, quoted in *Daily Chronicle*, December 23, 1914. For similar sentiments uttered in November 1914, see quotation given in Chéradame's *Pan-German Plot* (English Translation), p. 9.

easy of accomplishment. Even Belgium—the violation of whose neutrality was threatened by the development of German strategic railways,¹ and openly projected in German military circles²—had begun to rearm her fortresses, and to call up her citizens for general military training. Germany saw that she must strike soon if she were to strike at all. If through hesitation or feebleness she were to fail to snatch the prize of world-dominion in 1914, it might for ever elude her grasp; for her prospective victims were alarmed, and were equipping themselves for resistance. The Serbian barrier to the East might become impenetrable if its Russian buttress were allowed to consolidate itself; the necessary destruction of France might be rendered too costly a process to be undertaken if the open Belgian frontier were protected by anything more substantial than a German treaty-guarantee. German diplomacy had, indeed, brought Germany to the point beyond which no step could be taken unless armed force should clear the path.

¹ "If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were conversations on military subjects between British and Belgian officers, he may find one reason in a fact well known to himself, namely, that Germany was establishing an elaborate net-work of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier, through a barren, thinly populated tract—railways deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium, such as was carried out in August last" (Sir Edward, now Viscount, Grey, in *Daily Chronicle*, January 27, 1915).

² Cf. *Secret Memorandum on the Strengthening of the German Army*, March 19, 1913, published in French Yellow Book, Cd. 7860, p. 133. H. S. Chamberlain in his virulent *Kriegsaufsätze* goes so far as to boast that "the whole of the present plan of campaign dates in its very details back to old Moltke," who died in 1891. Cf. *The Ravings of a Renegade*, p. 94.

A second cause leading to war was the colossal and no longer to be concealed failure of the German colonial empire. In spite of lavish paternal nourishment those wretched overseas dominions would not come to any good. German emigrants would not go to them; the natives would not continue to live and work for Germany in them; they could not be made to pay.¹ In order to cover the failure it was necessary to seize from the older colonising nations more attractive and more profitable regions. The French colonies were those immediately coveted. In January 1914 the Imperial Crown Prince, hoping to secure British connivance, is reported to have said (in one of those bursts of German confidence and candour that did so much to conserve in this country the belief in German innocence) to an English member of Parliament: "You could shut your eyes and let us take the French colonies first of all. We want them."² The fact that Germany wanted them was confirmed by the Imperial Chancellor in his conversation with Sir Edward Goschen on the eve of the War: he would give no assurances that Germany would not take them; he made the "infamous proposal" that Britain should stand aside and see France despoiled of her dependencies. It was, however, merely "first

¹ The Balance-Sheet for 1914-15 shows receipts 78,494,769 marks, against expenses 179,908,951 marks. See full Table, which indicates how receipts were supplemented by loans and imperial subventions, in Giordani, *The German Colonial Empire*, p. 150.

² Mr. Ian Malcolm, M.P., *War Pictures behind the Lines*, p. 2.

of all" that French property was desired. Already large schemes had been formulated for the acquisition of British dominions, beginning with South Africa.¹ With France and Britain overthrown, the work of plundering the rest of the world would give no trouble.

A third cause that tended to urge the German Government to plunge into war was the alarming growth of social democracy within the empire. In the election of January 1912 the social democrats secured 4,250,401 votes out of the aggregate of 12,198,337, and they were vehement in their demand for increased influence in State affairs, for a reformed franchise, and for improved economic conditions. The Government saw that it would be compelled to surrender its militant autocracy unless it could divert this formidable proletariat (enrolled as a conscript army) against foes other than itself.

The fourth and last main cause of Germany's decision to wage war in 1914 was that her financial industrial and commercial difficulties were such that conquest supplemented by indemnities seemed to be the best, if not the only way out of them. She urgently needed capital, which her provocative foreign policy made it increasingly hard for her to borrow: she needed fresh sources of mineral supply, and specially coveted the coal and iron of Belgium

¹ See *Parliamentary Papers*, Cd. 7874, and cf. Rose, *Origins of the War*, pp 190-194.

France and Luxemburg ; she needed new markets for her goods in place of those which, in retaliation for her own tariffs, were being closed to them. Said a shrewd American observer in 1913 : "There are many indications that the German rulers may eventually come to regard war as the sole solution of the life and death economic problems with which they are confronted." ¹

§ 62. GERMAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

We have just seen that four separate groups of causes—international colonial political economic—were all converging to precipitate a German war upon the world. We have also noted how Austria from 1913 lusted for a pretext to attack Serbia and recover her lost ascendancy in the Balkans. We know, too, that Turkey and Bulgaria both smarted under the humiliations and losses of their recent overthrow, and ardently desired recovery and revenge. In all these states of Central and Southern Europe the war-fever burned high. It was Germany, however, whose dominant will to fight determined the issue ; it was her careful calculations that decided that the summer of 1914 would be the time to strike ; it was her elaborate and comprehensive preparations that made victory (barring accidents) secure. The German preparations for the pro-

¹ Moreton Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, p. 225.

jected war of 1914 may be classified under four heads, viz. : (1) diplomatic ; (2) military and naval ; (3) financial ; and (4) moral and intellectual,—if those last terms can appropriately be applied to measures that were always immoral and generally unintelligent.

I. Germany's diplomatic preparations for the War of 1914 were markedly less complete and successful than had been Bismarck's preparations for the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870. The military clique who were organising the campaign seem to have been so confident in the ability of their vast and well-equipped armies to overcome all conceivable resistance that they were comparatively indifferent as to who were allies and who enemies. Not even was a serious effort made to ensure the support of Italy, the third member of the Triple Alliance itself. Turkey Bulgaria and Rumania were left to decide their course of action after the outbreak of hostilities. If any really careful cultivation took place it was applied to Switzerland and Belgium. The Kaiser visited Switzerland in the autumn of 1912 and made himself exceptionally amiable to the rulers of the Republic whose territories covered the southern extremity of the fortress-barrier of France. The King of the Belgians was invited to Berlin in the autumn of 1913, and every effort was made to impress him with the irresistible might of Germany, and to make him feel the folly of trying to thwart the German will. He

was treated to some most indiscreet confidences, as though he were already a secure ally of the Kaiser. Said Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff, to him : "This time we must settle the business [with France] once for all, and Your Majesty can have no idea of the irresistible enthusiasm which on that day will sweep over the whole German people."¹ It was, however, not to neutral countries like Switzerland and Belgium that Germany's main activities were directed ; but to the countries of her prospective enemies—to Russia, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Egypt, India, South Africa. The story of German treachery and intrigue, of German guile and corruption, which is being pieced together from evidence coming from these and other lands is one of the most amazing records of diabolical villainy and ingenuity that human history has to show. But it is a story as yet incomplete ; and to give even such details as are now known would lead us too far afield.

II. Military and naval preparation formed the foundation of Germany's hope of decisive victory. Her design was to fall suddenly and without warning upon an unsuspecting and unready quarry, and to overwhelm it speedily by mere mass of men and material. An Army Act of 1913 provided that the peace strength of the forces of the empire should be raised to 870,000 (from 700,000) and its war

¹ See also Headlam, *England, Germany, and Europe*, p. 13.

strength to 3,500,000 (from about 5,000,000). Austria simultaneously voted an extraordinary £28,000,000 to be expended on her army during the first six months of 1914. The manufacture and accumulation of war material kept pace with the increase in the numbers of men. One munition firm alone, the famous Krupp's of Essen, raised its staff of workmen from 60,000 to 124,000 during the two years 1911-13. With great secrecy were made and stored up new and unprecedentedly powerful guns, such as would convert the most mighty fortresses into deathtraps for their defenders. The construction of dreadnoughts and submarines was pushed forward under the inflated German Navy Act of 1912. For the first time 15-inch guns were put on the new battleships. The widening and deepening of the Kiel Canal was hurried on, so that by the middle of 1914 the largest war vessels could pass at will and in security backwards and forwards between the North Sea and the Baltic. Careful arrangements were made by means of secret German agents throughout the maritime countries of the world (including England Scotland and Ireland) for the provisioning and equipping of German cruisers and undersea-boats in time of war. Large stores of food and raw material were laid up, in view of probable interruption of supplies in the latter part of 1914.

III. The financial measures of the German Empire in 1913 gave the clearest of all possible indications of the Government's expectation of immediate war. In addition to the normal £42,000,000 required by the army, and the £22,000,000 demanded by the abnormal Navy Act of 1912, a special levy on capital, calculated to produce £52,000,000, was decreed for the spring of 1914—this extra, unprecedented, and not repeatable exaction to be expended on permanent works fortifications barracks and equipment. There can be little doubt that when this levy was announced the Prussian military party, which had now secured control of the Kaiser and established ascendancy over the civilian element in the administration, had exactly fixed the late summer of 1914 as the date for the bloody adventure—the date by which the loan would be collected, the army at its maximum, the navy at its strongest, the Kiel Canal completed, the harvest gathered, the mighty armaments prepared, all things ready; the date by which none of the slow-moving precautions of the menaced Powers would have matured. The belligerent intentions of the Government were not wholly veiled from the people. One careful observer has placed it on record that in the spring of 1914 "war was filling the thoughts of private citizens of the Central Powers," and that in particular the levy on capital had given rise to

the opinion that "war will come either this year or not at all."¹

IV. The training of public opinion was, in fact, the last and most remarkable means by which Germany prepared for her projected act of treason against the Commonwealth of Europe. The principles of her procedure are laid down in that *Army Memorandum* of March 19, 1913, from which already several quotations have been made: "We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries."² In accordance with these principles, the servile press, supplied with heady materials by the Pan-German propagandists, began to devote its energies to inciting the war-fever in the German proletariat; to rousing their fear of the Slav, to stirring their hate of the British, to deepening their contempt for the French, above all to exalting their conceit of themselves. War was eulogised as "the sublimest and most sacred expression of human action"; the German destiny to dominate the world was declared; the superiority of German *Kultur* to all others asserted; the

¹ *New Europe*, vol. ii. p. 247. See also accumulated evidence given in *Le Mensonge du 3 août 1914*, published by Payot of Paris.

² Cd. 7860, p. 131.

invincible might and universal right of the Holy German Nation proclaimed. Never before, outside Bedlam, had there been such a chorus of lyrical lunacy; never so mad an outburst of criminal megalomania.¹

§ 63. THE RESPONSE OF THE ENTENTE POWERS

The Entente Powers did not take the Teutonic menace seriously enough. The very excesses of its pretensions, the profundities of its absurdities, the magnitude of its blasphemous wickedness, blinded them to the appalling dangers which it portended. It was difficult to believe that a civilised state in the twentieth century should make claims so ridiculous, profess doctrines so immoral, contemplate actions so atrocious. Nevertheless, there were in all countries a few clear-sighted publicists who perceived the realities of the situation and tried to rouse their fellows to a consciousness of the imminent peril. In England, for example, Lord Roberts, with noble persistence and amid a storm of calumny and ridicule from politicians and press, warned Britain that against even her Germany was preparing war, and that, regardless of justice or humanity, "Germany would strike when Germany's hour had struck."

¹ Dr. Nippold's *Deutsche Chauvinismus* (Berlin, 1913), gives 110 damnatory extracts selected from "thousands of speeches and articles of a similar tenor." This ante-bellum apocalypse may be compared with its post-bellum counterpart revealed in Bang's *Hurrah and Hallelujah*!

Professor J. A. Cramb, who as a pupil of Treitschke knew the workings of the Pan-Teutonic mind, in a series of notable lectures on *Germany and England*, delivered in 1913, informed all such as were prepared to hear what the purposes of the robber-empire were. M. Paul Vergnet did the same for his own country in *France in Danger*, and he was reinforced by M. André Chéradame, who in a succession of books and articles made clear the meaning of the Austro-German *Drang nach Osten*. From America came the monitory revelations of Mr. R. C. Usher's *Pan-Germanism* (1913), and the deliberate and reasoned conclusion of Mr. Moreton Fullerton's *Problems of Power* (1913), that "Germany constitutes a danger to peace"; while the veteran and far-sighted Admiral Mahan added his weighty warning in the words: "When Germany sets out to build a navy, she is building that navy with a view to victory, not to defeat, and the victory desired is over the British navy. No German thinks of the German navy as existing for any other purpose, and any Englishman who cultivates doubt on the subject is merely shutting his eyes to the obvious truth."

In spite, however, of the evidence of facts and the admonitions of friends it was precisely to this "obvious truth" that the majority of Britons, and the whole body of their responsible rulers, shut their eyes. They persuaded themselves that friction with Germany was merely temporary, and due to specific

removable causes; they tried to conciliate Pan-Germanism by making concessions over such matters as the Bagdad Railway; they offered several small saucers of milk to the hungry tiger. So far were they from increasing the Army that they actually reduced it, and left it inadequately supplied with artillery, machine-guns, aircraft, and other essential materials. When Germany made her great spurt in ship construction they proposed to her a joint "naval holiday," and only when she had declined the guileless offer did they (amid a chorus of protest from their usual supporters) make the irreducible minimum of additions to the British fleet. France, with her bitter memory of German invasion and with her vulnerable land-frontier, was not so impervious to the sense of danger as was Britain. Her precautionary measures were less incomplete. As a reply to the prodigious increase in the German army made by the Act of May 1913, France in July of the same year lowered the age of military service from twenty-one to twenty, and extended the duration of the service from two to three years. Russia simultaneously raised the term of service throughout her empire from three to three-and-a-quarter years, and made efforts to improve her frontier defences.

In none of the Entente countries, however, were defensive measures carried through with one tithe of the energy and success with which offensive measures were completed by the Central empires.

This is to some extent explicable by the fact that it is much easier to conspire to perform a definite act at a prearranged time than it is to provide a general safeguard against suspected but unknown dangers. But the main causes of Entente lethargy were, first, that in each country a powerful group of pacifists and Germanophiles offered strenuous opposition to any and every increase of armaments ; secondly, that each of the three countries was passing through a crisis in domestic politics which gravely distracted its attention from the vital problem of national security. "When the full secret history of the present war comes to be written, it will be found that more than one of the civil disturbances that have taken place have been deliberately fostered by German gold." Such are the words of Lord Robert Cecil, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, uttered in a speech delivered at Croydon on September 9, 1915. Certain it is that with singular simultaneity serious internal upheavals threatened revolution or civil war in Russia, France, and even the usually constitutional and peaceful Britain. In Russia industrial troubles of the most aggravated and implacable type culminated in July 1914 in the proclamation of a general strike ; barricades were actually being thrown up in Petrograd, and street fighting was about to begin, when the diplomatic crisis which precipitated the war supervened. In France an embittered political conflict broke out as

the result of the nauseous Caillaux scandal; disclosures made in the Chambers (July 13, 1914) concerning the flagrant unreadiness of the French army for service led to strong suspicions and violent allegations of treachery; syndicalist opposition to the new Army Act and to the authority of the State generally portended a domestic crisis of the first magnitude. As to Britain: first, the controversy respecting the government of Ireland had reached an *impasse*, and passions had been roused to so high a pitch that German agents sent to Dublin to survey the situation reported to the German Embassy in London that civil war was certain, and that it would prevent Britain for some time from taking part in Continental affairs; secondly, labour conflicts, which for several years had been growing in gravity, were working up towards such a combined strike of railwaymen miners and transport operatives as seemed likely to paralyse the community; thirdly, the female suffragists were adding their far from negligible contribution to the prevailing lawlessness and crime. The outlook in the early months of 1914 was indeed dark for the Entente Powers. It therefore appeared to be uniquely favourable to the success of the long-planned and assiduously-prepared German attack.¹

¹ The conditions laid down by Bernhardi in 1911 seemed to be in existence in the middle of 1914:—

“When hostile states are weakened or hampered by affairs at home and abroad but its own warlike strength shows elements of superiority, it is im-

§ 64. THE SERAJEVO PRETEXT

Now that we know—though even yet not fully—what Germany was planning and doing in the course of the two years July 1912 to July 1914, it is curious to compare the facts with the assurances by means of which the political leaders of the Entente nations soothed themselves and their followers. In France and Russia there was, indeed, some, though still inadequate, appreciation of reality: but in Britain all was bland insouciance. "Our relations with the German Government at the moment are excellent," said the Secretary for Foreign Affairs on July 10, 1912. A fortnight later the Prime Minister added his guarantee to the same gratifying assurance: "Our relations with the great German Empire are at this moment, and I feel sure are likely to remain, relations of amity and goodwill." When on October 25 of that year Lord Roberts uttered at Manchester his solemn warning respecting Germany's preparations for war,¹ the President of the Board of Trade rebuked him and said that "he would tender his apologies to Germany for Lord Roberts' unjustifiable words towards a friendly power." In 1913 the Cobden

perative to use the favourable circumstances to promote its own political aims. The danger of war may be faced the more readily if there is good prospect that great results may be obtained with comparatively small sacrifices."

¹ *Lord Roberts' Message to the Nation*, Murray, 6d.

Club issued a pamphlet entitled "The German Panic,"¹ to which Lord Loreburn (till 1912 Lord Chancellor) contributed a preface which concluded with the prophetic dictum: "Time will show that Germans have no aggressive designs against us, nor we against them; and then foolish people will cease to talk of a future war between us which will never take place." The Postmaster-General on January 15, 1914, comforted the people with the message: "At this moment, happily, we are at amity with all the world; with Germany especially have our relations been vastly improved. We live at peace and goodwill with the Great Empire across the North Sea." So late as May 19, 1914, the President of the Board of Education, speaking at the Guild-hall, said: "In my lifetime the relations with Germany were never more cordial than they are to-day."²

It was precisely at the time when the President of the Board of Education was laying this flattering

¹ This pamphlet well repays reading at the present time in the light of recent events. It affords a priceless example of the disastrous errors into which the idealogue falls when he meddles with practical affairs.

² Only after the outbreak of the War was there, so far as I am aware, any ministerial confession of uneasiness. Mr. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking at Liverpool on September 21, 1914, said: "We have been made the subject in the last eight or nine years, just in the same way as France was before 1870, and Austria before 1866, and Denmark before 1864, of careful deliberate scientific military reconnaissance. Well, we knew all about it." Similarly, Lord Haldane, referring to the period when he was Minister for War, made on November 17, 1915, the confession: "I was painfully conscious that there was at least a chance of a terrible war, and I did all that in me lay to bring home that information not where it would simply lead to mischief, but to the minds of my colleagues and to those with whom I was working."

unction upon the souls of his auditors that the German preparations for war were reaching completion, and that the first steps were being taken to carry out the prearranged programme. In the following enumeration the dates are the significant things. In May 1914 German reservists were called up from the Far East ; in June from Natal.¹ In the same month also the German War Office prepared for "exceptionally grand manœuvres," involving the mobilisation of 500,000 men, to take place in August on the French frontier. It further began to provide beds and hospital stores on an extensive scale.² On June 14 orders were issued from Berlin to cruisers overseas informing them of the means by which they could procure supplies of coal in the event of war.³ On June 15 contracts were entered into with America for coaling cruisers at sea, in certain specified localities, during the ensuing August and September.⁴ Not yet had the Serajevo crime been committed, nor was any other pretext for war in sight. After the murder of the Archduke on June 28, however, the warlike activities of Germany redoubled in energy—though still carried out in profound secrecy, and beneath an ostentatious garb of peacefulness. Throughout July bills on London were drawn by German merchants for sums far in excess

¹ Professor H. M. Gwatkin in *Cambridge Review*, October 25, 1916.

² H. W. Wilson in *Nineteenth Century*, June 1917.

³ Rose, *The Origins of the War*, p. 143.

⁴ Gwatkin, *op. cit.*

of trade, such bills falling due after August 1; on July 13 the Stock Exchange was puzzled by heavy selling of Canadian-Pacific Railway shares in Berlin; and surprise was converted into "great commotion," as Sir Edward Holden tells us, when, on July 18, it became known that the Dresdner Bank was disposing of its securities and advising its clients to do the same.¹ On the same date (viz. July 15, 1914) the German ambassador at Constantinople, Baron von Wangenheim, confided to his Italian colleague the important information that Austria was about to present to Serbia a Note so worded as to render war inevitable.² The Note, as all the world knows, was presented to Serbia on July 23, accompanied by an ultimatum demanding unconditional acceptance within forty-eight hours. The intention of the Note, "to render war inevitable," was patent on its face.³ Sir Edward Grey rightly remarked to the Austrian ambassador, who laid a copy before him, that he had "never before seen one state address to another independent state a document of so formidable a character." In vain did Serbia offer acceptance of all the main terms, and agree to leave the question of the acceptance of the rest (which virtually made Serbia a vassal of Austria-Hungary)

¹ Sir Edward Holden, Chairman of the London City and Midland Bank, at Cannon Street Hotel, January 29, 1915.

² E. W. Hallifax in *Hibbert Journal*, April 1916, p. 497.

³ See *British Diplomatic Correspondence*, Cd. 7860, especially telegrams given pp. 14-15.

to the decision of the Hague Tribunal. In vain did Russia plead for an extension of the time limit, and for a softening of the severity of the Austrian demands. In vain did Sir Edward Grey urge the reference of the dispute to a European tribunal. Austria declared war against Serbia on July 28. The Central Empires were indeed out for war; Germany in particular showed a fixed determination that nothing should render her matured preparations null and void. Every move that promised peace was countered by an insuperable German obstruction.¹ On July 31—before actual hostilities had commenced, when even Austria seemed to pause on the verge of the abyss, and when hopes of a pacific solution of the crisis were renewed by the opening of direct communications respecting Serbia between Vienna and Petrograd—Germany, who alone blocked the path to peace, signified unmistakably her will to fight by a cipher message (intended to be secret) sent by wireless telegraphy to the great liner *Kronprinzessin Cecilie*, then in mid-Atlantic: "War has broken out with England France and Russia. Return to New York."² The message was a lie. War had not broken out on July 31 with any one of the three Powers. Nor need it have broken out

¹ The writer of that notable book *Le Mensonge du 3 août 1914* has collected masses of evidence to show that German mobilisation actually began on July 21, 1914, and that on August 1—before the French mobilisation had commenced—the first line German armies were fully ready for war.

² Gwatkin, *op. cit.*

EUROPE

at the outbreak of the Great War,
1914.

English Miles
0 50 100 200 300 400 500




Boundary of the German Empire

Prussian Territory since 1806

Austrian Empire

Boundary of Turkey in Europe



at all if Germany had desired peace. She did not, however, desire peace, and accordingly she forced war upon, first, Russia (August 1), secondly, France (August 3), thirdly, Great Britain (August 4).¹

§ 65. THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Aristotle has remarked that political crises spring apparently from trivial incidents, but really from great causes. From the international point of view the Serajevo crime was a trivial incident. True, it was a dastardly deed, viewed ethically, and one that rightly excited the intensest horror throughout the civilised world. True, also, that viewed politically it was an act of supreme folly; for the murdered archduke was the best friend the Slavs had in the Hapsburg Empire—so good a friend, indeed, as to give some plausibility to the suspicion that, though the hand of the slayer was Slavonic, the source of the crime

¹ The following extract from the *Australian Statesman*, published in Melbourne and Sydney, October 1, 1914, furnishes an instructive supplement to the facts noted in the text. "How thoroughly the Germans prepared for this war has been shown in many ways, and it is also becoming increasingly clear to what an extent their business men trading or having agencies in Australia were aware that this war was coming. The coal which has enabled the *Emden* to prey on British commerce was, there is reason to believe, obtained in Brisbane and Newcastle months ago, and sent away to an unknown destination, whence it could be used for the purpose of enabling the *Emden* to sink British ships. It may not be without significance, too, that all of the Sydney ironmongers were cleared out of small arms a little while before the outbreak of war. It is perhaps still more significant, as showing how well ostensibly peaceable firms knew what was coming, that many German accounts with Australia were for the first time allowed to fall into arrears towards the close of the first half of this year."

was Magyar. But internationally the incident had no significance, for even if it could have been proved (as it never has been) that the Serbian Government or its officials were accomplices in the assassination, diplomacy had in its hands the proper means of redress, and Serbia made no attempt to evade a judicial enquiry. It is needless, however, to labour the point ; for, as we have seen, long before the Serajevo outrage took place, the war had been planned by Germany for the latter half of 1914. Some pretext or other would have been discovered or concocted so soon as ever the Kiel Canal was completed (June 1914), the harvest gathered, the levy on capital collected, the coal supply for distant cruisers provided, reservists called in, the money market organised. Said the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, in one of those moments of frank revelation which were commoner in the early days of the conflict than they are now : "That the war must some day come has been present to our minds for many years, and for that reason we armed ourselves, and even in the year of anniversary, 1913, we made willing sacrifices to increase our strength."¹

But, though the Serajevo outrage was the pretext rather than the cause of the war, its selection showed a good deal of that clumsy and naïve cleverness which is the peculiar characteristic of German intrigue—a transparent innocence in villainy which

¹ Quoted in *Westminster Gazette*, August 11, 1915.

suggests comparisons with the methods of the primitive savage or the vicious child. The Germans were confident of the ability of the combined forces of the Central Empires to crush France and Russia in a single autumn campaign : they expected to be in Paris within three weeks of the outbreak of war, Petrograd within another six, and (leaving a good margin for accidents) to be back triumphant in the "dear Fatherland" in time for Christmas *Te Deums*. All that was necessary for the success of their scheme was that Britain should not intervene within the first few weeks of the campaign, and they thought it extremely unlikely that the pacific British Government (which was notoriously anxious for a good understanding with Germany, and averse from Continental entanglements) would at once throw itself into a struggle that seemed to concern Britain so little as did this sordid Balkan squabble. Hence Austria, with whom Britain was on excellent terms, was put forward as the protagonist in the war, and every effort was made to get the British ministry to accept the German view that the matter concerned Austria and Serbia alone, and that Austria was but undertaking to inflict punishment on a guilty and dangerous neighbour for an unusually atrocious crime.

The British Government, however, was not to be so easily deceived. It is true that it was blind to the significance of the Austro-German *Drang nach*

Osten,¹ and that it did not realise how prominent a place the actual conquest of Serbia occupied in the programme of the Central Empires. But it was fully aware that, however ostentatiously Austria might strut on the front of the stage, Germany was the prime mover of the whole tragic business, and that the Austrian threat to Serbia was in reality a German challenge to Russia, an ultimatum bidding her abandon her ancient claim to protect the interests of her kinsmen and fellow-Christians in the Balkan Peninsula, and to surrender for ever her own hope of gaining free access to the Mediterranean. It perceived, moreover, that the German challenge to Russia involved an immediate and mortal menace to France; because the Franco-Russian Alliance was such that any attack upon one of the two allied Powers would become a *casus belli* to the other, and in any war which Germany might wage against France and Russia simultaneously, the full weight of her first onslaught would almost certainly fall upon France. The British Government felt strongly—and made it quite clear to the German Government—that Britain could not possibly stand on one side and passively watch the destruction of France, or even the rape of her colonial possessions. The British Government, further—peace-loving and unsuspecting though it was—knew enough of German principles, German ambitions, and

¹ An Anglo-German treaty making large concessions to Germany in the matter of the Bagdad Railway was ready for signature when the war broke out,

German methods to be acutely conscious that if Britain were to hold aloof from this conflict, as France had held aloof from the Austro-Prussian conflict of 1866, her own Sedan would inevitably come in a very few years. A sure and sound instinct warned Britain that she had arrived, suddenly and unexpectedly, but quite unmistakably, at the crisis of her fate and that if she failed to aid her friends against the dastardly assailant, her own doom would be—and would justly be—sealed.

But even beyond the question of the destiny of the Empire, the British Ministry recognised that the future of the Commonwealth of Europe was at stake. Sir Edward Grey, to his everlasting honour and in splendid vindication of British policy, refused to allow for a moment that the fate of even the smallest and least reputable of European states was a matter of indifference to Europe as a whole. He repudiated the German contention that the penal subjugation of Serbia was a matter that concerned Austria alone, and he demanded that a conference of all the Powers, or of representative Powers, should be called to adjudicate the points at issue. He took from the first a European position, and urged the claims of Continental solidarity, concert, common action, judicial procedure, law, and peace. Germany, in repudiating her European citizenship and the reign of law, in persisting in her determination to plunge the Continent into war in pursuit of her own selfish

interests, in sending her ultimatum to Russia and so destroying the hope of a peaceful settlement of the Austro-Serbia dispute—in doing this Germany made the great betrayal of the cause of civilisation, and committed the unpardonable sin against humanity which (beyond even the offence against Serbia, the threat to France, and the menace to the British Empire) made British intervention against Germany an imperative duty. On Sunday, August 2, then, when the British Cabinet met to consider its course of action, it ought to have declared for war and ought at once to have given orders for the mobilisation and despatch of its expeditionary force. It did not do so, however, partly because of internal differences of view, partly because of uncertainty respecting the trend of parliamentary and public opinion. If Germany had been prudent she could probably have kept both Cabinet and country hesitating until intervention would have been too late.¹ Happily for the cause of Europe and the Allies, in her over-confidence and contempt, she committed the incredible folly as well as unspeakable crime of invading Belgium, in spite of her solemn and repeatedly reiterated pledge to maintain its neutrality. At length British intelligence was roused to some apprehension of the German peril. A second

¹ Cf. Chéradame, *Pan-German Plot*, p. 161: "If England had tarried, if she had tarried only for a few days, German landings in Normandy, Brittany, and as far as Bordeaux would have been effected," and in that case "English intervention would have proved futile."

opportunity of salvation was offered to the Cabinet on August 4, and this time it was not rejected.

§ 66. THE MEANING OF THE WAR

The violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany on August 4 was both a crime and an act of folly. It was a crime of the most brutal and blackguardly order—the attack of a strong power upon a weak one, an assault delivered without a pretence of provocation or just cause, an outrage involving the flagrant violation of solemn treaty-engagements, a felon blow inflicted upon a ward to whom protection and security had been guaranteed. It was more (and, from the German point of view, worse) than a crime: it was an act of suicidal folly. It made immediate British intervention practicable and indeed inevitable. Little as the people of the United Kingdom study history, and scanty as is their normal interest in foreign politics, it was impossible for them to remain blind to the dangers of a German occupation of Antwerp and Ostend, and equally impossible for them to continue indifferent to the doings of a power who openly flouted treaties as “scraps of paper,” and showed a ruthless disregard both of the principles of ethics and of the universal rules of the code of honour. If the Germans had not, with all their perverted learning, remained ignorant alike of the lessons of history and of the

fundamental facts of British psychology, they could not have perpetrated so fatal a stupidity as the invasion of Belgium. If they had stood on the defensive in the West and had launched their first grand attack against Russia (whom they professed to fear) British public opinion would certainly not have sanctioned any participation in the war. If, as an alternative, they had pursued the plan of campaign which they actually adopted, viz. the plan of defence in the East, and offence in the West, but had been content from Metz and Strasburg to attack the line of French fortresses (Belfort to Verdun), trusting to their superior forces and their mighty siege-guns for success, it is equally certain that British opinion would not have awakened to the meaning of the crisis until it was too late for British intervention to have modified the issue. As it happened, by some miracle of madness, they did precisely that deed of darkness which was necessary instantly to convert the loosely-knit Triple Entente into a rigid and invincible Triple Alliance pledged not to dissolve itself until the criminal aggressor should be defeated and punished.

The crime perpetrated against the helpless and inoffensive Belgian people, with its accompanying aggravations of treachery perfidy and brutality, and with its immediate sequel of sanguinary atrocity unparalleled in modern times, illuminated as by lightning-flash the political horizon, and made clear

the nature and magnitude of the menace to which Christian civilisation was exposed by this belated but most terrible outbreak of pagan barbarism. It was seen that the ogre of Prussian militarism threatened with destruction everything good for which Europe had been striving since the overthrow of Napoleon. First, the Commonwealth of Europe, the Concert of the Powers, the growing sense of solidarity and habit of joint action, the increasing recognition of general interests, the development of international institutions such as the Hague Tribunal—all were seen to be doomed to extinction should Germany emerge victorious from the war. Secondly, international law, laboriously formulated by a long line of jurists from the days of Grotius to our own—one of the most beneficent creations of modern times, and the indispensable foundation of any supra-national society that may ever be constructed in the future—this was perceived to be abrogated and utterly abolished if a single criminal state could defy it with impunity; could successfully refuse arbitration, repudiate treaties, violate oaths, ignore Geneva Conventions and Hague Declarations; could profitably profess a total disregard of all considerations except such as conduced to its own selfish advantage. Thirdly, the smaller states of Europe—such as Serbia and Montenegro, Holland and Belgium, Norway and Denmark—with their peculiar gifts, their cherished traditions, their

languages and institutions, their individual contributions to Western civilisation : the fate of these was clearly marked out as sealed, if the monstrous claims of the Pan-Germans should be established, if the arrogant *Kultur* of Deutschland should ever be in a position to impose its baleful incubus upon a subjugated world. Fourthly, the idea of nationality which throughout the nineteenth century had increasingly manifested itself as the vital principle of the stable and organic modern state : this active determinant would obviously be transmuted from a principle of permanence and peace into a principle of constant disaffection and unrest if Germany were to strengthen her hold over Alsatians Danes and Poles, if the Teuton-Magyar ascendancy were to be riveted more firmly than ever upon the many peoples of the Dual Monarchy, and if the unholy alliance of Kaiser and Sultan were to succeed in crushing beneath an overwhelming military coalition the nascent Balkan nations. Fifthly, democracy, with all that it implies of self-government, freedom from external compulsion, peaceful evolution, and civic progress — democracy itself was seen to have come at last to death-grips with its ancient enemy, militarism ; and the military defeat of Germany was recognised to be the essential preliminary to the emancipation of mankind from the menace of ambitious emperors and Junker megalomaniacs. Sixthly, the future development of

all the Entente Powers, together with that of every neutral state, was perceived to be in jeopardy should Germany achieve her purpose of overthrowing the balance of power and of establishing in its place her own world-dominion ; for with Germany dominant from Berlin to Bagdad, the British Empire in Africa and Asia must melt away, Russia must be placed in economic servitude to the rulers of the Dardanelles, France must be reduced to impotence, and every neutral state left to the mercy of invincible Teutonic tyranny. Finally, behind all material interests, profound moral issues were felt to be at stake. Just as Burke realised that the revolutionary war at the close of the eighteenth century was essentially a struggle against an "armed doctrine," so did the peoples of Europe instinctively recognise that their supreme endeavour must be to purge the Continent from the virus of the Teutonic theory of the State—from that diabolical perversion of all sound political thinking which proclaims that the State is power, that it is exempt from all moral restraints, that war is its normal activity, and that war must be waged with a ferocity that knows no mitigation of compassion.

Thus did the war of 1914 come as the natural—we must not, however, say inevitable—culmination of the two generations of European development which succeeded the disappointments and disillusionments of 1848-52. The failure of the democratic and

national movements in Germany and Austria-Hungary had committed the destinies of Central Europe into the hands of hopelessly reactionary forces. Round the despotisms of the two Kaisers gathered all the influences that conflicted with freedom self-government and progress. In 1914 these influences made their bid for complete and final victory. Never before had so great an issue been joined; perhaps never again will a war be waged in which so much is at stake.

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EPILOGUE

§ 67. THE OPENING OF THE CONFLICT

THE course of events has now been traced down to the outbreak of the German War in August 1914. Concerning the war itself little can here be said ; for at the time of writing the issue still remains in doubt, and many of the incidents of even the early part of the conflict are veiled in obscurity. This much, however, is clear : the German conspiracy in its original form was not successful. Unexpectedly it failed of the speedy triumph which its organisers had regarded as secure. The hidden cause of the failure has yet to be revealed. We can, it is true, discern some of the factors which contributed to the result : Leman's splendid defence of Liège ; the prompt entry of Britain, the magnificent quality of her small expeditionary force, the war-readiness of her fleet ; the heroism and fine fighting fury of the French ; the vigour of the Serbian resistance to Austria ; the unanticipated rapidity of the Russian mobilisation, and the embarrassing Russian in-

vasion of East Prussia. But beyond these objective obstacles to victory there was something else. There was some inexplicable collapse on the German side ; some break-down in the elaborate organisation ; some incompetence of leadership on the part of the Grand General Staff ; some failure of morale among the Teutonic hordes ; some paralysing consciousness of crime in those to whom honour was not wholly dead ; something, whatever it may have been, which at the critical moment shattered the German scheme. The mystery of the Marne is already the theme of keen controversy : it is probable that the present generation will search in vain for its complete unravelment.

Great and (from the military point of view) disgraceful, however, as was the German failure to capture Paris in September 1914—a failure which dislocated the whole Prussian programme—it must be recognised that the Grand General Staff made a remarkable recovery from its disappointment and disorganisation, and that with infinite resource and resolution it formulated fresh plans and carried them through with a formidable measure of success. During the autumn of 1914 the German hold over Belgium and the industrial North-East of France was firmly established ; in 1915 Poland Lithuania and the Baltic Provinces of Russia were overrun and occupied ; in 1916—most serious of all—Serbia and the Wallachian half of Rumania were brought

under the control of the Central Empires. It is true that in no single one of these cases was conquest quite so complete as it was hoped it would be;¹ nevertheless it was conquest on a scale so considerable as to provide, if it could be retained, a broad and adequate basis for Germany's future world-dominion. It removed from the path of German aggrandisement France Belgium Russia Serbia Montenegro and Rumania, either by crippling their resources, limiting their frontiers, or totally destroying their independence; it established the German Empire in undisputed control over her subject-allies Austria-Hungary Bulgaria and Turkey: above all it opened the Teutonic road to the East and provided a broad and unimpeded way by which *Deutschtum* could penetrate and dominate Anatolia Syria and Persia, and could prepare for the next steps in the Pan-German advance, viz. the destruction of the British power in Egypt and in India. After the successful Rumanian campaign of the autumn of 1916 it became the supreme purpose of the Government of Berlin to obtain a "German peace" which, at whatever temporary sacrifice in Belgium France Poland and Lithuania, should secure the one vitally important matter, the German ascendancy in the Near East. If this should be

¹ In 1914 Ypres Calais and Boulogne eluded the German grasp; in 1915 the tide of victory stopped short of Riga; in 1916 the Serbian and Rumanian armies escaped annihilation.

attained, Germany could rightly regard herself as victorious, in spite of all her reverses in other fields, all her miscalculations, all her sacrifices, all her colossal and sanguinary losses. She would gain a base from which every surrender could speedily be recovered, every expenditure recouped, every loss made good.

Surely in vain, however, is the snare set in the sight of any bird! The eyes of the allied nations have been opened to the magnitude and meaning of the German plot. The fact that the key to the whole situation lies in the Balkan Peninsula has at last, although late, become evident to the world. It is recognised that the idea of the Franco-British expedition to Gallipoli was an inspiration of genius, and that if only the attempt to realise it had been more adequately planned and executed the issue of the war might have been determined long ago. It is essential that the Turk shall be expelled from Europe, that the German hold over Bulgaria shall be relaxed, that Serbia Montenegro and Rumania shall be recovered and restored, that Russia shall secure a free outlet to the Mediterranean, that all the nationalities of South-Eastern Europe shall be emancipated. Any peace which should leave intact the dominance of the Central Empires over the Balkans and Asia Minor would be a certain precursor of further gigantic schemes of Germanic aggression, and a fruitful source of wars even more frightful than the one at present raging. This much, at least,

has become clear, as the awful struggle has developed and extended itself.

More than this, however, has become clear. To the historian, at any rate, the great war appears to be the culmination of all preceding events. To him it seems as though all the problems of all the ages had once more been opened and brought up for final settlement. Russia's struggle to secure an uninterrupted passage for her grainships through the Dardanelles carries him back through memories of countless conflicts of Ottomans Byzantines and Hellenes to those remote days when, on precisely the same issue, Hector and Achilles strove in heroic combat

“Far on the ringing plains of windy Troy.”

The clash of Turk and Briton in Syria and Mesopotamia, round Gaza and Bagdad and amid many other scenes famous in Scripture and romance, stands forth as but the latest manifestation of that immemorial antagonism between Europe and Asia, Occident and Orient, which is the very central thread of history. The swaying line of the eastern front where Russian and German wrestle with one another in mortal agony appears to be no other than the determination of that implacable rivalry in which Slav and Teuton have contended without break from prehistoric times for the rich plains watered by the Oder and the Vistula. Similarly the fierce incessant tumult

in the Western theatre of war comes but as the climax of that clamour for the revision of the Treaty of Verdun, and the repartition of the heritage of Charlemagne, which has embroiled France and Germany for a thousand years. But it is as the culmination of the great movements of the nineteenth century that the war especially impresses itself upon his perception.

§ 68. THE PROBLEM OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

As we have already remarked, the war was primarily caused by the determination of a single state to establish its ascendancy over the others, to destroy the Concert of Europe, to upset the Balance of Power. Now the dominant characteristic of the nineteenth century—as was pointed out at length in the Introduction to this course of Lectures—was precisely the growing consciousness of unity among first the governments and secondly the peoples of the Continent. The solidarity of Europe which was strikingly manifested in the Holy Alliance of the beginning of the period, was displayed in a still more impressive manner by the second Hague Conference held towards the end of the period (1907). The building of the Palace of Peace in the Scheveningen Avenue at The Hague (completed 1913), to be the seat of a permanent court of

arbitration and a base for the authoritative administration of international law, gave rise to the hope that a pacific commonwealth of peoples was gradually coming into existence. But the very foundation of that system of interpolitical equity which the Hague tribunal embodies is the principle of the independence and equality of states, irrespective of their size, power, culture, or mode of government. The modern *Jus Gentium*—developed largely through the labours of Dutch and Swiss publicists—is the charter of liberties to the small Powers, the code of abnegation to the great. How grave then the offence of Germany! It is the fundamental principle of the Commonwealth of Europe that she repudiates; it is the authority of the whole body of public law and international morality that she defies. That *enfant terrible* of the Fatherland, Maximilien Harden, frankly proclaims: “We are waging war for ourselves alone.”¹ It is because Germany has not got all the seaports she desires, all the coalmines markets and colonies she covets, that she plunges the world into war, without a pretence that she takes into consideration the interests of any nation but herself. Her actions, as well as the candid avowal of Herr Harden, are but the logical conclusion of that perverted theory of the State by means of which Treitschke and his disciples have poisoned the minds of the last two generations of their fellow-countrymen. The State

¹ *Die Zukunft*, quoted in *Daily Chronicle*, December 23, 1914.

is an end in itself ; it is unfettered by moral restraints ; it has no obligations to any but its own subjects ; its subjects have no duties save such as it sanctions ; its highest activity is war ; its normal relation to its fellow-states is one of hostility—these are the diabolical dogmas of nationality-gone-mad which have cut Germany off from the communion of her equals, have rendered futile the labours of the Hague potentiaries, have thrown Europe back into the welter of the later Middle Ages. Germany, in fact, is an anachronism, and her Treitschke is Macchiavelli reborn out of due season. The notions which inflate the mind and inflame the imagination of the Kaiser are exactly those which inspired Ferdinand of Aragon, Henry of England, Louis of France, and Cæsar Borgia some four hundred years ago. The unity which the Western kingdoms attained in the fifteenth century was attained—and that but imperfectly—by Germany only in the nineteenth ; and Germany is now displaying in a world to which she has come as a parvenu and an alien the obsolete principles, the untimely passions and the no-longer-tolerable wickednesses of the period of the Renaissance. The Hohenzollern dynasty, with its cult of the All-Highest War-Lord, is a monstrous survival of a mediæval autocracy ; its claim to sovereignty by right divine recalls the superstitious sacro-sanctities against which Marsilio of Padua protested in the distant days of Lewis the Bavarian ;

its predatory ambitions are such as were proper only to the princes of the lawless age which preceded the development of the modern state-system ; its methods of managing overseas dominions are the false and fatal methods of the "old-colonial" school of the early days of exploration and settlement—methods of oppression and exploitation long abandoned by all governments that have had experience in the administration of dependencies ; its manner of diplomacy is the brutal braggadocio combined with the faithless intrigue of the mediæval brigand-chief ; above all, its mode of waging war marks an awful and all-but-incredible return to the abominations and atrocities which prevailed (especially in Germany during the Thirty Years' War) before the mitigating influence of Grotius and his successors had begun to place some restraint upon the worst excesses of infuriated force. This war against the Hohenzollerns, then, is no ordinary conflict of interests. It is the struggle of the twentieth century against the sixteenth ; it is the life-or-death battle of the modern democracies against the last of the malevolent despots ; it is the effort to save from destruction the best products of the progressive human activities of the past four hundred years ; it is the supreme endeavour of the people of goodwill to restore the Balance of Power, reconstitute the Concert of Europe, and render possible the formation at no hopelessly remote date of an effective Commonwealth or Federation of Nations.

In such a fight no compromise is possible ; and amiable pacifists or weak sentimentalists who express a longing for peace without victory, and reconciliation without a decision, do not recognise the fact that this is a conflict between light and darkness, a war such as was waged in the primal dawn, a struggle which can know no truce or termination until the prince of the powers of the night, with all his evil host, is hurled

“ with hideous ruin and combustion down
To bottomless perdition.”

If the German conspiracy and revolt against the authority of Europe should succeed, nay, if it should so much as escape complete disaster, then indeed would the future be black ; for an inconclusive settlement could only mean the brief postponement to other and still more sanguinary battlefields of the uncompromisable issue whether in the common affairs of the Continent the lawless force of Germany or the forceful law of the Concert of Europe shall prevail.¹

¹ The issue *Germany versus Europe* was unmistakably joined in respect of the question of Belgian neutrality in August 1914. As Professor J. W. Allen well says : “ It was a question of European credit and of international law. The common interests of Europe imperatively demand adherence to international treaties. To allow that a state may, in pursuit of private ends, suddenly renounce a treaty to which it was a party with neutrals, at the very moment when that treaty becomes operative, would be definitely to abandon the assertion of European solidarity and to accept the German view of international relations. International law, through which the solidarity of Europe finds expression, depends on strict observance of treaties. Already we have reached a position in which the deliberate and unprovoked breach of treaties is a crime against Europe ” (Allen, *Germany and Europe*, p. 103).

§ 69. THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY

The self-regarding and consequence-damning nationalism of Germany, which precipitated this war and has been the cause of its worst horrors, shows clearly the perils of a patriotism that has become a monomania, and the menace of a national principle that has ceased to have respect for any claims or aspirations other than its own. Intoxicated with the easy victories of 1864-71, exalted by a sense of invincibility, obsessed by illusions respecting the superiority of her own *Kultur*, filled with contempt for the rest of the world, Germany deliberately set out to Teutonise mankind.¹ In her, amid the fumings and the foamings of the Pan-Germanic League, the spirit of nationality reached the limits of unreason: it became an arrogant racialism, an insatiable greed, a brutal militarism, an incessant provocative to war. It merited all the harsh things that Lord Acton ever said about it.² Nevertheless, in spite of the excesses of German nationalism, and in spite of the fact that in other countries besides Germany—notably in Ireland—the principle of nationality has been made the basis of monstrous

¹ Cf. H. S. Chamberlain, *Kriegsaufsätze*, No. IV.: "Although Germany is victorious in Europe, that is not an end to the struggle: the inhabitants of other continents are there. . . . What a glorious prospect for the future of humanity to be placed under the influence of Germany! . . . There will be no more important task than to enforce the German language on the world."

² Cf. Acton, *History of Freedom and Other Essays*: "On Nationality," 1862.

claims and disruptive conspiracies, it is the principle on which alone a stable New Europe can be established. The irrational egoisms of the *Alldeutscher Bund* or the *Sinn Fein League* are not of its essence. It is not necessarily a seeker after ascendancy, or an enemy of the human race. It can be a spirit of co-operation rather than a spirit of competition, a spirit of mutual help rather than one of mutual antagonism, comprehensive not exclusive. In this more amiable aspect it was conceived and depicted by Mazzini, its great apostle in the nineteenth century: "In principle," he said, "nationality ought to be to humanity that which division of labour is in a workshop, viz. the recognised symbol of association; the assertion of the individuality of a human group called by its geographical position, its traditions, and its language, to fulfil a special function in the European work of civilisation."¹

If on the one hand nationalism of the Germanic type means selfishness separation schism and solitude, which slowly fester into envy hatred malice and ultimately war; on the other hand cosmopolitanism means chaos and anarchy. There are differences among the groups into which the human race is divided that it is madness to attempt to ignore—differences of colour, physical develop-

¹ I quote this passage from Lipson, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 264. The idea constantly recurs in the writings of Mazzini. An interesting collection of the relevant paragraphs is given in Giuseppe Calabro, *La Dottrina Religiosa-Sociale nelle Opere di Mazzini*, pp. 193-234.

ment, language, religious ideas, moral standards, historical traditions, economic interests. Of these differences the deepest and most enduring are those which sort men out into nations.¹ The nation is the largest and most comprehensive group of which a man can be an effective member : it is as the active citizen of a national state that he can render his best service to humanity. The national state is the sphere within which the individual naturally seeks and finds the perfection of self-realisation and the fulness of life. The principle of nationality, which even in the fifteenth century was strong enough to dissolve the cosmopolitan *Respublica Christiana* of the Middle Ages, became in the course of the nineteenth century so dominantly powerful that it can no longer be repressed without disruptive consequences. Treaties that conflict with it will have to be revised ; empires whose existence is incompatible with it will have to be reorganised or swept away. No second settlement of Vienna is conceivable. For experience has shown that it is only national states—that is political organisms in which the sense of community is vitally and transcendently strong—that can successfully deal with the complex and difficult social economic and moral problems that to-day face all modern governments. The satisfaction of national

¹ The futility of the effort to substitute class-divisions for those based on nationality has been strikingly demonstrated by the impotence and disintegration of the cosmopolitan socialistic societies during the war.

desires, the formation of a polity coterminous with a people, is the indispensable preliminary to both peace and progress.

The present war—which significantly was engendered through Vienna, the European headquarters of anti-nationalism—is the last and most determined effort of the forces opposed to the national principle to set up perpetual barriers to its realisation. Austria-Hungary began the war in order to prevent the unification of the Southern Slavs; Germany egged her on and supported her in order that she at the same time might extend her dominance over Dutch Belgians Danes Swiss French Poles and other neighbouring peoples; Turkey came in in order that she might retain her hold over the subject Christian races of her neo-Byzantine empire; Bulgaria cast her lot on the side of the enemies of nationalism in order that she might establish herself in the position of “the Prussia of the Balkans.” The complete defeat of these allied antagonists of nationality—two of them composite tyrannies based on the oppression of subject peoples; two of them aggressive national states bent on the subordination of their neighbours—their complete defeat is necessary in order that a New Europe may be constructed wherein tranquillity and pacific progress may be possible. Germany must be brought to such a frame of mind or body that she will restore Alsace-Lorraine to the French, Schleswig to the Danes, Posen to the

Poles. In Austria-Hungary the Teuton-Magyar ascendancy must be brought to an end ; the Czechs of Bohemia must attain at least internal autonomy and external equality ; Poles Rumanians Serbs Ruthenes Croats must be allowed to reunite themselves to their respective kinsmen beyond the borders of the Dual Monarchy. The Turk must be cleared from Europe ; he must be condemned to lose Arabia and compelled with it to surrender his usurped headship of the Mohammedan world ; Armenia, the scene of his worst barbarities, must be delivered from his yoke and placed under Russian protection ; Anatolia, the natural home of the Asiatic nomad, must remain to him as the sole relic of his mediæval conquests ; Bulgaria must be reduced to her place of due equality among the Balkan powers. Only by means of some such radical reconstruction of Europe on a national basis can stability and security be looked for.

§ 70. THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY

As the great war drags on in its slow terrific course it becomes increasingly evident that it is a struggle not only between imperialism and nationality, between dominion based on conquest and polity developing from natural affinities, between states compounded by force and states springing organically from the soil of freedom ; but also a struggle between democracy and autocracy. This

aspect was obscured at first by the fact that Russia, one of the Entente Powers, was apparently the most autocratic of all the combatants engaged. Even at first, however, this appearance did not correspond with reality, and acute observers from the beginning proclaimed the fundamental democracy of Russia, in spite of its Tzardom and its bureaucracy. Said Professor Allen : "I see a great deal of democracy in Russia ; I do not see much of it in England. . . . Russia is probably the most democratic of all European countries. . . . At this moment it is not so much against Germany as against Germanism that Russia is fighting ; against Germanism not only in Europe, but in herself. For Russia this is a war of liberation—a war to set free the great soul of Russia."¹ Similarly, the very theme of M. Wesselitsky's notable book *Russia and Democracy* is that the essential genius of the Slavonic folk is democratic, and that all the gravest troubles in Muscovy during the past couple of hundred years have been due to the "German canker" of autocracy introduced by the successors of Peter the Great. "The sharp medicine of war," he concludes, "is rapidly and thoroughly curing Russia of the German virus which for two centuries has poisoned the organism of that Empire. The Russian democracy is at last coming to its own again."² The fact which even

¹ J. W. Allen, *Germany and Europe* (1914), pp. 111-112.

² Wesselitsky, *Russia and Democracy* (1915), p. 86.

in 1914-15 was evident to those who knew (though not evident to the multitude) is now, owing to the Revolution of March 1917, made patent to the world. Russia stands revealed as the country beyond all others wherein, through countless vicissitudes of central administration, have remained unchanged from time immemorial the spirit of local self-government and the organisation of the primitive autonomous village-community. Russia thus obviously falls into line with Britain France and Belgium as a champion of the democratic principle against the attack of the panoplied despots. The entry of the United States of America into the conflict, on the side of the Allies, further emphasises the growing prominence of the democratic issue. President Wilson, indeed, in the great speech to Congress in which he proclaimed to the world his reasons for casting off neutrality and taking up arms, laid prime stress upon the fact that at last had been joined the crucial struggle between militarist monarchs and industrial peoples—a struggle which the Transatlantic Republic could on no account allow to be decided in any way save one.

This battle between democracy and autocracy is, however, more than a duel between antagonistic ideas: it is also a severe test of practical efficiency. In the sphere of action, it must be admitted, democracy does not always display itself to advantage as compared with its rival. In our survey of the

history of the nineteenth century we have seen how time and again it has been its own worst enemy, and how by its own failures and follies it has brought upon itself discredit and destruction. The French Revolution perished of suicidal mania; the anarchic excesses of the Parisian demagogues of 1848 made the usurpation of the third Napoleon easy if not inevitable; the paralysing garrulity of the German democrats of the mid-nineteenth century, combined with their hopeless ineptitude and unpracticality, delivered the Fatherland, and with it the Continent, into the control of the sinister efficiency of Bismarck Moltke and Roon. Democracy, indeed, has the defects of its merits. If it makes for freedom and progress, it tends to do so at the expense of consistency and order. In place of the concentrated silent immediately-operative will of the despot or the bureaucrat it substitutes the indeterminate conflicting debating compromising vacillating procrastinating wills of a number of kaleidoscopic parties or groups. Over against the knowledge and experience of the expert it sets the ignorance and gaucherie of the man-in-the-street. It was, no doubt, the difficulty of informing, the danger of alarming, the fear of alienating the British democracy which caused the politicians of 1911-14 to conceal the truth respecting the German peril, and pretend that all was well; it was the bitter rivalries of the multitudinous French cliques, with the consequent

incessant changes of ministries, that resulted in such unreadiness and disorganisation in the French armies (to say nothing of still graver evils) as were so nearly fatal in the early days of the war ; it was the struggle between Liberals and Clericals in Belgium that in the end—by postponing until too late the introduction of universal military service, and by deferring until it could not be accomplished the refortifying of the frontier—left her naked to her enemies.

This war is destined to show whether democracy can learn from its past errors, can recover from its initial catastrophes, can organise efficiency out of chaos, and can snatch victory out of the jaws of defeat. The omens are good. Marvellous successes, indeed, have already been achieved. Fortunately, autocracy also has the defects of its qualities. Its mechanical perfection is devoid of vitality. In democracy and not in its foe is life and the promise of life.

§ 71. THE PROBLEM OF PERPETUAL PEACE

One reason why democracy is determined to gain decisive victory in this present conflict is that it is resolved for the future to hold in its own hands the issues of peace and war. It does not propose to allow either its own fate or the destiny of civilisation to be at the mercy of a dynastic faction, a militarist

clique, or a financial camarilla. This resolution does not mean, or in the smallest degree imply, either (*a*) that democracy is inherently less warlike than monarchy or aristocracy, or (*b*) that the present war would have been avoided if democratic control of foreign affairs had obtained in the belligerent countries. Neither of these propositions would be true. Human nature is the same in the democrat as in the tyrant or the oligarch, and the democrat will fight as readily as either of the other two, though probably not for the same causes. If it is a fact that from time to time unwilling and pacific peoples have been dragged or driven into war by bellicose governments, it is equally a fact that at other times cautious and reluctant governments (both autocratic and bureaucratic) have been forced into war by bellicose public opinion, or have with difficulty held back a populace less pacific than themselves. To mention only three examples within the period covered by these lectures, all coming from our own country: it was not a sceptred soloist or a select diplomatic concert-party that on the eve of the Russo-Turkish War sang the heady song which gave the name of "Jingo" to our language; it was not the British democracy, but a small group of highly placed diplomats (including Queen Victoria and Prince Albert) who, at the cost of great unpopularity, kept Britain from intervening on the wrong side in the American Civil War; it was not the ministry but the mob which "maficked"

in militant fury during the South African campaign. No: the theory that peoples are peaceful while governments are warlike is one of those baseless figments of the imagination, one of those hopeless illusions of the doctrinaire, which must be dismissed before the first step can be taken towards the rational discussion of the problem of a permanent peace. Never was this theory more false than in regard to the present war. In 1913 Mr. Moreton Fullerton gave it as his judgment that "the German government is pacific; but German opinion bellicose."¹ The terms "pacific" and "bellicose" are, of course, as here used, merely relative expressions; but there can be no doubt that the Kaiser's determination to fight was due in no small measure to the fact that the German nation as a whole was eager for war, and that resistance to its will would have imperilled the imperial throne itself. Never was William II. more entirely popular than he was at the beginning of August 1914; never had he more perfectly represented the sentiments of his subjects.

The causes which led the German nation to desire war in 1914 have been set forth in the preceding lectures. Suffice it here to repeat and to emphasise the fact that one of the main determinants was the firm conviction that for Germany at that date war

¹ Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, p. 227. Similarly p. 228: "In Germany not merely the Opposition but the Press have constantly reproached the Government for its pusillanimity."

would be synonymous with speedy and decisive victory. It was this universal belief in the military omnipotence of the Fatherland that made every German so eager to fight, in order to enjoy a share of the triumph and the plunder. In other words, one of the prime causes of the war was that dislocation of the European balance of power which resulted from the series of Prussian conquests in the years 1864-1871. The first essential, therefore, of the restoration of conditions in which permanent peace is possible is the re-establishment of that dislocated equilibrium.

Few political expressions have, during the period since the outbreak of the war, been the subject of more ignorant and unintelligent criticism than this expression, "the balance of power." The "poet Shaw" is said by the German Chancellor to have described it as "a hatching-oven for wars"; Mr. J. A. Hobson has spoken of it as "the core of diplomatic falsehood"; Mr. Arthur Ponsonby has characterised it as "part of the hideous nightmare of the past"; the Bishop of Hereford has condemned it as "a disgrace upon international politics." The utterance of all this nonsense might have been avoided if the speakers had taken the trouble to find out either what the balance of power is, or what it is not. It is not the rigid maintenance of the *status quo*: it is not the ruthless seizure of the *quid pro quo*; it is merely "such a disposition of

affairs that no Power can ever find itself in a position to enjoy undisputed predominance and to impose the law on others.”¹ Its general principle is that “there must be no single Power, or group of Powers, dominated by a single will, so strong as to be able to defy the rest of the world, and therefore to be tempted by the prospect of world-supremacy.”² Thus stated, it is axiomatic and elemental. Germany was in 1914—and is still—seeking precisely that position of predominance defined by Vattel; she is that Power which has defied the rest of the world, and has been tempted by the prospect of universal sovereignty. There can, therefore, be no peace on earth, and no prospect of peace, until Germany is utterly defeated and her dream of world-supremacy dispelled.

The second essential condition of a permanent peace is that Europe shall be reorganised on some such national lines as those which have been indicated in a preceding section: only so will the settlement which marks the close of this war have the elements of stability. This again involves the complete overthrow of Germany, and the disintegration of its subject-allies Austria-Hungary and Turkey.

The third essential condition of a permanent peace is that the economic necessities of all the national states shall be satisfied, and in particular

¹ Vattel, *Le Droit des Gens* (1758). Book iii. ch. iii. § 47.

² Professor Ramsay Muir in *New Europe*, No. 16 p. 66.

that such conventions shall be concluded as shall give to them that free access to the open sea which is vital to their material prosperity.¹

The fourth essential condition of a permanent peace is that some sort of International Government shall be established — legislative, executive, judiciary — capable of formulating a law of nations, capable of enforcing it, capable of punishing such states as violate it. On the possibility of constituting, not a League of Peace (for peace is not the highest interest of mankind), but a League of Law, depends the future of humanity.

§ 72. THE PROBLEM OF THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY

Both the difficulty of setting up an international authority, and the danger lest when it is set up it may do more harm than good, are amply displayed in the history of the period of the Congresses (1815–22). We have seen how this early nineteenth-century attempt at the organisation of Europe was vitiated and ruined by, first, the unsatisfactory nature of the Vienna settlement on which it was based; secondly, the failure of the diplomats to provide any constitutional means for the necessary periodical revision and modification of the treaties;

¹ This important matter is admirably treated by A. J. Toynbee, *Nationality and the War*, to which suggestive book the student is referred.

thirdly, the antagonism of the monarchs and ministers who formed the Concert of Europe to the democratic and national aspirations of the peoples whom they controlled ; and finally, the fatal determination of Metternich and his supporters to extend the sphere of their international government from the external relations of the states of the Continent to their domestic affairs. All this, now so clear, is full of warning and guidance for the present and the future.

The task of the present and the hope of the future consists in the formation of a confederacy of nations pledged to maintain public justice and to develop and enforce international law. Incidentally, but merely as a secondary result of its chief activities, such a confederacy will cause peace to prevail. Now, the first condition of the formation of such a confederacy appears to be the completion of the long process of the organisation of the Western World on the principle of nationality. Those persons who would disrupt the national state, who would disintegrate it into guilds and syndicates, who would rearrange mankind on the basis of class-distinctions, who would organise cosmopolitan fraternities and pronounce them superior in their claims to kin and country—such persons are among the worst obstacles to the formation of an international society. An international society can be formed only by the voluntary union of a number of free and equal national states.

Cosmopolitanism is the deadliest foe of internationalism : the landless man now as in the Middle Ages (though with a different connotation of the word "land") is an outlaw and an enemy ; patriotism is not a "vulgar vice," but the primary virtue of the good European.

But no free and independent national state—strong in patriotic sentiment and eager for self-realisation along its own lines—will join any confederacy or league if there is any prospect that its domestic concerns will be the subject of external interference. The second condition, then, of the organisation of an international government is the full and unqualified recognition of the principle which Castlereagh and Canning vehemently (though in their day vainly) urged against Metternich and Alexander I., viz. that in the internal affairs of a sovereign state no intervention whatsoever is allowable. The third condition is that in external affairs—that is in the mutual relation of state with state—the authority of the confederacy should be admitted, its limits exactly defined, its decisions within those limits irresistibly enforced by the whole united power of all the members. This means that international law, which hitherto has been a mere classified and annotated collection of ethical principles and prevalent customs, shall be converted into an operative code enforceable by sanctions. It also means that the Hague Tribunal (or some reconstituted

counterpart of it), which hitherto has been a mere fount of benevolent sentiment, shall be transmuted into an effective Areopagus.

The chief difficulty in the way of the organisation of an international society is now, as it has been during the past generation, and as it seems likely to be for some time to come, the attitude and behaviour of Germany. Among Germany's worst offences against Europe and humanity have been her violations of honour, her breaches of treaty-engagements, her repudiations of both law and morality, her use of barbarous methods of war which she in common with all civilised nations had bound herself to abandon, her shameless avowal that her own immediate interests are the sole guide of her conduct and that, for her, necessity knows no restraint. The early successes of Germany in the war are to no small extent due to her flagrant treachery. Her solemn pledge to protect Belgium; her solemn pledge not to employ poison gas; her solemn pledge to observe the recognised rules of maritime warfare—pledges all of them wantonly broken—gave her an immense advantage over honourable opponents who placed trust in German honour. Until Germany has repented in dust and ashes for her perfidy and villainy, until she has made restitution to her victims, until she has given adequate guarantees for future decency, she can never be admitted as a member of any League of Law. As well might Judas unrepentant

seek to recover membership of the apostolic band. No League of Law, indeed, can be established until this arch-anarchist is defeated, and compelled to make reparation for her unspeakable crimes. When this necessary vindication of justice is accomplished, the rest will not be hard. For the League of Law is already coming into existence as the world gradually ranges itself on the side of the Triple Entente against the criminal Germanic group. The entry of America into the war is the event of decisive importance. It assures ultimate victory to the forces of the light, and it places permanently at the disposal of the international authorities of the future powers so vast that no criminal state or group of states will be able to defy them. The best hope of the future rests in the cementing, and the perpetuating for the purpose of the maintenance of public law, of the Great Alliance, which is at the present moment, at awful cost of blood and treasure, rescuing civilisation from the destroyer.

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